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ABSTRACT 
This project investigates the uses and effects of scenario planning in companies operating in 
highly uncertain and dynamic environments.  Whereas previous research on scenario planning 
has fallen short of providing sufficient evidence of its mechanisms and effects on individual 
or organizational level variables, this research corrects this void by investigating the dynamics 
of organizational learning through the lenses of a corporate scenario planning process. This 
enhances our scientific understanding of the role that scenario planning might play in the 
context of organizational learning and strategic renewal. Empirical evidence of the various 
difficulties that learning flows has to overcome as it journeys through organizational and 
hierarchical levels are presented. Despite various cognitive and social psychological barriers 
identified along the way, the results show the novel and counterintuitive ways in which an 
organization uses scenario planning in balancing the tension between exploration and 
exploitation. Moreover, this research proposes two novel mechanisms designed to enhance 
learning flows. At the core of this dissertation are four papers which in combination solidify 
our theoretical understanding of scenario planning while simultaneously presenting a more 
nuanced account of the individual behaviors and social dynamics underpinning organizational 
learning.  
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ABSTRACT 
Dette projekt undersøger brugen og effekterne af scenarie planlægning i virksomheder der 
operer i usikre og dynamiske omgivelser. Eksisterende forskning i scenarie planlægning har 
ikke i tilstrækkelig grad frembragt empirisk belæg for de forskellige mekanismer og effekter 
der gør sig gældende på individuelt og organisatorisk niveau. Denne afhandling udfylder dette 
tomrum ved at undersøge dynamikkerne i organisatorisk læring set fra et scenarie-
planlægningsperspektiv. Dette styrker vores videnskabelig forståelse af den rolle som scenarie 
planlægning kan spille i forhold til organisatorisk lærings- og strategiske fornyelsesprocesser. 
Afhandlingen præsenterer empirisk data som dokumenterer de vanskeligheder der kan opstå 
når ny viden bevæger sig igennem forskellige organisatoriske og hierarkiske lag. På trods af 
kognitive og socialpsykologiske barrierer viser afhandlingen nye og overraskende måder 
hvorpå organisationer kan bruge scenarie planlægning til at balancerer spændingen mellem 
exploration og exploitation. Ydermere præsenteres to nye teknikker designet til at forbedre 
læringsprocesser. Afhandling er bygget op af fire artikler der samlet set både konsoliderer 
vores teoretiske forståelse af scenarie planlægning og præsenterer et nuanceret billede af den 
individuelle adfærd og de sociale dynamikker der udgør grundlaget for organisatorisk læring. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research motivation 
This project was motivated by Novozyme’s (business partner for this Industrial PhD project) 
desire to look into its scenario planning process and ways to improve it. Anchored by this 
organizational process, I had the exceptional opportunity to have, for three years, full access 
to the insights of a world leading corporation and observe the actors, processes and decisions 
involved on its scenario process leading into strategy. Consequently, I was in a unique 
position to provide evidence about the individual and organizational effects of scenario 
planning as the process unfolds and evolves over time.  
A limitation on the scenario planning literature is the predominance of self-reported 
and often biased accounts of scenario planning practitioners and their interventions 
(Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Rather than providing empirical evidence of the prescribed 
individual and organizational outcomes (Chermack and Nimon, 2008; Glick, Chermack, 
Luckel, and Gauck, 2012; Harries, 2003; Hodgkinson, Maule, Bown, Pearman, and Glaister, 
2002; O’Keefe and Wright, 2010) the scenario planning literature has focused on legitimizing 
and justifying scenario planning as a managerial tool (Chermack, Lynham, and Ruona, 2001; 
Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Consequently, an unbiased and methodologically rigorous 
research of scenario planning with focus on its dynamics and outcomes has the potential to 
become an important contribution to management practitioners and academics alike. 
Moreover, the scenario planning literature is also hindered by a lack of theoretical 
grounding and understanding of causal relationships  (Chermack, 2005; Harries, 2003; 
Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Improved individual and organizational learning, counter of 
individual cognitive biases, better decision making, or to sustain organizational ambidexterity 
are some of the intended benefits of scenario planning (Bodwell and Chermack, 2010; 
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Chermack, 2004; van der Heijden, 2004, 2005; van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, and 
Wright, 2002; Schoemaker, 1993, 1995; Schwartz, 1991; Wack, 1985; Wright, 2005). 
Surprisingly, the literature has leveraged very little from the more consolidated research 
streams that is speaks to – e.g. organizational learning, human cognition or ambidexterity. 
Consequently, this research makes a point on leveraging and interacting with these more 
established research streams in an effort to blend knowledge and strengthen the theoretical 
basis in the scenario planning literature. Similarly, the theoretical ideas and empirical results 
presented throughout this dissertation contribute in different ways to the organizational 
learning and ambidexterity literature.    
Theoretical foundation  
The four papers included in this dissertation are self-contained and intended as potential 
journal articles. Therefore, the papers contain sections such as theoretical background, 
methodology, research questions and so forth. Consequently, I will not bore the reader with 
theoretical and methodological concepts already discussed in each paper. Instead this section 
defines the overall research question for this PhD project, and provides an overarching 
theoretical framing that binds the four papers together.      
The starting point is the scenario planning literature. Given my professional 
background (e.g. as opposed to academic background) and little ex ante knowledge of this 
literature, deep, methodological review of this literature was necessary. This occupied a large 
part of my first year in this project. After a while I became well acquainted with this literature 
and was able to identify various areas where our understanding was limited. It daunted on me 
the disconnection between the intended benefits of scenario planning (e.g. organizational 
learning or individual cognition) and the little it leveraged from these streams. For instance, 
most models of organizational learning (for a review see Flores, Zheng, Rau, and Thomas, 
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2012) depict the phenomenon as a multilevel process starting at the individual and 
culminating at the organizational level.  Further, there are several potential blockers and 
barriers that might restrict the flow of learning into the organizational level (Crossan, Maurer, 
and White, 2011; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, and Kleysen, 2005; Schilling and Kluge, 2009). 
The scenario planning normatively says it improves organizational learning, without 
addressing how exactly the learning from scenario planning moves from the individual into 
the organization, or how it overcomes the potential barriers to organizational learning at 
various levels of analysis. Similarly, much of the scenario planning literature uses externally 
driven stand-alone interventions (e.g. workshops for scenario construction) as mechanism to 
create change. Conceptually, these single interventions resemble what change and 
intervention theory calls episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1999). Interestingly, the scenario 
literature ignores some key features of the episodic change literature. Namely, it is doubtful 
that episodic interventions can achieve lasting effects and relapse to previous patterns – e.g. 
before intervention - is likely (Weick and Quinn, 1999) thus having limited effect on 
organizational outcomes.  
Another good example of the inconsistencies of the scenario planning literature is the 
role the scenarios themselves - a core construct in this literature. Scenario are said to be good 
devices in changing individual mental frames via the introduction of uncertainties, which in 
turn reduces individual cognitive biases such as overconfidence in estimates or anchoring in 
strategies (Schoemaker 1993). However, there is also evidence that scenario-like 
presentations introduce the same biases – e.g. overconfidence or anchoring (e.g. Sedor, 2002). 
Consequently, the empirical evidence does not support, or at least warrants further research 
on the effects of scenarios over individual cognition and mental frames. 
In sum, I was struck by the normativity of the scenario literature and the lack of 
evidence to support its claims. It was evident that in order to make an academic contribution 
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to the scenario planning literature and to the fields that this literature speaks to (e.g. 
organizational learning, individual and social cognition, strategic management) I had to get a 
basic understanding of the literature in these fields, and blend such knowledge.  
It is only so much one can do in a three year project in terms of acquiring a deep 
understanding of different research streams. Consequently, I focused on the organizational 
learning literature and so it became one of the core pillars supporting the theoretical 
background of this research. Specifically, I wanted to understand what this literature had to 
say about the processes and mechanisms that might facilitate the movement of learning from 
the individual into the organization at large. I concentrated in the work of Crossan and 
colleagues (Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999) because its beauty simplicity in depicting the 
rather complex concept of organizational learning. Specifically, their 4I learning framework is 
supported by 4 key premises: (1) organizational learning is a multilevel process; (2) learning 
moves between levels via 4 sub-processes (the 4I’s); (3) it interacts between cognition and 
action, and (4) it acknowledges the tension between the assimilation of new learning 
(exploration) and using what has been previously learned (exploitation). In 2009, the work of 
Crossan and colleagues received the prestigious AMR (Academy of Management Review) 
“Decade Award” for most cited AMR article in the last 10 years. This is a statement of the 
impact on the field of this 4I framework for organizational learning. As important, it became a 
foundation for further research on organizational learning as the original 4I framework has 
received various extensions and empirical studies (Berends and Lammers, 2010; Crossan and 
Berdrow, 2003; Holmqvist, 2004; Lawrence et al., 2005; Schilling and Kluge, 2009; Vera and 
Crossan, 2004). However, there are still several pressing areas in need of further research 
(Crossan, Maurer, and White, 2011); for instance in relation to potential learning barriers that 
might restrict the flow of learning across the 4I processes, or to meaningfully integrate 
various barriers of learning in a framework to organizational learning (Crossan et al., 2011).  
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To be certain, the literature links scenario planning and organizational learning 
(Schoemaker 1995; Schwartz 1991; van der Heijden 2004; van der Heijden et al., 2002). The 
selection of the 4I model of organizational learning as core theoretical framework for this 
project is explained by its importance to the field, its simplicity in portraying a complex 
process, and the various areas still in need of exploration that can be supported by this 
framework. Specifically, because of my unique position - being embedded in the social 
setting where organizational learning occurs - I saw the potential of this project to not only 
contribute to the scenario planning literature, but also to the organizational learning literature 
in regards to two underdeveloped areas: better understanding of the learning flow along the 4 
processes, and the potential barriers to this flow.  
The work of Crossan and colleagues is highly influenced by March’s (1991) paper on 
the tension between exploration and exploitation. March’s work also set the basis for 
academic interest in organizational ambidexterity, or the balance between exploration and 
exploitation as cornerstone for long run success in organizations (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 
2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). March’s work convincingly represented the various 
contradictory goals of combined exploration and exploitation in organizations. Crossan and 
colleagues (1999) integrated these ideas into a coherent framework for organizational 
learning. The ambidexterity literature provides some clues into the potential mechanisms that 
make some companies better than others in overcoming these contradictions. Consequently, 
and partially because of my practical background, I was also attracted to the ambidexterity 
literature. Scenario planning and ambidexterity have also been linked before (Bodwell and 
Chermack, 2010). Coincidentally, I had unlimited access to an ambidextrous and very 
successful organization. Novozymes has a long history of success, it is a worldwide market 
leader in its field and has innovation (exploration) and efficiency (exploitation) as core 
elements in its strategy (Novozymes A/S, 2013). According to Sarkees and Hulland (2009), 
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revenue, profits, product innovation and customer satisfaction are four dimensions of 
performance characteristic of ambidextrous organizational. Novozymes excels at all these 
metrics (refer to paper 3 in this dissertation: Managing ambidexterity: An analysis of the 
design, actors and decisions at a market leading bio-tech firm, pg 9). Naturally, I leveraged 
this opportunity and set to investigate an area in ambidexterity research which needs further 
clarification; namely, the actors, decisions and mechanisms that make ambidexterity work in 
organizations (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Eisenhardt, Furr, and Bingham, 2010; O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2013; Rogan and Mors, 2014). Consequently, the ambidexterity literature is 
another research area supporting this project. 
Lastly, I wanted this research to capture the essence of doing an industrial PhD; that 
is, to bridge academia with management practice. To do so, this research had to be rooted in 
realistic assumptions and observations of the individuals interacting in the social context of an 
organization. For instance, a limitation of organizational learning models is the assumption of 
an unremitting progression in the learning flows from the individual to the organizational 
level thus portraying organizational leaning as easily implemented and leading to positive 
organizational results (Berthoin-Antal, Lenhardt, and Rosenbrock, 2003; Crossan and 
Berdrow, 2003). As noted by Crossan and Berdrow, (2003), “organizational learning often 
remains a black box as researchers presume that positive transformation can and will happen” 
(p.1089). Clearly, this is not how things happen inside an organization.  
The same criticism is true for the scenario planning literature which, saving few 
exceptions, leaves important human and social interaction elements such as cognitive biases, 
effects of social settings, or individual and group emotions out of the analysis (Hodgkinson 
and Wright, 2002; MacKay and McKiernan, 2010; O’Keefe and Wright, 2010). 
Consequently, I became acquainted with literature pointing to human cognitive biases and 
heuristics (e.g. Dorner and Schaub, 1994; Hogarth, 1987; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 
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1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), individual and social emotions (e.g. Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2011; Huy, 2011; Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi, 2009) and social contexts 
pertaining for instance to social identity, inclination for consensus building, or political 
considerations (e.g. Coopey and Burgoyne, 2000; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Fiske and 
Taylor, 1984; Fox, 2000; Turner and Oakes, 1986). Having spent more than 10 years inside 
organizations as a practitioner, I could easily relate to the ideas put forward in these literature 
streams. Emotions, personal considerations, political games and so on are part of the daily 
operations of an organization, and academic research in strategic management abstracting 
from these facts is not in tune with reality. Most of the before mentioned literature streams are 
integrated under the umbrella of behavioral strategy (Powell, Lovallo, and Fox, 2011) and 
thus it becomes another central block in this research.  
In sum, the literatures of scenario planning, organizational learning, ambidexterity 
and behavioral strategy provide the theoretical framework for this research. The fundamental 
research question driving this project is: What are the effects of scenario planning on 
organizational learning in companies operating in highly dynamic environments? The position 
of the author is that scenario planning research has done a poor job in explaining its basic 
processes, mechanisms and outcomes. Furthermore, the evidence the literature presents is 
largely aloof to the reality and complexity of social behaviors and organizational 
environments. Consequently, this project proposes that whether scenario planning in 
organizations might seek exploratory learning, a combination of poorly designed processes 
and a variety of learning barriers at various levels renders organizational outcomes that have 
little to do with exploration.  
This research question and thesis proposition are investigated along four papers. 
Each paper addresses at least one of the four core literature stream supporting this research, as 
it can be seen on Figure 1 
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Figure 1 
Thesis structure and theoretical foundations 
Thesis structure and contribution  
The first paper: “Scenario Planning as organizational intervention. Integrative review, 
current debates, and future directions”, is directed for the most part to the literature in 
scenario planning. Given my limited knowledge in this literature, I had to read a lot of 
material. As I started gradually to understand the literature, various unanswered questions 
surfaced. Chiefly, there was a lack of a generalizable theoretical framework and basic 
understanding of the central mechanisms and relationships behind scenario planning. This 
Organizational
learning 
Organizational 
ambidexterity
Behavioral 
Strategy
Scenario 
planning 
P1
P4
P3
P2
P1: Paper 1: Scenario planning as organizational intervention. Integrative review, current debates, and future directions
P2: Paper 2: Organizational learning through scenario planning
P3: Paper 3: Managing ambidexterity: An analysis of the design, actors and decisions at a market leading bio-tech firm
P4: Paper 4: Overcoming barriers to organizational learning: Integrating behavioral strategy into the 4I organizational learning framework
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first paper provides the literature with such coherent framework and basic understanding of 
the potential relationships present in scenario planning. It is a systematic review of the 
literature which collapses it into an integrative framework. Most importantly, it highlights 
areas in need for further research and iteratively makes connections to more established 
literatures with the intention to highlight inconsistencies in the scenario planning literature as 
well as potential ways to address the identified gaps and inconsistencies. The aim is at setting 
the foundations for future theoretical and empirical work in scenario planning. Thus it 
addresses calls in this literature for strengthening its theoretical foundation (e.g. Burt and 
Chermack, 2008; Chermack, 2005; Harries, 2003; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008).  
The proposed integrative framework includes process and outcome variables as well 
as antecedents (2), moderators (5) and mediator (1), which is novel in this literature. Four 
research areas were identified in particular need of further theoretical or empirical 
investigation: (1) efficiency of scenarios as cognitive devices – e.g. do they eliminate or rather 
generate bias? (2) analysis of the influences of the organizational and social context on 
scenario planning; (3) better understanding of various dimensions around the scenario 
planning team such as its composition, purpose and positioning within the organizational 
structure; and (4) research with focus on understanding the mechanisms that make learning 
from scenario planning transcends the individual level into organizational level outcomes. 
Some of these underdeveloped research areas are indeed investigated in the next three papers 
included in this dissertation.  
Paper 2: “Organizational learning through scenario planning” is an empirical piece 
written in collaboration with professors Bo Nielsen and Megan Woods. It integrates the 
scenario planning and organizational learning literatures by conceptualizing scenario planning 
as a learning system. We use the extended case method (Burawoy, 1998) to explore the 
dynamics of organizational learning in the context of the scenario planning process used at 
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Novozymes. The focus is on the mechanisms that might enhance or restrict the flow of 
learning generated from the scenario planning. Using the 4I framework for organizational 
learning (Crossan et al., 1999) this longitudinal case study follows the learning generated by 
this process as it traverses different levels both organizationally (from the individual to the 
organization) and hierarchically (form analysts to senior executives). We identify numerous 
cognitive and socio-psychological barriers that affect the transmission of learning between 
levels. Namely, individual cognitive biases, searching and scanning routines, the functional 
bias of scenarios, power and political dynamics, the organization’s structure and culture of 
decision making biased the learning generated by the scenario process. Although scenario 
planning is said to overcome individual or organizational biases by challenging existing 
frames of mind (van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker, 1995) our findings illustrate how in 
reality various barriers at different levels exert effect over the process thus potentially 
preventing its learning benefits. Additionally, by theorizing and demonstrating how scenario 
planning acts as a learning system, we contribute to the theoretical grounding of scenario 
planning.  
 Paper 3: “Managing ambidexterity: An analysis of the design, actors and 
decisions at a market leading bio-tech firm” is also an empirical paper motivated by the need 
to better understand the individual actions that underpin organizational ambidexterity 
(Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, and 
Tushman, 2009; Rogan and Mors, 2014). In this paper, the focus of analysis changes from the 
scenario planning process into the design, actors and decisions that make ambidexterity work 
at Novozymes. Scenario planning is found to serve as an integrating mechanism across 
functional and hierarchical levels amidst the deliberate and dynamic design at Novozymes to 
manage the conflicting interest of exploration and exploitation. The evidence shows the 
simultaneous use of structures, culture, processes and networks in supporting ambidexterity at 
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Novozymes. Furthermore, these mechanisms for managing ambidexterity are constantly 
refined and adjusted in response to internal or external changes. Re-design of contracts, 
partnerships, networks and so on is what rejuvenates the ambidextrous design at Novozymes. 
In the absence of such rearrangements, contemporary ambidextrous behaviors and designs 
might become a source of organizational inertia tomorrow. Consequently, the research 
augments prior empirical evidence (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; Westerman, McFarlan, 
and Iansiti, 2006) of the dynamic alignments and refinements needed to constantly support 
long run exploration and exploitation.  
In response to calls for further research on the role of managerial capabilities and the 
decisions that go into managing ambidexterity, this paper identifies some of the roles and 
actions of senior and middle managers. Among other tasks, senior managers – executives – 
are found to have the critical role of creating and accepting contradictions as an organizational 
mental frame. The study reveals some of the actions and mechanism used to achieve this. The 
paper also brings some new insights into the important role of middle managers in managing 
ambidexterity. Middle managers are found to actively promote and reinforce ambidextrous 
behaviors, while at the same time managing the dilemma of which ambidextrous behaviors 
are allowed to move up into the next organizational level. Finally, this paper finds evidence of 
the role of organizational and individual networks, both internal and external, at managing 
ambidexterity. In doing so, it extends recent work in this area (e.g. Rogan and Mors, 2014). 
The last paper of this dissertation, “Overcoming barriers to organizational learning: 
Integrating behavioral strategy into the 4I organizational learning framework” is a theory 
piece developed with Professor Bo Nielsen. Much of the ideas contained in this paper came 
from the constant iteration along this PhD project between the diverse literature I had read, 
the observations at Novozymes, and the findings from the previous two empirical papers. It is 
a nice way to close this dissertation in the sense that it incorporates most of that was learned 
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throughout my PhD studies. Importantly, it proposes some mechanisms on how to overcome 
some of the observed learning barriers (e.g. in paper 2). The paper integrates real assumptions 
about human behaviors and social interaction – e.g. behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011) – 
into the 4I organizational learning framework (Crossan et al., 1999). We identify and 
integrate five specific behavioral and social processes that constrain the acquisition and flow 
along the feed-forward and feed-backward process of the 4I framework. Importantly, we 
introduce intervening and instigating as two potential mechanisms for dealing with these 
barriers in order to open up learning flows. Intervening is a mechanism for cognitive frame-
breaking and reduction of ego defenses at the individual and group level. It has three 
underlying processes: (1) forcing discrepancies and shifts in information processing modes; 
(2) challenging of expert knowledge capacity; and (3) promoting dialogue and critical self-
reflexivity. Building on insights from the power and dependence perspective (Emerson, 
1962), instigating is our mechanism that alters the power dynamics within the social context 
of organizational learning. This allows learning to be transmitted upwards from individual to 
group and organizational levels.  
By integrating potential behavioral and social processes that constrain the acquisition 
and flow of leaning into a well-established learning model, we present a more complete 
account of the difficult journey of organizational learning. Importantly, by designing two 
mechanisms for opening up learning flows, we provide insights into how organizational might 
manage the tension between exploration and exploitation. We close this paper by circling 
back to scenario planning to highlight how the literature has partly focused on some of the 
processes underlying our intervening mechanism, while mostly ignored the processes 
suggested under our second mechanism - instigating. This provides a more nuanced 
explanation to why successful scenario planning interventions are likely the exception rather 
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than the rule, and potential ways to correct this in pursue of organizational learning and 
strategic renewal.   
Taken together, this PhD project provides a detailed account of the various behavioral 
and social influences over scenario planning which greatly affect its ability to generate 
exploratory learning (e.g. Paper 2). Instead, scenario planning ends up being mainly used as 
an integrating mechanism guiding exploitative needs (e.g. Paper 3). These empirical findings 
addressed some of the underdeveloped areas identified in the scenario planning literature (e.g. 
Paper 1) while also provided some key insights about learning systems in general. These 
insights created a fertile terrain to advance various propositions pointing to mechanisms with 
the potential to overcome various learning barriers (e.g. Paper 4). The four papers are 
presented in the following sections. 
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Scenario planning as organizational intervention. Integrative review, 
current debates, and future directions 
Jose D. Balarezo 
Copenhagen Business School 
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ABSTRACT 
Scenario planning is said to be a capable intervention in improving important organizational 
outcomes such as organizational learning and strategic renewal. Yet, the theoretical 
understanding of the mechanisms governing scenario planning as well as empirical evidence 
of its effects on organizations is underdeveloped. This paper critically reviews and reflects on 
the current state and progress of the scenario planning literature. Based on a systematic 
literature review, an integrative framework is provided to a largely normative literature that 
has dealt with issues in isolation. The framework includes antecedents, processes, outcomes, 
moderators and mediators. The paper highlights debates and under-researched areas while 
iteratively making connections to more established research streams, the insights from which 
have not been sufficiently integrated into the scenario planning literature. The review reveals 
four areas in need for future research in order to enhance our theoretical understanding of 
scenario planning and set the stage for future empirical examination on its effects on 
individual and organizational level outcomes.   
Keywords: Scenario planning; strategic renewal; organizational learning 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic renewal is necessary for the long term survival and success in organizations 
(Agarwal and Helfat, 2009); yet such strategic renewal is very difficult to achieve (Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995; Corner, Kinicki, and Keats, 1994; Huff, Huff, and Thomas, 1992; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). An organizational intervention with the potential for improving strategic 
adaptation and renewal is Scenario Planning (SP). SP is thought to bring strategies more in 
tune with changing business environments due to its ability to improve learning (van der 
Heijden, 2004; Schoemaker, 1995), enhance sense making, remedy cognitive biases and 
challenge prevailing mindsets (van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker, 1993, 1995; Schwartz, 
1991; Wack, 1985a, 1985b), or devise better strategic options and thus aid decision making 
(Chermack, 2004a; van der Heijden, 2005; Wack, 1985a, 1985b). Accordingly, the use of SP 
creates organizations better prepared for coping with the uncertainty inherent in the business 
environment (Wack, 1985a). In short, SP works under the basic assumption that the future 
will not be constant or similar to the current business environment; therefore it questions the 
deepest assumptions about an organization’s strategy - thus promoting strategic renewal. The 
normative aspects in this literature are quite appealing and its potential benefits have been 
fleetingly recognized by the strategic management literature. For instance, important research 
streams such as dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007) or organization identity and learning 
(Brown and Starkey, 2000) have briefly touched upon the potential benefits of SP. 
However, the SP literature does not provide sufficient understanding of the process 
and its causal mechanisms thus preventing scientific verification of its merits (Chermack, 
2005; Harries, 2003; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Empirical evidence supporting its 
individual and organizational outcomes is insufficient (Chermack and Nimon, 2008; Glick, 
Chermack, Luckel and Gauck, 2012; Harries, 2003; O’Keefe and Wright, 2010) and 
potentially unreliable because of the anecdotal and subjective-based nature of self-reported 
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practitioners’ often-biased-accounts of their interventions (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). 
Instead, the literature is dominated by a relatively large number of publications focusing on 
“techniques” or “methodological approaches” for building scenarios, many of which are at 
odds with each other leading to methodological confusion (Varum and Melo, 2010). 
Consequently, SP research can be described as “Popularist Science” where practical relevance 
is high but theoretical and methodological rigor are low (Anderson, Herriot, and Hodgkinson, 
2001). To advance, the SP literature must be grounded in better theoretical understanding and 
empirical evidence of its governing mechanisms – e.g. move towards “Pragmatic Science” 
where both relevance and methodological rigor are high (Anderson et al., 2001). Therefore, 
having a generalizable theoretical framework and better understanding of the relationships 
governing SP is much needed (Burt and Chermack 2008; Walton 2008).  
This research responds to these calls by critically reviewing and synthesizing this 
fragmented literature and providing a coherent conceptual framework. Previous literature 
reviews have organized the SP literature mainly by clustering in different ways the various 
techniques for developing scenarios (e.g., Bishop, Hines, and Collins, 2007; Börjeson, Höjer, 
Dreborg, Ekvall, and Finnveden, 2006; Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, and van der Heijden, 
2005). Instead, this study systematically reviews, integrates, and links the SP literature to 
other relevant streams with focus on theoretical, methodological, and empirical development. 
Specifically, the current study aims to: 1) synthetize and integrate the SP literature into a 
coherent framework; 2) offer a systems view of a process mainly researched in isolation, and 
3) identify areas of debate and highlight priorities for future research. The proposed
framework includes antecedents, processes variables, outcomes and moderating / mediating 
variables. It intends to provide a solid starting point for solidifying the theoretical foundations 
of the SP literature, and setting the stage for future empirical testing of the relationships and 
outcomes.  
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A methodological section follows this introduction. The next section presents a 
conceptual framework for SP and discusses in detail its components. Discussion of the main 
debate areas in need of future research follows as well as its implications for theory and 
practice.   
METHODOLOGY 
An analytical review scheme is necessary for a systematical evaluation of the literature in a 
research field, and especially suited for evaluating contributions and discerning patterns from 
a widely different set of studies or domains (Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1985). Statistical 
methods such as meta-analysis are also employed when reviewing academic research; 
however, meta-analysis is most appropriate when the number of empirical results is large and 
some commonalities are present in the criteria used in such studies (Salipante, Notz, and 
Bigelow, 1982). Given the lack of a common framework in the SP literature and the limited 
empirical work, meta-analysis is prohibitive for this research. Consequently, a systematical 
review of the literature is used, which is explained in the following. 
The research started with an electronic search drawing from the Science Citation 
Index Expanded (SCI-expanded) and the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). These two 
databases are widely used in social sciences and humanities due to their cross disciplinary 
coverage and archival depth. These two databases were accessed through the Web of 
Knowledge platform on November 2012. Dates were not constrained hence the search 
included the widest possible range – from 1900 to November 2012 for the SCI-Expanded, and 
from 1956 to November 2012 for the SSCI. The search did not yield any record older than 
1977. The search was restricted to articles in peer-reviewed journals to make the research 
manageable while ensuring the quality of it as articles in such journals are considered 
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validated knowledge, and are expected to have the highest impact on their fields (Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, Bachrach, and Podsakoff, 2005). 
The key words used were “scenario planning”, “scenario thinking” and “scenario 
building”, which are commonly used in this literature (Varum and Melo, 2010).  12 categories 
were selected, these being “management”, “economics”, “business”, “business finance”, 
“operations research management science”, “planning development”, “computer science 
interdisciplinary applications”, “sociology”, “psychology”, “applied psychology”, 
“psychology multidisciplinary” and “multidisciplinary sciences”. This search yielded 223 
records. Management, economics, business, business finance and operations research 
management were obvious choices as SP is often related to many of the core streams in 
management research such as strategic cognition or organizational learning. Planning 
development was chosen as SP aligns with the flexible approach to strategic development and 
thus acquired popularity as an alternative to more formal planning (Chermack, Bodwell, and 
Glick, 2010) yet, they share common roots. Computer science interdisciplinary applications 
was chosen since one of the two historical centers for scenario techniques - the USA center, 
which subsequently gave birth to the Intuitive Logic School, and Probabilistic Modified 
Trends School (PMT) – was originally influenced by computer power and simulations 
(Bradfield et al., 2005). Sociology, psychology, applied psychology and psychology 
multidisciplinary were also included as SP intends to challenge individual and collective 
mental frames. Multidisciplinary sciences broadened the search due to the wide array of 
applications for SP. 
The increased availability of databases has raised questions related to the accuracy of 
research based only on one database due to the differences in journal coverage (Basu, 2010). 
For example, research comparing the Scopus and Web of Knowledge databases has shown 
that using only one of these databases risks missing relevant research (Vieira and Gomes, 
30
2009), especially when the search is limited to smaller citing entities – i.e. journals, 
conference proceedings or institutions (Meho and Sugimoto, 2009). Hence, to strengthen the 
research, a secondary search was performed using the Scopus database. The parameters 
selected followed as closely as possible the search in the Web of Knowledge. This search 
yielded 317 articles. After a manual review and de-selection of duplicated results, the final 
raw number of articles used in this research was 396.  
The 396 articles were subjected to a manual selection process to assess their 
contributions and were selected for final inclusion based on presence of: (1) a theoretical 
contribution (such as frameworks, mechanisms, antecedents, moderators, variables or 
boundary conditions); (2) empirical nature (quantitative or qualitative) and; (3) detailed case 
studies of SP or scenario intervention which could potentially increase our understanding of 
the variables and mechanisms at play. After reviewing the 396 articles, 120 were finally 
included in this research.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SP 
What follows is the development and discussion of the integrative framework built from the 
literature review. Table 1 (later) presents the final selection of articles used in constructing 
this integrative framework. It contains a summary of the main objectives, key findings, and 
theoretical underpinnings of each article along with their links within the proposed integrative 
framework which is presented in Figure 1. The framework integrates past and current research 
on SP and represents a stylized understanding of the different constructs and mechanisms 
underpinning SP as proposed by prior research. Major antecedents, moderators and mediators 
along with the different processes and intended outcomes of SP are included in the 
framework.  
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The framework advances previous theoretical attempts to synthesize the literature 
(Chermack, 2004b, 2005; Chermack and Lynham, 2002; Keough and Shanahan, 2008) by 
presenting antecedents, moderators and mediators which is novel in this literature. It 
emphasizes two antecedents, five processes, three main outcome categories, five main 
moderators and a mediator. In combination, Table 1 and Figure 1 provide the basis for 
understanding the processes and variables underpinning SP. This processual analysis 
(Pettigrew, 1997) contributes to the SP literature by integrating relationships between 
antecedents, processes and outcomes which have mainly been studied in isolation. Moreover, 
the analysis provides much needed theoretical foundations for SP (Burt and Chermack 2008; 
Walton 2008) and thus it intends to guide future discussions and empirical research.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Two antecedents [Box 1] influence the processes and outcomes. Environmental 
uncertainty becomes an antecedent working under the basic assumption that the future will 
not be constant or similar to the current business environment thus supporting the need for SP. 
Conceptualizing SP as a recurrent process allows understanding of prior strategy in addition 
to individual and organizational frames as the context for the following iteration. There are 
five processes [Box 2 and 5], starting with environmental scanning and culminating in active 
monitoring which influence, over time, individual and organizational level responses – e.g. by 
directing scanning teams’ attention towards important trends to follow which might improve 
organizational learning. Three main outcome categories are identified [Box 3, 4 and 6]. Box 3 
holds cognitive and learning outcomes, box 4 decision making outcomes, and box 6 
performance outcomes. These outcomes are sequential, meaning that cognitive and learning 
outcomes are necessary for better decision making and later organizational performance. 
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Similarly, in reaching these outcomes, SP moves move progressively from the individual (i.e., 
cognition) or group level into the organizational level (e.g. strategic renewal). These processes 
and outcomes are moderated [Box 7] or mediated [Box 8] by several variables. The following 
explains the different parts of the framework in greater detail.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Antecedents 
Two antecedents are identified. Increased environmental uncertainty combined with 
engrained individual or organizational mental models puts the organization at a disadvantaged 
position towards long term strategic adaptation and survival. This combination creates the 
domain where SP operates in its quest for enhanced individual and organizational outcomes.  
Environmental uncertainty. The importance of an organization’s external 
environment and its ability to match strategies to external changes has long been discussed in 
the strategic management literature (Daft, Sormunen, and Parks, 1988; Duncan, 1972; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Miller, 1994; Milliken, 1987). In a similar vein, the SP literature 
also acknowledges the importance for organizations to be in tune with their external 
environment; in fact much of the adoption of the method is attributed to heightened external 
uncertainty. Linneman & Klein (1983) studied the use of scenarios in US firms for the period 
1977-1981 and found that its adoption increased substantially after a number of external 
shocks. Similarly, Malaska and colleagues (Malaska, Malmivirta, and Hansen, 1984) 
surveyed 166 firms and found evidence that scenario analysis was associated with increased 
unpredictability of corporate environments. More recently, studies correlate adoption of SP 
with higher external uncertainty faced by decision makers (Ramirez, Van Der Heijden, and 
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Selsky, 2010; Varum & Melo, 2010). Hence, the literature establishes a positive relationship 
between increased environmental uncertainty and adoption of SP in search for strategic 
adaptation. 
Individual and organizational mental models. The cognitive perspective of strategy 
making acknowledges the bounded rationality of the individual (Simon, 1979) and the 
important role that cognition plays in strategic contexts (Hodgkinson and Maule, 2002). 
Individuals have limited information processing capabilities which make them prone to 
creating economic tendencies – e.g. heuristics - and to process information under the filters 
created by core beliefs, cognitive categorizations and mental frames (Barnes, 1984; Duhaime 
and Schwenk, 1985; Hodgkinson, 2003; Hogarth, 1987; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 
1982; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Porac and Thomas 1990; 
Reger and Palmer 1996; Walsh 1995). Therefore, the way individuals act is explained by past 
experiences and economic tendencies on information processing. These might blind managers 
to important environmental changes and lead them to inaccurate interpretations and wrong 
decisions.  
The SP process is said to be an efficient organizational intervention in reducing these 
cognitive limitations. Good scenarios can challenge preconceptions through a deeper 
appreciation of the factors that could shape the future (Schoemaker, 1995). Further, scenarios 
aim at enhancing sense-making capabilities (Wright, 2005) and reduce individual bounded 
rationality by presenting vast amounts of relevant information easily accessible by memory, 
thus likely able to affect individual mental frames (Chermack 2004a). According to van der 
Heijden, (2005) scenarios develop the ability in managers to interpret information from the 
environment differently and force them to “think the unthinkable”. Therefore, cognitive 
benefits are prescribed by this literature under the assumption that individuals and 
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organizations are unlikely to timely update their mental models in face of dynamic 
environments. Consequently, given the existence of mental models in individuals and 
organizations, these become antecedent to SP and part of the context in which SP occurs. 
Processes  
Five main processes in SP are identified. The first is environmental scanning which provides 
input for scenario building. The output of scenario building is the scenarios themselves which 
subsequently are disseminated throughout the organization. Active monitoring links current 
SP process to future ones. Research on SP processes has mainly focused on two areas, 
scenario building techniques and the scenarios themselves. In doing so, much of the 
interesting features of SP are left unexplored – e.g. movements across and within levels or the 
effects of the process over time.    
Environmental scanning is an important input for scenario building, for example in 
the identification of key factors and driving forces in the company’s external environment 
(van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker, 1993; Schwartz, 1991; Wack, 1985a). Therefore, the 
quality of information gathered from the scanning process will have a great influence on the 
ensuing scenarios built. However, little attention is giving in this literature to the different 
biases that scanning is potentially vulnerable to. For instance, scanning can be detrimental for 
changing perceptions due to biases such as hindsight (Barnes, 1984; Kuvaas, 2002) or 
confirmation (Darley and Gross, 1983) which predisposes individuals to look for information 
that confirms their initial beliefs rather than finding contradictory evidence. As pointed out by 
Dorner and Schaub (1994), most information collection mistakes are due to preformed images 
of reality as people fail to look at the whole range of information. Instead, people focus to 
what is considered important from the point of view of their preconceived image of reality. 
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Therefore, standard ways of scanning are likely to be oriented towards known events rather 
than unknown (Beck and Plowman, 2009).  
Hence, although the SP literature acknowledges the importance of environmental 
scanning - and the effects of engrained mental models as antecedent - it does not recognize or 
discusses the potential biases that scanning brings into the process. This constitutes a 
limitation in this literature. 
Scenario Building. This is the area within SP that has drawn most scholarly 
attention. The number of methodologies proposed for creating scenarios is large. Bishop et al. 
(2007), Börjeson et al. (2006), Bradfield et al. (2005), Huss and Honton (1987), Schnaars 
(1987), and Varum and Melo (2010) provide good overviews and classifications of different 
methodologies for scenario building. However, despite the noble attempts at synthesizing the 
literature, many methodologies are at odds with each other (Varum and Melo, 2010). Most 
importantly, the literature offers no theoretical reasons or empirical evidence to explain why a 
particular methodology should be preferred over another.  
Moreover, the confusion is not only associated with the methodologies for creating 
scenarios but also with the construct definition. Scenarios, scenario building, scenario 
thinking, and SP are often confused or used interchangeably. For instance, Miller and Waller 
(2003) defined SP as a “process for structured thinking in which stories are created that bring 
together factual data and human insight to create scenario plots exploring possible futures” (p. 
95). However, according to van der Heijden (2005), SP should have an integrating focus 
where decisions and actions to implement strategies should be part of the process. There is a 
clear difference in these two definitions; the first one is centered on creating scenarios, thus 
missing integration into strategy development or implementation as proposed by the second 
definition. As pointed out by Chermack and Lynham (2002), SP definitions are unclear about 
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what the primary intentions of the process are. This not only confuses readers but also 
potentially misdirects researchers in this field as it is often unclear whether a particular study 
is about scenario building, SP, or something else. The lack of precision on the construct 
definition is indeed a critical issue in this literature. Without clear construct definition, efforts 
to strengthen the theoretical foundations of SP and unearth its mechanisms are seriously 
undermined. Bishop et al. (2007) briefly addressed the misuse of the word “scenarios” as it is 
often used indiscriminately to refer to scenario development and SP. The authors suggested 
using the word SP only when referring to a “complete foresight study” which generally 
should include 6 steps (framing, scanning, forecasting, visioning, planning and acting). 
Scenario development should be used only in the context of creating or building the “stories 
about the future” (Bishop et al. 2007). 
These limitations notwithstanding, this review identifies 4 building blocks frequently 
associated with building scenarios; 1) predetermined elements, or driving forces pushing for 
inevitable outcomes, although the timing and impact of these outcomes are not yet known 
(Wack 1985a; Wack 1985b). The identification of these predetermined elements is central to 
SP projects (Burt 2006); 2) the strategic conversation, or “carefully thought out but loosely 
facilitated series of in-depth conversations for key decision makers throughout the 
organization” (Schwarz, 1991, p. 221). The strategic conversation incorporates a wide range 
of unstructured thoughts and views and out of this creates a common interpretation (van der 
Heijden, 2005); 3) consensus, as scenario building is a consensus and legitimation device 
around key strategic issues challenging the organization (Schoemaker, 1993). Finally, 4) 
“thinking the unthinkable” which attempts to entice out of the box thinking, usually by the 
inclusion of “remarkable people” (van der Heijden, 1997) to better challenge institutionalized 
thinking and broaden views. The four constructs appear to combine quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions in developing the scenarios. 
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Interestingly, the literature generally has not reflected on further biases introduced 
during scenario building. For instance, research points to potential problems in large group 
settings (used in scenario building workshops) such as stereotyping, decreased ownership of 
ideas or unwillingness to express novel thoughts (Weick and Quinn, 1999) and this constitutes 
an area which needs to be better integrated with insight from other research streams.  
Scenarios are a central element of SP. However, their ability to effectively stretch 
people’s thinking or challenge firm’s strategic decisions is increasingly challenged as noted 
by a recent trend which points to fundamental problems with scenarios. For instance, 
scenarios tend to be unimaginative, constrained to a standard range of possibilities, focused 
on current issues, predictable on their factors and theme selection, and prone to leaving 
uncertainties out of the analysis (Bacon, 2012; van Notten, Sleegers, and van Asselt, 2005; 
O’Brien, 2004).  Rather, scenarios seem to be misleading and ill-prepared to entice novel 
thinking or anticipate rare events (Goodwin and Wright, 2010; Postma and Liebl, 2005). As 
illustration, Bacon (2012) analyzed 13 different scenario-based studies regarding the “future 
of Russia” and found that in all cases the scenarios constructed were too close to each other 
and reduced to a standard set of futures, usually within the lines of best case, worst case, 
continuity, and regional variation. Similarly, van Notten et al. (2005) reviewed 22 scenario 
studies and found only half of them included discontinuities. Methodological choice, 
tendency to consider only attractive futures and avoid threatening ones, organizational 
resistance towards uncertainty, or assumptions that the future will not be meaningfully 
different from the present are some of the reasons for this omission (van Notten et al. 2005).  
The evidence points to a problematic area of SP: the scenarios themselves. Despite 
the large number of proposed methodologies, scenarios remain unimaginative, similar to each 
other, or gravitating toward current, known trends. In such state, scenarios are ineffective to 
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accomplish their prime objective - challenging mental frames. Instead, the restrictive array of 
scenarios might reinforce current views and status quo (Wright and Goodwin, 2009). Indeed, 
many companies in their approach to scenarios are simply quantifying the obvious (Wack 
1985a). The response has been more methodologies for reducing these weaknesses. For 
instance, the combination of quantitative and qualitative dimensions (von der Gracht and 
Darkow, 2010; Söderholm, Hildingsson, Johansson, Khan, and Wilhelmsson, 2011), use of 
fuzzy cognitive mapping (Amer, Jetter, and Daim, 2011; Jetter and Schweinfort, 2011), 
combination of different methodologies (Dammers, 2010), or inclusion of different types of 
scenarios such as inconsistent, context, recombinant, or scenarios that highlight key 
vulnerabilities (Bryant and Lempert, 2010; Muskat, Blackman, and Muskat, 2013; Postma 
and Liebl, 2005).  
Rather than proposing further methodologies, a more fruitful line of research is to dig 
deeper in understanding the mechanisms that out to be driving the process towards its 
intended outcomes. Scenarios and SP in general are social processes involving individuals 
and embedded in the organizational context. As such, it is surprising that this literature has 
not sufficiently leveraged research streams which might provide insights into how to improve 
the effectiveness of scenarios and SP –e.g. psychology, social psychology, or social cognition. 
Contextual sharing and disseminating. A critically underdeveloped area of SP is the 
lack of clarity on how the process transcends into the organizational level (Burt and 
Chermack 2008). The organizational learning literature provides insights on how information 
residing at individual levels of analysis is likely to reach organizational levels. For instance, 
dissemination is a key process for organizational learning and the only way to move learning 
from lower levels (individual or team) into higher levels (Flores, Zheng, Rau, and Thomas, 
2012). Within the SP literature, the case study at Shell provides good evidence of how 
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knowledge from scenarios moved from the individual into the organizational at large – e.g. 
changes in strategy. The company engineered this dissemination process by asking their line 
managers how they would react to the different scenarios created (De Geus, 1997; Wack, 
1985a). Hence, similar to organizational learning models, it appears through dissemination SP 
transcends the individual level.  
However, transferring knowledge is not a simple task and requires a two sided 
cooperation. For instance, research on information transfer among teams found that teams 
must make the necessary effort to translate the knowledge into meaningful realities and 
contexts for the recipient side (Bresman, 2012). Although limited, there are few examples 
within the SP literature where the efforts to disseminate scenarios and make it context specific 
are clear (Cornelius, Van de Putte, and Romani, 2005; Mobasheri, Orren, and Sioshansi, 
1989; Moyer, 1996; Wack, 1985a). For instance, in the case presented by Wack (1985a), after 
a series of failed attempts for SP to reach organizational level responses, scenarios presented 
to line managers evolved into a “tailored made fit between the scenarios and their [line 
manager’s] deepest concerns” (p 88). Thus, scenarios and their potential outcomes were made 
contextual depending on which part of the organization they were meant to reach.  
Hence, it appears that through the dissemination of the different scenarios and the 
efforts in making the implications context specific for the recipients that SP effects transcends 
progressively from the individual to the organizational level. The handful of studies identified 
provides important insights but many questions remain unanswered; for instance in relation to 
barriers and enablers that might restrict or allow learning from SP to move from the group 
level (e.g. scenario building workshops) into the organization at large. Consequently, further 
research looking into the transferring mechanisms and potential blockers of this transfer is 
much needed.  
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Active monitoring and SP as continuous process. Some researchers understand SP 
as a continuous organizational process. For instance, SP needs to continuously bridge the 
organization with its external environments by fine-tuning strategies and their implementation 
(Miller and Waller, 2003). Hence, SP is a continuous learning process that enhances 
organizational responsiveness by actively monitoring the key uncertainties identified during 
the scenario process, tracking environmental changes, and having frequent exposure updates 
(Miller and Waller, 2003). Most SP projects fail because there is no link between the 
scenarios and strategies; a lack of implementation which can only be remedied with time and 
practice (Wilson, 2000). Consequently, SP acts as a trend following an alert mechanism 
where signposts are used as early warning indicators for flagging which scenario might be 
developing (Chermack, Lynham, and Ruona, 2001; Ramirez, Österman, and Grönquist, 2013; 
Schoemaker, 1995).  
Furthermore, as input for scenario building, the quality of information gathered from 
active monitoring will greatly influence subsequent iterations. Due to the high uncertainty 
inherent in long term scenarios, these should be refined and adjusted regularly as a way to 
assist decision making. In other words, SP as a decision support mechanism should be a 
continuous, iterative process; not a one-time, episodic exercise (Burt and van der Heijden, 
2003; Heinonen and Lauttamäki, 2012; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Sarpong, 2011).  
However, despite the very good reasons for understanding SP as a dynamic and 
continuous process, most of the literature reviewed implicitly characterizes SP as a 
demanding, one-time exercise frequently led or facilitated by external advisers. Therefore, 
there is scant evidence of the long term effects or evolution of the process over time. Inter-
temporal or dynamic dimensions are mainly ignored. This omission prevents a better 
understanding of how exactly SP reaches organizational level outcomes.  
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Outcomes 
Improved cognition, learning, strategic decision making, and organizational performance are 
some of the intended outcomes of SP. However, empirical evidence linking SP to such 
benefits is seldom. This section revises the proposed individual and organizational outcomes. 
Individual cognition. Changes in individual cognition is a primary intended outcome 
of SP (Chermack, 2004b; van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker, 1995; Wright, 2005). SP 
fosters a constant level of attention with its continuous demand for awareness to the internal 
and external environment. This, in turn, facilitates better sensing and forces decision makers 
to contemplate different perspectives. However, little empirical evidence exists to support 
these claims. The best evidence for the effect of scenarios on individual mental models is 
provided by Schoemaker (1993) who conducted experiments on MBA students. The results 
showed how the use of scenarios expanded their thinking as confidence ranges were widened. 
Schoemaker (1993) argued that scenarios use exploitation of biases in human cognition as 
mechanisms to achieve its goals. More precisely, scenarios achieve mental changes by 
reducing biases such as overconfidence, anchoring or availability through exploiting the 
conjunction fallacy bias, or inclination to believe that a combination of events is more likely 
than a single one. 
In addition to Schoemaker’s experiment, only 3 other studies were found to 
empirically test the effects of SP on individual cognition, although the findings are generally 
inconclusive. Glick and colleagues (2012) used a sample of 129 individuals involved in SP 
interventions in 10 different firms. Comparison pre and post-intervention revealed mild 
support for the process’ ability to change some individual mental models; however, the results 
are inconclusive due to lack of control groups and short time span between the surveys. 
Zegras and Rayle (2012) used surveys pre and post SP intervention and did not find evidence 
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for SP’s ability to change participants’ perception or views. Finally, Sedor (2002) built on 
contributions from the field of psychology - specifically from Koehler's (1991) argument that 
tasks requiring a hypothesis to be treated as true is “sufficient to increase confidence in the 
truth of that hypothesis”. Accordingly, by being presented with a scenario, individuals 
momentarily assume it as true, incorrectly assigning a higher likelihood of such scenario 
becoming true in detriment of alternative ones. Sedor (2002) investigated the biasing effect of 
scenario-like presentations by management following disappointing financial results. The 
evidence shows that scenario-like presentations create more optimistic forecasts in analyst’s 
recommendations. This experiment indicates that instead of correcting them, scenarios may 
potentially introduce further cognitive biases.  
Consequently, despite the wide advocacy of SP prowess on challenging and 
changing mental frames, the empirical evidence does not support this. Further research is 
needed to better understand the actual effects of scenarios on individual cognition.  
Individual and organizational learning. The literature generally prescribes SP as an 
intervention that improves individual and organizational learning (Schoemaker 1995; 
Schwartz 1991; van der Heijden 2004; van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, and Wright, 
2002). According to Aligica (2005) scenarios create knowledge from two perspectives; (1) 
psychologically through its cognitive contributions meant to confront uncertainty, decompose 
complexity and de-bias human minds by reducing over-confidence; and (2) from an epistemic 
point of view, where scenarios increase the stock of knowledge by putting pieces of 
information together where a new configuration that brings new knowledge about the actors 
and implications might emerge. Since scenarios come from a rational assessment, they create 
knowledge which is not factual or empirical but conditional. Similarly, Kivijarvi and 
colleagues (Kivijärvi, Piirainen, and Tuominen, 2010) see scenarios as elements that enhance 
organizational knowledge by testing knowledge items against other items. According to  
43
Bodwell and Chermack (2010), SP can help to achieve organizational ambidexterity – 
simultaneous pursue of explorative and exploitative learning.  
However, as it was the case with individual cognition, empirical evidence for the 
relationship between SP and organizational learning is unclear and further research is needed 
(Chermack, Lynham, and van der Merwe, 2006). Of the papers analyzed, only Chermack and 
colleagues (2006) investigated empirically the link between SP and organizational level 
learning by analyzing the difference in individual responses pre and post SP interventions (3 
months span) in a large educational institution in the USA. The results appear to associate SP 
with increased perception of organizational learning; however, the sample set is composed of 
only 9 respondents thus diminishing the validity of the results.  
Decision making outcomes. Selection of strategies more in line with the (emerging) 
environment should follow cognitive and learning outcomes. Although better appreciation of 
the business environment or identification of possible developing trends is important, 
decisions and actions need to be implemented (van der Heijden, 2004). However, the 
important link between SP and strategy formulation and implementation is understudied; the 
existing literature provides inadequate guidance or empirical evidence for how SP aids 
strategic selection or enables strategic change (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002; Keough and 
Shanahan, 2008; Tapinos, 2012; Wilson, 2000). 
The early SP literature proposed qualitative and quantitative approaches for strategy 
selection such as intuition, managerial knowledge, wind tunneling, qualitative correlations, 
option stock/holder matrix, SWOT methods, key-success-factor-matrix or TOWS matrix for 
debate stimulation (van der Heijden, 2005; Schoemaker, 1995, 1997; Weihrich, 1993). 
However, Such tools are generally too simplistic, inadequate, and fraught with a multitude of 
problems (Goodwin and Wright, 2001). Moreover, they mostly underestimate the complex 
decision making process in face of many scenarios, different constraints, alternatives and 
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objectives; thus such tools suffer from lack of realism (Eriksson and Weber, 2008). 
Consequently, SP has received growing criticism for its underdeveloped strategic evaluations 
techniques which are unlikely to help in choosing better strategic decisions (Eriksson and 
Weber, 2008; Goodwin and Wright, 2001; Lempert, Groves, Popper, and Bankes, 2006; 
Tapinos, 2012; Wright, Cairns, and Goodwin, 2009).  
Organizational performance. Surprisingly, the relationship between SP and 
organizational performance has received relatively little attention (Chermack, 2004b; 
Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002; Keough and Shanahan, 2008; Mietzner and Reger, 2005; 
Varum and Melo, 2010). Furthermore, increased performance is generally not mentioned as a 
necessary outcome for SP (Chermack and Lynham 2002), despite the large amount of 
resources typically devoted to it (Millett, 2003; Mietzner and Reger, 2005). This review only 
identified two studies empirically investigating the relationship between SP and 
organizational performance. Phelps, Chan, and Kapsalis (2001) studied two different 
industries in the UK and found only mild support for improved financial performance 
resulting from SP. However, the results are tenuous at best due to the combination of 
uncontrolled variables and a small sample – in addition, worse performance measures were 
also reported in some non-financial parameters. Visser and Chermack (2009) interviewed top 
level managers from 9 companies (small and large) in different industries and found some 
evidence that SP contributes to firm performance. However, in addition to the small sample 
set, the interview data was subject to self-reported bias and notable differences between the 
SP processes of the interviewed companies prevent meaningful comparisons.  
Consequently, the empirical evidence does not support a positive relationship 
between SP and firm performance. This is not surprising considering the evidence does not 
support a positive relationship between SP and its previous intended outcomes – cognition 
and learning. 
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Moderation/mediation 
Theoretical or empirical studies pointing towards moderators or mediators in SP research are 
scarce. SP research has focused more on the process and content (Wright et al., 2008) rather 
than the pre-existing or boundary conditions necessary for its effectiveness. It seems to be an 
implicit assumption that SP can be used effectively in any context or firm without 
considerations of the internal capabilities or adequacy of the method for the host institution. 
However, mainly building from the evidence presented in single case studies, this review has 
identified several variables with the potential to affect the relationship between SP and its 
outcomes. Although in many cases the authors did not explicitly discuss or label a variable as 
moderator or mediator, the context provided supports interpretations of the proposed variables 
as moderators or mediators. Five moderators are identified; namely (1) organization and 
industry characteristics; (2) anchoring and understanding; (3) power and politics; (4) the SP 
team; and (5) structured quantitative techniques. Similarly, one mediator is discussed: 
emotional responses.  
Organization and industry characteristics as moderator. The large amount of 
resources needed to perform SP is a potential limitation, especially for medium-sized and 
small enterprises. Scenarios are not cheap or easy to create (van der Heijden, 2005) and the 
intense level of involvement makes SP an activity for only the most financially secured 
companies (Wack, 1985a). Besides financial considerations, the method is time consuming 
(Mietzner and Reger, 2005) and highly demanding on personnel (Millett, 2003) which are 
further limitations of the method. 
Interestingly, much of the broad adoption and popularity of SP hinges on the 
successful implementation at Shell and its ability to identify environmental shifts (Cornelius 
et al., 2005; Wack, 1985a, 1985b). However, a careful read of the implementation at Shell 
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shows the large amounts of capital, human resources, data and analyses behind the process 
(Wack, 1985a). Further, it took years and much iteration for SP at Shell to have a positive 
organizational impact. Given the sheer size and idiosyncratic nature of Shell, this brings to 
question the generalizability of this case to other firms. If anything, this points to unique 
circumstances possibly constraining the process outside companies with these characteristics 
(large in size, financially strong, experienced in dealing with uncertainty and with an 
advanced economics and analytics’ team). As noted by Mintzberg (1994), successful SP 
interventions might be an exception rather than a rule.  
Similarly, strong institutional settings and organizational willingness to experiment, 
absorb and use the knowledge gathered in the process also may affect SP’s success (Volkery 
and Ribeiro, 2009). Unless the institution and its leaders are ready for such challenges, the 
process is likely to fail. Moreover, Gordon (2011) argued that an organization’s level of 
influence over the potential uncertainties that could shape its environment servers to make the 
distinction between using visionary (normative) and adaptive scenarios. If the potential level 
of influence is considerable, the former type of scenarios is recommended. However, if there 
are many forces over which the organization has no real influence, adaptive scenarios should 
be used (Gordon, 2011). 
Industry characteristics also have the potential to affect SP interventions (Keough 
and Shanahan, 2008). On their account of a failed intervention, Hodgkinson and Wright 
(2002) left open the possibility that their intervention might have been premature for an 
organization embedded in a slow moving industry characterized by incremental change and 
not used to questioning its core beliefs and processes. Since SP questions long held 
assumptions and accepts discontinuities, it might be more appropriate for companies 
embedded in highly dynamic environments whose management is used to discontinuities and 
revision of assumptions underpinning strategies. 
47
Consequently, the success of SP appears to be moderated by various internal and 
external factors such as resource availability (human and financial), time, institutional and 
industry characteristics, willingness to challenge strategies, and ability to influence external 
uncertainties. 
Anchoring and understanding as moderator. Anchoring SP at the highest ranks of 
the organization (e.g. the upper echelons) is important to achieve organizational buy-in. 
Consequently, the SP team, stakeholders, and project sponsor are preferably anchored at the 
higher organizational ranks in order to facilitate SP (Goodwin and Wright, 2001; van der 
Heijden, 2005; Mobasheri et al., 1989; Schwartz, 1991).  
An unclear understanding of the purposes of the scenario intervention is noted as one 
of the main culprits for unsuccessful SP interventions (Burt and van der Heijden, 2003, 2008). 
According to van der Heijden (2004), there are four reasons for using SP (sense making, 
anticipating future events, finding the optimal strategy, and adaptive learning). The author 
observed most failures when firms tried to generate strategies out of stand-alone scenario 
interventions, which incidentally tend to produce unsurprising scenarios. Naturally, 
organizational outcomes are difficult to reach from a standalone interventions involving few 
actors.  
Consequently, a clear understanding from the inception of the purpose along with 
buy-in and support from high levels within the organizations are regarded as important for the 
success of SP.  
Power and politics as moderator. Broad participation and organizational 
representation, for instance during scenario building workshops, is recommended in the 
literature. However, inequalities within the participants in terms of hierarchy and political 
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weight might influence the deliberations during scenario construction and marginalize some 
views (Hanssen, Johnstad, and Klausen, 2009). Thus, instead of prompting social and 
cognitive openness, SP might provoke cognitive closure if powerful individuals exert their 
influence. For instance, influence of powerful individuals potentially renders SP vulnerable to 
be used for setting personal or political agendas (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009), to increase 
momentum of a topic (Eriksson and Weber, 2008), or to modify the results to make them 
politically more palatable (Heinonen and Lauttamäki, 2012). Similarly, the project sponsor 
should be open and inclusive, instead of being embedded in close networks or biased in 
pursuing her/his own agendas (Cairns, Wright, ven der Heijden, Bradfield, and Burt, 2006). 
Personal interest might be served by selecting or presenting scenarios one way or another 
(Selin, 2006).  All these present important dilemmas as actions and allocations of resources 
might be recommended out of SP.  
Consequently, powerful individuals have the potential to exert negative influences on 
SP which is a key issue seldom discussed in the SP literature.  
SP team - composition and positioning as moderator. Keough and Shanahan (2008) 
identified the SP team composition as vital for the success of the process while at the same 
time pointing to the lack of guidance in the literature as to how the team members are to be 
selected or trained. Notably, Hodgkinson and Healey (2008) investigated in depth the SP 
team’s composition and its role in stimulating cognitive outcomes. Leveraging from the field 
of social psychology and personality, a series of propositions regarding the composition and 
design of the SP team were articulated with focus on 1) participant’s sufficient background 
knowledge and perspectives to maximize the likelihood of effective group information 
processing; 2) ensuring adequate blend of personalities to entice cooperative teamwork and 
minimize conflicts, decision stress and future-focused anxiety, and; 3) avoid political or 
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logistical factors that might derail the optimal configuration of the teams (Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2008) 
The critical importance of the core SP team is in full display in the account presented 
at Shell (Wack, 1985a, 1985b). Despite many obstacles, the SP team at Shell persevered until 
successful organizational outcomes were reached. However, as noted previously, the success 
achieved by the Shell SP team should not be generalized to other contexts. This team was 
very skilled at their positions and trained in dealing with uncertainty (Mintzberg, 1994). Less 
experienced teams might have reached a different outcome. Given the importance of the core 
SP team, it is surprising the little academic attention that its optimal composition or 
characteristics has drawn and this constitutes an area ripe for further studies.  
Structured quantitative techniques as moderator. The review revealed a growing 
trend towards combining SP with more structured quantitative tools better prepared for 
assessing and selecting strategic options. The structured quantitative dimension is argued as 
necessary to overcome human limitations in dealing with complex systems such as: (1) 
focusing on few variables; (2) neglecting time lags; (3) being subject to biases; and (4) using 
heuristics, focusing on linear causality and overlooking feedback loops (Acar and 
Druckenmiller, 2006; Jetter and Schweinfort, 2011). The overriding idea in combining SP 
with quantitative techniques is to reduce the complexity of the decision making. For instance, 
by using the idea of decomposition – re-composition in decision analysis where the re-
composition phase follows a formalized set of axioms thus reducing decision making biases 
usually employed by managers when faced with such complexity (Goodwin and Wright, 
2001; Kowalski, Stagl, Madlener, and Omann, 2009). Some of the techniques proposed to be 
used in combination with SP are Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (Goodwin and Wright, 
2001; Kowalski et al., 2009; Song, Ding, and Knaap, 2006; Stewart, French, and Rios, 2013; 
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Wright and Goodwin, 2009) or real options thinking (Alessandri, Ford, Lander, Leggio, and 
Taylor, 2004; Driouchi, Leseure, and Bennett, 2009; Miller and Waller, 2003). 
Consequently, in the absence of quantitative techniques more adept at following 
formalized axioms for strategic selection, SP is ill prepared to select strategic options and 
rather it is prone to introduce further biases due to the complexity of the decision process. 
Hence the exploratory essence of the scenarios seems to be well supplemented by structured 
quantitative techniques, thus likely improving the overall strategic selection capabilities of 
SP.  
Emotional responses as mediator. SP introduces more uncertainty in the decision 
making process by avoiding prediction. Reaching a decision in face of different perspectives 
and dilemmas is likely to create anxiety for the decision makers. New information that 
conflicts with current assumptions forces individuals into unease, anxiety and active rejection 
of the new painful information (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011; Karlsson, Loewenstein, and 
Seppi, 2009).  
Within the SP literature, the important role of emotions has not been sufficiently 
addressed. This review found just a handful of studies exploring the effects that emotions play 
in the process. MacKay and McKiernan (2010) identified 4 dysfunctional effects of scenarios: 
(1) creativity layered on fantasy, (2) heightened expectations and confusion, (3) pride and 
passion, and (4) lack of relation to everyday work. The authors argued these dysfunctional 
effects might render the SP neutral, distant, or irrelevant at best; and harmful at worst. 
Heightened expectations and confusion arise from the reevaluation of current reality due to 
new lenses that lead to stress and frustration. Pride is triggered among senior executives as 
scenario building activities may challenge their strategy, validity, necessity or durability 
(MacKay and McKiernan 2010). Emotional responses are also present in the SP study 
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presented by Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) where it failed because it triggered defensive 
avoidance strategies by the participants as escape valve to cope with the high levels of 
decision stress. Similarly, O’Keefe and Wright (2010) described a scenario intervention that 
failed from the outset as the process raised doubts about already made decisions, potentially 
jeopardizing the work security of the individuals involved in these prior decisions, many of 
which were participants of the scenario building process. Thus, instead of openly discussing 
the firm strategic direction, emotional considerations prevailed. As noted by Wright and 
colleagues (2008), SP interventions are likely to challenge and question prevailing mindsets 
thus bruising some egos in the process.  
Hence, emotional responses are important in SP as mediator to cognitive outcomes 
and strategic responses. Scenarios might trigger emotional responses such as anxiety, 
insecurity, pride and passion therefore yielding certain topics, trends, or decisions to be 
marginalized. This likely (1) hinders cognitive and learning outcomes, and (2) delays or 
avoids strategic decisions. Similarly, scenarios might also trigger detachment from the 
process further diminishing its effects. Therefore, emotions triggered during the scenario 
building process and ensuing scenarios might negate any positive cognitive outcomes of SP 
and instead reinforce dated views.      
UNSOLVED DEBATES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has examined the current state of the SP literature. Based on a comprehensive 
review, an integrative framework was created which embodies the different processes, 
outcomes and variables affecting SP. Importantly, four underdeveloped research areas in 
particular need of further academic investigation have been identified.  
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1. Are scenarios effective cognitive devices or rather sources of biases?
An unclear yet vital issue is whether the scenarios, a central building block of SP, are at all 
effective in challenging views and enhancing individual and corporate perceptions. The 
evidence found does not support this argument. Rather, scenarios seem to be a constraining 
mechanism reinforcing potentially dated views and introducing further biases. This is due to 
its limited variety, novelty and neglect of discontinuities. Scenarios are presenting similar, 
agreeable, consensual, preferred pictures of the future, with limited treatment of uncertainties 
or discontinuities (Bacon, 2012; van Notten et al., 2005; O’Brien, 2004). If companies in their 
approach to scenarios are quantifying the obvious (Wack 1985a), then SP seems unlikely to 
open mental frames and challenge dated assumptions.  
Furthermore, in the event that scenarios are well constructed, novel and interesting, it 
is not clear either if they are adequate in reducing biases. The empirical evidence is mixed. 
Some evidence suggests scenarios achieve mental changes by reducing biases such as 
overconfidence, anchoring or availability (Schoemaker 1993). However, there is also 
evidence that scenario-like presentations introduce the same biases – e.g. overconfidence or 
anchoring (Sedor, 2002). Further empirical research is needed to clarify this central issue.  
2. The organizational context and influences on scenarios and SP
The review revealed a contradiction in the SP literature. On one hand, it correctly identifies 
the need for organizations to renew their mental models in face of uncertain and dynamic 
environments. From this perspective, the method is prescribed as an intervention fitting for 
updating dated mental models and correct limitations in information processing. On the other 
hand however, it ignores how difficult it is to change those same mental frames (Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995; Corner et al., 1994; Hall, 1984). Most importantly, the SP literature has not 
yet reflected on the variety of biases and constraints affecting the process due to its 
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organizational embeddedness. For instance, in addition to strategic mental frames, 
organizational identity and organizational routines are elements that form the structure of 
organizational strategic cognition (Narayanan, Zane, and Kemmerer, 2010). Organizational 
identity is the organizational member’s collective understanding of central and relative 
permanent features of the organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985). Strong organizational 
identities might result in cognitive inertia (Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger and Palmer, 1996). 
Organizational routines are repeatable patterns of independent behavior often used to 
accomplish organizational tasks (Feldman, 2000). Routines are every day part of an 
organization and they tend to have a constraining effect on individual thinking and judgment 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992).  
The SP literature has seldom touched onto the effects of identity or routines over the 
process. It is not clear how the SP process, embedded within the organization, breaks free 
from such influences affecting individual and organizational cognition. For example, the first 
building block for scenario construction, the identification of predetermined elements, will be 
heavily influenced by the biases introduced during the environmental scanning due to the 
biased nature of scanning (Barnes, 1984; Beck and Plowman, 2009; Darley and Gross, 1983; 
Dorner and Schaub, 1994; Kuvaas, 2002). After some analysis, a “predetermined element” 
might be identified, but such an element is predetermined only to the extent that its 
relationships are internally consistent and fit current mental frames. As scenarios are built 
from identified non-paradoxical trends or simple dichotomies, they are unlikely to be useful 
for exploring situations beyond past known boundaries and contexts, or anticipate rare events 
(Goodwin and Wright, 2010; Postma and Liebl, 2005).  
Only a handful of papers within the SP literature discussed these potential biases and 
their effects on SP. For instance, Roubelat (2006) argued organizational structures are rarely 
adequate to challenge old paradigms, much less to propose alternative ones. Consensus and 
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self-censure will tend to eliminate views that do not fit the current paradigm, especially if 
members are selected to represent certain parts of the organization. Elkington and Trisoglio 
(1996) studied the effects of organizational identity at Shell and concluded the scenarios 
created by the company were affected by features associated with the identity of 
multinationals at the time – e.g. individualism, hierarchy and lack of egalitarian perspectives. 
This made Shell miss obvious trends in their environment; for instance in relation to corporate 
responsibility.  
Similarly, the role of emotions as well as power and politics might affect SP. Certain 
topics, scenarios or decisions might be avoided due to the anxiety the method produces 
(emotions), or because certain topics might not be in the interest of powerful individuals 
involved in SP (power & politics). However, with few exceptions, this literature has avoided 
these key issues and their effects on SP. This represents an important oversight in this 
literature. 
Power as a moderator in SP opens up an interesting debate: the tension between SP 
being anchored at the higher levels of the organization - which is widely recommended in the 
literature - and the potential negative influences these individuals might exert into the process 
due to their powerful positions. The main argument for anchoring the process high in the 
organization is the need to have SP buy-in at the higher ranks as organizational action is 
presumed to converge at the top management level (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia, 1993). This facilitates execution at lower levels. 
Although in line with the “upper echelon” view of the importance of top management teams 
(TMT) in organizations (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), this line of argument disregards 
literature pointing towards the possible negative effects of such strong involvement. For 
example,  executive managers tend to focus their attention on topics they deem most relevant 
while selectively ignoring other topics not thought important (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft 
55
and Weick, 1984; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Furthermore, commitment to status quo is a 
significant top management orientation (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993) 
which may limit interpretation adequacy and learning capabilities of organizations (Beck and 
Plowman, 2009), or prevent the opportunity to make sense of a situation by organizational 
groups outside top management (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010). Within the SP literature, the 
negative effects of an uncooperative CEO on a SP intervention have been documented 
(Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002). Therefore, contrarily to the established view of senior 
executives anchoring and involved in SP, there is also evidence such involvement may be 
detrimental. Presumably, a more cohesive TMT with longer tenure will have stronger mental 
frames and be more resistant to SP interventions, or exert negative influences on the process 
as compared to younger, more diverse TMTs potentially more open to being challenged and 
exploring new alternatives. Better understanding of the TMT compositional characteristics 
and their effects on SP interventions seems ripe for further investigation.  
Closely related to power and TMT influences is the issue of consensus vs. 
divergence. As pointed out by van der Heijden (2000), scenarios are effective only when the 
right balance between convergence and divergence of views is achieved. However, a more 
interesting question is to better understand how this consensus is achieved. If consensus is 
influenced by power, then it is certainly detrimental to SP. When “groupthink” or consensus 
dominates, non-conforming views are discouraged or marginalized, which narrows the 
concerns and capabilities of organizations (Janis and Mann, 1977; Miller, 1993). As the 
power of the dominant coalition generally maintains particular worldviews, norms or 
traditions, it is of paramount importance in SP interventions to neutralize these influences. 
Consequently, further research pointing to mechanisms that balance out this power may be of 
particular value.    
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In sum, the SP literature does not sufficiently recognize the embededness of this 
organizational process and the potential constraining effects that organization identity, 
routines, emotions, and power and politics among others might exert over SP. Further 
research elaborating on these organizational effects as well as finding ways to prevent these 
forces seems an important future research area in this literature.  
3. SP team: Composition, function and positioning
The SP team has the potential to balance some of the negative organizational influences and is 
key in SP reaching successful organizational outcomes (Wack, 1985a). However, research 
around the SP team is scarce and questions around its composition, function and positioning 
remain unanswered. For instance: should it be a cross-functional lead team? In which part of 
the organizational should the team be anchored? To whom should they report – e.g. 
organizational positioning? What are the optimal backgrounds, experiences, and personalities 
of the members? Or based on which criteria should the SP team select participants for 
scenario building workshops? – especially if we take in consideration that cultural 
backgrounds of the scenario building participants have the potential to affects the outcomes of 
the process (Barbanente, Khakee, and Puglisi, 2002; Johnston, 2001). 
Specifically, future research should clarify: 1) what is the purpose of the SP team? If 
it is only to facilitate SP interventions, then it is unlikely that SP will have positive effects in 
organizations as facilitation will likely converge into the views and needs of key stakeholders. 
Rather, the main task or mandate of the SP’s team should be to challenge and ask the difficult 
questions that managers or key stakeholders do not want to hear. However, this is likely to 
trigger emotional responses or face political pressures which creates the next pressing need 
for research about the SP team, namely: 2) positioning. It is important to identify mechanisms 
to shield this team from these social and political influences. Maybe changing the reporting 
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line from the upper echelon tiers of the organization to the Board of Directors could minimize 
some of the political influences. Lastly, (3) the internal composition of this team should be 
further investigated. For instance, what are the implications of different personalities, 
capabilities and backgrounds on the functioning and effectiveness of this team?  
It is surprising that the SP literature has not examined enough some of these 
questions surrounding a team which has the vital task of challenging the organization. The 
work by Hodgkinson and Healey (2008) on SP team composition is an important first step in 
this direction, however more research, for instance grounded in social identity theory (Turner 
and Oakes, 1986) or human personality (Digman, 1990) seems fruitful.  
4. SP learning flows - from the individual into the organization
A largely under-researched area was found in the mechanisms that transcend SP learning 
from the individual and group level into the larger organization. The literature mainly speaks 
to the individual or group level – for example, within the people participating in the scenario 
building sessions. But how this knowledge flows to other individuals within the organizations 
(both laterally and vertically) is not well understood. It appears that, similar to models for 
organizational learning or sense making, SP reaches the larger organization through the 
dissemination of the different scenarios and the sense-giving process of making the 
implications of such scenarios context-specific for the recipients. Likely, it is only gradually 
that the learning from SP is transmitted from individual to group and organizational levels. 
Therefore, it can only be with the aid of time that SP learning transcends into the organization 
at large.  
Yet, oddly most of this literature focusses on externally driven stand-alone 
interventions. Conceptually, these single interventions resemble what change and intervention 
theory calls episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1999). Episodic change occurs when a 
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change agent deliberately establishes conditions and circumstances that are different from 
what they are now - e.g., scenarios - and this is accomplished through a series of actions or 
interventions either singularly or in collaboration with other people - e.g., external consultant, 
SP team, scenario building workshops (Ford and Ford, 1994). Episodic change follows the 
freeze-transition-refreeze sequence and although people are highly motivated to learn during 
the transition stage, it is difficult to unfreeze patterns and relapse to previous patterns is likely 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999). Furthermore, research on individual change behavior indicates that 
people exposed to interventions are normally at one of the following stages: pre-
contemplation, contemplation, action or maintenance (Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross, 
1992). These steps follow a spiral-like pattern with successive relapses to previous stages 
before action is taken. Beer and Eisenstat (1996) offered a good account of the difficulties of 
achieving lasting organizational change from single interventions. Together, these studies 
illustrate how difficult it is to achieve individual and organizational change out of episodic 
interventions. Consequently, self-reported positive effects from single SP interventions do not 
match well with change theory and other individual or organizational evidence. Likely, stand-
alone scenario interventions are destined to fail (van der Heijden, 2004; Korte and Chermack, 
2007). Further accounts of single interventions must provide detailed explanations and 
empirical evidence to substantiate their claims. Researchers should be careful not to equate 
such normative descriptive story-telling with rigorous research and thus draw conclusions 
accordingly. 
Instead, SP is better conceptualized in line with intervention theory for continuous 
change which entails constant learning (Weick and Quinn, 1999). An attitude towards 
continuous learning and adaptation must be institutionalized. In this way, feedback loops can 
be established. Learning from prior SP processes informs subsequent iterations; change and 
adaptation could happen, in time. Given the learning benefits attributed to SP, organizational 
59
learning (OL) theory offers a particularly promising conceptual lens for theoretically 
grounding SP. Yet surprisingly, few studies have empirically explored this possibility 
(Chermack et al., 2006). By the same token, because SP spans individual, group and 
organizational level of analysis, it is multilevel in nature. Hence, SP research will greatly 
benefit from detailed accounts of the evolution of the process over time, the interactions 
across levels, and the mechanisms that potentially facilitate or preclude SP from reaching 
organizational outcomes. Multilevel research could add much value in uncovering the 
mechanisms that link the different levels of analysis within SP from the individual to the 
organization.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMIA AND PRACTICE 
There are several implications from this research. For academia, it provides the most 
complete framework to date for understanding SP. The framework gives structure to a 
literature that has grown mainly from practical accounts focusing in an area or two – e.g. 
scenario building techniques. Furthermore, links to research discussing the various parts of 
the framework is provided in the form of tables which should guide future research. By 
iteratively drawing parallels and leveraging from more established literature streams, this 
research highlights inconsistencies in the SP literature while simultaneously providing 
potential venues for further research. Four research streams and debate areas in need of 
further research have been identified. These are highlighted and summarized in Table 2 which 
also points to literature streams and theories with the potential to shed light on these 
knowledge gaps. Consequently, table 2 serves as an agenda for future SP research. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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For practitioners, this study highlights misunderstood areas and potential problems 
with SP and its implementation. Despite the wide practitioner-driven endorsement in the 
literature of the positive cognitive and learning benefits of SP, empirical evidence does not 
support these claims. Despite solid, detailed single case study accounts that appear to support 
SP as an effective organizational intervention (Mobasheri et al., 1989; Wack, 1985a), the 
evidence is too scarce and idiosyncratic thus preventing generalization at this point. Many SP 
studies use Shell’s successful case study as legitimizing mechanism, however, the evidence 
provided for their own “successful” interventions is unconvincing and generally lacking a 
methodological approach for data collection to support the findings. Instead, managers and 
users are advised to be skeptic of these unfounded claims. Undoubtedly, SP is a complicated 
process potentially hindered by a variety of factors in its quest to improve organizational 
outcomes. The framework and tables presented in this study are informative to practitioners 
by pointing to potential complications along with potential sources of information. 
Additionally, by discussing several moderating and mediating factors, organizations are better 
prepared to assess the fit of SP to their own organizational context.  
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ea
se
d 
af
te
r 
SP
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n.
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
04
 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
R
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l b
en
ef
its
 o
f 
SP
 
in
 a
id
in
g 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
SP
 h
as
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l t
o 
ad
dr
es
s 
4 
ke
y 
ca
us
es
 o
f 
er
ro
ne
ou
s 
de
ci
si
on
s:
 C
ha
ng
e 
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
s,
 
re
du
ce
 b
ou
nd
ed
 r
at
io
na
lit
y,
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
of
 
ex
og
en
ou
s 
an
d 
en
do
ge
no
us
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
nd
, 
re
du
ce
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
st
ic
ki
ne
ss
  
D
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
20
05
 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
 
[2
];
[3
];
 
[4
];
[6
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
ro
po
se
 a
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
SP
 
M
od
el
 b
ui
ld
s 
fr
om
 5
 u
ni
ts
 o
f 
an
al
ys
is
: 
sc
en
ar
io
s,
 le
ar
ni
ng
, m
en
ta
l m
od
el
s,
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
ar
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 
T
he
or
y 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
 
20
08
 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
an
d 
N
im
on
 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fi
rm
 in
 U
S
A
 
(2
-3
) 
P
re
-t
es
t a
nd
 
po
st
-t
es
t 
su
rv
ey
s 
E
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
SP
 a
nd
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
' d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
st
yl
e 
T
he
re
 w
er
e 
so
m
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t's
 D
M
 
st
yl
es
 3
 m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
SP
 -
 S
P 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
ra
tio
na
l D
M
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
tu
iti
ve
 D
M
 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
84
20
03
 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
an
d 
va
n 
de
r 
M
er
w
e 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
ra
w
 p
ar
al
le
ls
 b
et
w
ee
n 
SP
 a
nd
 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
vi
st
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
an
d 
te
ac
hi
ng
 
C
on
st
ru
ct
iv
is
t p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
m
ea
ni
ng
, s
oc
ia
l i
nf
lu
en
ce
s 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 r
ea
lit
y 
ca
n 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 to
 
SP
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
.  
 
C
on
st
ru
ct
i-
vi
sm
 
20
06
 
C
he
rm
ac
k,
 e
t 
al
. 
U
S
A
 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
(2
-3
) 
E
m
pi
ri
ca
l 
Q
ua
nt
ita
ti
ve
ly
 v
er
if
y 
th
e 
SP
 e
ff
ec
t 
ov
er
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
SP
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
it
h 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l l
ea
rn
in
g.
 H
ow
ev
er
, 
re
du
ce
d 
sa
m
pl
e 
(9
) 
di
m
in
is
he
s 
re
su
lts
. 
C
og
ni
tio
n.
 
H
um
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
20
10
 
C
he
rm
ac
k,
 e
t 
al
. 
[6
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
os
iti
on
 S
P 
an
d 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
am
bi
de
xt
er
it
y 
as
 to
ol
s 
fo
r 
be
tte
r 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
SP
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l a
m
bi
de
xt
er
it
y 
ha
ve
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l t
o 
en
ha
nc
e 
fi
rm
 e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s 
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
ei
r 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 e
nh
an
ce
 te
am
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
T
ea
m
s'
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
20
12
 
C
ob
b 
an
d 
T
ho
m
ps
on
 
Pa
rk
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
nd
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t  
[2
];
 
(2
-3
);
  
(3
-4
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y.
  
E
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
pr
oc
es
s 
 
T
he
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 w
or
ks
ho
ps
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
d 
ex
pl
or
at
iv
e 
an
d 
ac
ti
ve
 d
ia
lo
gu
e.
 T
hr
ou
gh
 s
uc
h 
di
al
og
ue
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
is
 n
ur
tu
re
d 
an
d 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 a
do
pt
ed
 
S
ys
te
m
s 
in
no
va
tio
n.
  
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 r
es
ili
en
ce
 
20
05
 
C
or
ne
li
us
, e
t 
al
. 
Sh
el
l 
(2
-3
);
 
7-
(3
-4
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y.
 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 b
ri
ef
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
ev
ol
ut
io
n 
an
d 
us
es
 o
f 
th
e 
S
he
ll
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
du
ri
ng
 th
e 
la
st
 th
re
e 
de
ca
de
s 
SP
 is
 a
 g
oo
d 
to
ol
 f
or
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 u
nc
er
ta
in
tie
s 
bu
t i
t i
s 
no
t d
es
ig
n 
fo
r 
se
le
ct
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 
al
lo
ca
tin
g 
ca
pi
ta
l. 
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
us
ed
 in
 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
w
it
h 
re
al
 o
pt
io
ns
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
10
 
D
am
m
er
s 
T
er
ri
to
ri
al
 
E
ur
op
e 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
D
is
cu
ss
 n
ew
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
fo
r 
cr
ea
tin
g 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
th
at
 c
om
bi
ne
s 
th
e 
th
re
e 
w
el
l k
no
w
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 f
or
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
C
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 s
tr
en
gt
hs
 o
f 
th
e 
th
re
e 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 a
pp
ea
re
d 
to
 b
e 
fr
ui
tf
ul
. E
sp
ec
ia
ll
y 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 q
ua
nt
ita
ti
ve
 a
nd
 
qu
al
ita
ti
ve
 d
im
en
si
on
s.
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
06
 
D
in
ka
 a
nd
 
L
un
db
er
g 
 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
de
si
gn
 
(7
-2
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
U
nd
er
st
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
ro
le
 d
ur
in
g 
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 d
es
ig
n 
vi
a 
sc
en
ar
io
 w
or
ks
ho
ps
  
B
ot
h 
Id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
ro
le
 h
av
e 
a 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t i
m
pa
ct
 
on
 s
ce
na
ri
o'
s 
pr
oc
es
s 
an
d 
re
su
lts
 
In
di
vi
du
al
 
id
en
tit
y 
20
09
 
D
ri
ou
ch
i, 
et
 a
l. 
(7
-4
) 
Il
lu
st
ra
ti
ve
 
ca
se
 
P
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
bl
em
 s
tr
uc
tu
ri
ng
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 to
 a
ss
es
s 
re
al
 o
pt
io
n 
de
ci
si
on
s 
un
de
r 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
B
y 
co
m
bi
ni
ng
 r
ob
us
tn
es
s 
an
al
ys
is
, r
ea
l o
pt
io
ns
 
th
in
ki
ng
 a
nd
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
, d
yn
am
ic
 
fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 is
 c
re
at
ed
 in
 p
ro
je
ct
 p
la
nn
in
g 
D
M
 u
nd
er
 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
20
10
 
D
ur
an
ce
 a
nd
 
G
od
et
 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
R
ev
is
in
g 
so
m
e 
im
po
rt
an
t c
on
ce
pt
s 
of
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 a
nd
 f
or
es
ig
ht
 
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
an
d 
fo
re
si
gh
t a
re
 n
ot
 s
yn
on
ym
ou
s.
 
D
is
ti
nc
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
no
rm
at
iv
e 
an
d 
ex
pl
or
at
or
y 
sc
en
ar
io
s.
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
85
19
96
 
E
lk
in
gt
on
 a
nd
 
T
ri
so
gl
io
 
Sh
el
l 
[2
];
 
(7
-2
);
 
7-
(2
-3
) 
C
as
e 
St
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 c
as
e 
st
ud
y 
to
 d
em
on
st
ra
te
 
th
at
 S
he
ll 
ig
no
re
d 
tr
en
ds
 in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 o
pi
ni
on
 th
at
 w
er
e 
cl
ea
r,
 a
nd
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 m
ad
e 
w
ro
ng
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d 
at
 S
he
ll 
w
er
e 
"h
ie
ra
rc
hi
st
" 
or
 "
in
di
vi
du
al
is
t"
 w
hi
ch
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
of
 a
 la
rg
e 
m
ul
ti
na
tio
na
l a
t t
he
 ti
m
e.
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
08
 
E
ri
ks
so
n 
an
d 
W
eb
er
 
(7
-2
);
 
(3
-4
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
A
ch
ie
ve
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
l c
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
vi
ew
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l a
sp
ec
ts
 
of
 a
da
pt
iv
e 
fo
re
si
gh
t 
B
y 
ad
op
tin
g 
id
ea
s 
of
 a
da
pt
iv
e 
pl
an
ni
ng
,  
ad
ap
tiv
e 
fo
re
si
gh
t  
ca
n 
ov
er
co
m
e 
m
an
y 
of
 th
e 
sh
or
tc
om
in
gs
 o
f 
fo
re
si
gh
t m
et
ho
ds
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
10
 
E
va
ns
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l  
St
re
ng
th
en
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 f
ou
nd
at
io
ns
 
of
 S
P 
by
 d
ra
w
in
g 
pa
ra
lle
ls
 w
it
h 
ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
 th
eo
ry
 
E
vo
lu
tio
na
ry
 th
eo
ry
 is
 a
 u
se
fu
l a
pp
ro
ac
h 
fo
r 
st
re
ng
th
en
in
g 
SP
 f
ou
nd
at
io
ns
. S
P 
ha
s 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l t
o 
in
du
ce
 f
ir
m
's
 e
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
an
d 
va
ri
at
io
n,
 o
r 
re
in
fo
rc
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
al
 in
er
tia
 
E
vo
lu
tio
na
ry
 
T
he
or
y 
 
20
05
 
Fi
nk
, e
t a
l. 
 
(2
-5
);
(5
-
2)
;(
5-
1)
; 
(4
-5
);
(5
-
4)
 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
es
cr
ib
e 
ne
w
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 f
or
es
ig
ht
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 b
y 
co
m
bi
ni
ng
 e
xt
er
na
l 
(m
ar
ke
t u
nc
er
ta
in
tie
s)
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 
(r
es
ou
rc
e 
ba
se
d 
ap
pr
oa
ch
) 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
T
he
 c
om
bi
ne
d 
ap
pr
oa
ch
ed
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
re
at
e 
a 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ea
rl
y 
w
ar
ni
ng
 s
ys
te
m
 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
ba
se
d 
vi
ew
 
20
09
 
Fo
rg
e 
E
U
 p
ol
ic
y 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 n
ov
el
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
th
at
 
co
m
bi
ne
s 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 m
et
ho
ds
  
It
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
to
 c
om
bi
ne
 m
ic
ro
 a
nd
 m
ac
ro
 le
ve
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
by
 u
si
ng
 m
es
o-
ec
on
om
ic
s 
M
es
o 
ec
on
om
ic
s 
20
10
 
Fr
ee
m
an
 a
nd
 
P
at
tin
so
n 
7-
(2
-3
) 
6 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s 
 
E
xp
lo
re
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 "
cl
ie
nt
" 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
.  
C
lie
nt
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t i
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
 H
is
/h
er
 
po
si
tio
ni
ng
 in
 th
e 
fi
rm
's
 n
et
w
or
k 
co
ul
d 
ac
t a
s 
an
 
en
ab
le
r 
or
 b
ar
ri
er
 to
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
12
 
G
lic
k,
 e
t a
l. 
10
 f
ir
m
s 
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
SP
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
 
(2
-3
) 
P
re
-t
es
t a
nd
 
po
st
-t
es
t 
su
rv
ey
s 
E
m
pi
ri
ca
ll
y 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 S
P 
on
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t's
 m
en
ta
l m
od
el
s 
 
E
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 S
P 
be
in
g 
ab
le
 to
 a
lte
r 
so
m
e 
of
 
in
di
vi
du
al
's 
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
 s
ty
le
s 
C
og
ni
tio
n 
20
10
 
G
oo
di
er
, e
t a
l. 
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
[2
];
  
(2
-3
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
bu
ild
in
g 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
th
at
 s
hi
ft
 f
oc
us
 f
ro
m
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
to
 in
du
st
ry
 le
ve
l 
P
ro
ce
ss
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
en
ga
ge
d 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 a
nd
 
he
lp
s 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 p
ot
en
tia
l c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
is
su
es
. 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
01
 
G
oo
dw
in
 a
nd
 
W
ri
gh
t 
7-
4 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
hy
po
th
et
ic
al
 
ca
se
  
P
ro
po
se
 a
 m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
ad
dr
es
si
ng
 a
n 
un
de
rd
ev
el
op
ed
 a
sp
ec
t o
f 
SP
: t
he
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
 a
cr
os
s 
a 
ra
ng
e 
of
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 
T
he
 u
se
 o
f 
m
ul
ti
-a
tt
ri
bu
te
 v
al
ue
 m
od
el
lin
g 
cr
ea
te
s 
a 
fo
rm
al
iz
ed
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 e
va
lu
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
w
it
hi
n 
SP
. T
hi
s 
po
te
nt
ia
ll
y 
av
oi
ds
 b
ia
se
s 
w
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
de
ci
si
on
s 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
 
20
10
 
G
oo
dw
in
 a
nd
 
W
ri
gh
t 
[2
] 
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
 a
nd
 
pa
st
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
th
e 
m
et
ho
ds
 in
te
nd
ed
 f
or
 
ai
di
ng
 in
 th
e 
an
tic
ip
at
io
n 
ra
re
-h
ig
h 
im
pa
ct
 e
ve
nt
s 
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
m
et
ho
ds
 a
nd
 n
on
-f
or
ec
as
ti
ng
 
m
et
ho
ds
 (
su
ch
 a
s 
SP
) 
ar
e 
ch
al
le
ng
ed
 in
 
an
tic
ip
at
in
g 
ra
re
 e
ve
nt
s.
 F
ir
m
s 
sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
1)
do
w
ns
id
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
an
d 
2)
pr
ov
id
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
fo
r 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g 
th
in
ki
ng
 
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g.
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
86
20
11
 
G
or
do
n 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a 
an
d 
T
an
za
ni
a 
(1
-2
);
 
(7
-2
) 
C
on
tr
as
ti
ng
 
ca
se
 s
tu
di
es
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
un
de
r 
w
hi
ch
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 
"v
is
io
na
ry
" 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
ar
e 
us
ef
ul
 
P
ro
po
se
s 
li
m
it
s 
to
 w
he
n 
"v
is
io
na
ry
" 
an
d 
 
"a
da
pt
iv
e"
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 u
se
d 
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
10
 
vo
n 
de
r 
G
ra
ct
h 
an
d 
D
ar
ko
w
 
L
og
is
tic
s 
in
du
st
ry
. 
G
er
m
an
y 
[2
] 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 f
in
di
ng
s 
on
 a
n 
ex
te
ns
iv
e 
D
el
ph
i-
ba
se
d 
sc
en
ar
io
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
 
M
ix
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 u
si
ng
 e
xp
er
t's
 k
no
w
le
dg
e,
 
D
el
ph
i m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
, q
ua
nt
it
at
iv
e 
an
al
ys
is
 a
nd
 
in
cl
us
io
n 
of
 d
is
co
nt
in
ui
tie
s 
fo
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
11
 
H
an
af
iz
ad
eh
, 
et
 a
l. 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
Ir
an
 
7-
4 
C
as
e 
St
ud
y 
In
te
gr
at
in
g 
sc
en
ar
io
 p
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
a 
M
C
D
A
 m
et
ho
d 
 
T
he
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
tw
o 
m
et
ho
ds
 c
re
at
ed
 a
 
po
rt
fo
lio
 th
at
 is
 s
ta
bl
e 
in
 f
ou
r 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ce
na
ri
os
 
P
or
tf
ol
io
 
de
si
gn
 
20
09
 
H
an
ss
en
, e
t a
l. 
R
eg
io
na
l 
fo
re
si
gh
t 
(7
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l  
Id
en
tif
y 
an
d 
di
sc
us
s 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
di
le
m
m
as
 r
el
at
ed
 to
 d
em
oc
ra
tic
 
le
gi
ti
m
ac
y 
of
 f
or
es
ig
ht
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
Fo
re
si
gh
t p
ro
ce
ss
es
 g
en
er
al
ly
 la
ck
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
to
 
en
su
re
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
it
h 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 v
al
ue
s.
 
E
qu
al
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n,
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 le
ve
l o
f 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
re
 in
ad
eq
ua
te
 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
20
03
 
H
ar
ri
es
 
[4
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
ro
vi
de
 a
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
th
e 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
s 
D
M
 to
ol
 
Sc
en
ar
io
-b
as
ed
 D
M
 e
va
lu
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 a
 c
as
e 
ba
se
d,
 e
m
pi
ri
ca
l o
r 
th
eo
re
tic
al
 p
oi
nt
 o
f 
vi
ew
. 
D
if
fi
cu
lt 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
if
 a
nd
 h
ow
 s
ce
na
ri
o-
ba
se
d 
D
M
 is
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
l 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
00
 
va
n 
de
r 
H
ei
jd
en
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
is
cu
ss
in
g 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
fr
om
 tw
o 
di
ff
er
en
t p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
  
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
1)
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
e 
fu
tu
re
 b
y 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g 
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
s;
 a
nd
 2
) 
ar
e 
a 
so
ci
al
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
at
te
m
pt
in
g 
to
 f
in
d 
a 
m
id
dl
e 
gr
ou
nd
 
be
tw
ee
n 
gr
ou
p 
th
in
k 
an
d 
fr
ag
m
en
ta
tio
n 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
04
 
va
n 
de
r 
H
ei
jd
en
 
(7
-2
);
 
(5
-1
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
R
ef
le
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
us
e 
an
d 
va
lu
e 
of
 S
P,
 
af
te
r 
m
an
y 
ye
ar
s 
of
 u
se
 b
y 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
Fo
ur
 r
ea
so
ns
 f
or
 u
si
ng
 S
P,
 e
ac
h 
w
it
h 
di
ff
er
en
t 
di
ff
ic
ul
ti
es
 a
nd
 li
ke
li
ho
od
 o
f 
su
cc
es
s 
ar
e 
pr
op
os
ed
. F
ir
m
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
r 
fr
om
 th
e 
ou
ts
et
 
w
ha
t d
o 
th
ey
 w
an
t f
ro
m
 S
P
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
12
 
H
ei
no
ne
n 
an
d 
L
au
tta
m
ak
i 
C
li
m
at
e 
an
d 
en
er
gy
 
po
lic
y.
 
Fi
nl
an
d 
[2
];
 
(3
-4
);
 
7-
2 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
on
 h
ow
 
Fo
re
si
gh
t c
an
 a
ss
is
t p
ub
lic
 p
ol
ic
y 
fo
rm
ul
at
io
n 
G
en
er
al
ly
 u
se
fu
l, 
al
th
ou
gh
 s
om
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
ar
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 w
it
h 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 p
re
di
ct
ab
ili
ty
, 
di
sc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
to
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
an
d 
po
lit
ic
al
 
in
fl
ue
nc
es
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
08
 
H
od
gk
in
so
n 
an
d 
H
ea
le
y 
[7
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
In
cr
ea
se
 o
ur
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
 
SP
 te
am
 
V
ar
io
us
 th
eo
ry
 -
 b
as
ed
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ns
 a
ro
un
d 
SP
 
te
am
 a
re
 a
dv
an
ce
d 
P
er
so
na
lit
y 
an
d 
So
ci
al
 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
87
20
02
 
H
od
gk
in
so
n 
an
d 
W
ri
gh
t 
Fi
rm
 in
 
pu
bl
is
hi
ng
 
in
du
st
ry
 
(2
-8
-3
);
 
(3
-8
-4
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
R
ep
or
t a
nd
 r
ef
le
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
a 
fa
ile
d 
SP
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
 d
ef
en
si
ve
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
w
er
e 
tr
ig
ge
re
d 
by
 th
e 
st
re
ss
 g
en
er
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
SP
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
w
hi
ch
 h
ig
hl
ig
ht
ed
 th
re
at
s,
 b
ut
 n
o 
cl
ea
r 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
  
C
on
fl
ic
t 
th
eo
ry
 o
f 
D
M
 
19
87
 
H
us
s 
an
d 
H
on
to
n 
[2
] 
L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
  
D
es
cr
ib
e 
3 
SP
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 w
it
h 
&
 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
nd
 d
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
  
A
 f
ir
m
's
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 S
P 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 m
ig
ht
 p
ar
tl
y 
de
pe
nd
 o
n 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
de
ta
il 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 m
ak
e 
a 
de
ci
si
on
. 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
19
99
 
Is
le
i, 
et
 a
l. 
P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
l i
nd
us
tr
y.
 
U
K
 
[2
] 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f 
us
in
g 
ju
dg
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
li
ng
 in
 a
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
w
or
ks
ho
p 
w
ith
 1
8 
se
ni
or
 m
an
ag
er
s 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
ca
l a
pp
ro
ac
he
s 
ar
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
gr
ou
p 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g.
 
Ju
dg
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
lin
g 
ai
de
d 
in
 th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
ou
tc
om
es
.  
Ju
dg
m
en
ta
l 
m
od
el
li
ng
 
20
11
 
Je
tte
r 
an
d 
Sc
hw
ei
nf
ur
t  
So
la
r 
en
er
gy
  
[2
];
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
Im
pr
ov
e 
co
gn
it
iv
e 
m
ap
pi
ng
 f
or
 S
P 
by
 c
om
bi
ni
ng
 q
ua
nt
ita
ti
ve
 a
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
of
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s' 
m
en
ta
l m
od
el
s 
Fu
zz
y 
co
gn
iti
ve
 m
ap
pi
ng
 h
as
 p
ot
en
tia
l t
o 
ov
er
co
m
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 li
m
ita
tio
ns
. 
D
if
fe
re
nt
 p
la
us
ib
le
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 c
an
 b
e 
cr
ea
te
d.
 
So
m
e 
in
di
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
pa
ra
di
gm
 s
hi
ft
in
g 
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
01
 
Jo
hn
st
on
 
[4
];
[7
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l  
R
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
le
an
in
gs
 a
nd
 li
m
it
at
io
ns
 
of
 f
or
es
ig
ht
 s
tu
di
es
 
N
ee
d 
of
 b
et
te
r 
th
eo
re
tic
al
 b
as
e,
 e
va
lu
at
io
n,
 
lin
ka
ge
 to
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
an
d 
cu
lt
ur
al
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
im
po
rt
an
t u
nd
er
-d
ev
el
op
ed
 a
re
as
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
12
 
K
ah
an
e 
 
[2
];
 
7-
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 n
ew
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 -
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
iv
e 
 
So
m
e 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
te
am
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
08
 
K
eo
ug
h 
an
d 
Sh
an
ah
an
 
[2
],
[4
],
 
[6
],
[7
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
C
ol
la
ps
e 
co
m
m
on
 e
le
m
en
ts
 in
 
di
ff
er
en
t S
P
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
 in
to
 a
 
ge
ne
ri
c 
m
od
el
  
T
he
 p
ro
po
se
d 
ge
ne
ri
c 
SP
 m
od
el
 in
cl
ud
e 
5 
co
ns
tr
uc
ts
: E
ng
ag
em
en
t, 
te
am
 c
om
po
si
tio
n,
 S
B
, 
de
ci
si
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
10
 
K
iv
ij
ar
vi
, e
t a
l. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 in
du
st
ry
 
(2
-3
) 
T
he
or
et
ic
al
 
an
d 
2 
ca
se
 
st
ud
ie
s 
P
ro
vi
de
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
l b
as
e 
fo
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 p
ro
ce
ss
 a
s 
a 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
of
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
in
no
va
ti
ve
ne
ss
 
In
co
nc
lu
si
ve
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 S
P 
as
 a
bl
e 
to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
cr
ea
tio
n,
 s
ha
ri
ng
, a
nd
 s
us
ta
in
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l i
nn
ov
at
iv
en
es
s.
  
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
cr
ea
tio
n 
20
07
 
K
or
te
 a
nd
 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 p
la
nn
in
g 
as
 a
 
to
ol
 to
 c
ha
ng
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
cu
ltu
re
 
SP
 in
vi
te
s 
ch
an
ge
 in
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
ul
tu
re
 b
y 
fa
ci
lit
at
in
g 
th
e 
re
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
of
 s
ha
re
d 
m
en
ta
l 
m
od
el
s 
th
at
 g
ov
er
n 
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
al
 a
ct
io
ns
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
09
 
K
ow
al
sk
i, 
et
 
al
. 
R
en
ew
ab
le
 
In
du
st
ry
 -
 
A
us
tr
ia
 
[2
];
 
(3
-4
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
A
na
ly
ze
 th
e 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
us
e 
of
 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
m
ul
ti
-c
ri
te
ri
a 
an
al
ys
is
 (
P
M
C
A
) 
A
ss
es
si
ng
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 w
it
h 
P
M
C
A
 is
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
in
te
ns
e 
bu
t t
he
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 a
llo
w
s 
fo
r 
a 
ro
bu
st
 
an
d 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 D
M
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
 
88
20
06
 
L
em
pe
rt
, e
t a
l. 
P
ol
lu
tio
n 
co
nt
ro
l  
7-
(3
-4
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
an
 
ex
am
pl
e 
P
re
se
nt
 a
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 f
or
 f
in
di
ng
 
ro
bu
st
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
un
de
r 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
of
 d
ee
p 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
R
ob
us
t, 
ad
ap
tiv
e 
D
M
 u
nd
er
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 c
an
 b
e 
bo
rn
 f
ro
m
 c
om
bi
ni
ng
 id
ea
s 
of
 S
P 
w
it
h 
de
ci
si
on
 
an
al
ys
is
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
 
20
10
 
va
n 
de
r 
L
ijn
  
Su
da
n 
[2
] 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y.
 
6 
sc
en
ar
io
 
w
or
ks
ho
ps
 
C
om
pa
re
 4
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 f
or
 S
ud
an
 in
 
ye
ar
 2
01
2 
H
ig
h 
si
m
ila
ri
ty
 in
 th
e 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d 
in
 
di
ff
er
en
t w
or
ks
ho
ps
 is
 n
ot
ed
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
04
 
M
ac
K
ay
 a
nd
 
M
cK
ie
rn
an
 
(7
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l  
In
cr
ea
se
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 h
in
ds
ig
ht
 b
ia
se
s 
on
 
fo
re
si
gh
t 
C
ou
nt
er
-t
o-
fa
ct
ua
l a
na
ly
si
s 
ca
n 
re
du
ce
 h
in
ds
ig
ht
 
w
hi
ch
 r
es
ul
ts
 f
ro
m
 s
ha
llo
w
 p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
hi
st
or
y.
 T
hi
s 
in
 tu
rn
 w
il
l e
nh
an
ce
 f
or
es
ig
ht
 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
an
d 
hi
st
or
y 
20
10
 
M
ac
K
ay
 a
nd
 
M
cK
ie
rn
an
 
[2
];
 
(2
-8
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
  
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 d
ys
fu
nc
ti
on
s 
an
d 
da
rk
 s
id
es
 o
f 
cr
ea
ti
vi
ty
 a
nd
 
in
no
va
tio
n 
w
it
hi
n 
SP
  
Fo
ur
 d
ys
fu
nc
tio
ns
 a
re
 in
fe
rr
ed
 a
nd
 f
ou
r 
op
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
de
al
in
g 
w
it
h 
th
es
e 
dy
sf
un
ct
io
ns
 a
re
 
pr
op
os
ed
. 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
-
na
l 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
19
87
 
M
ad
do
x,
 e
t a
l. 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
sh
or
t 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
 
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
"i
m
ag
in
er
y"
 a
nd
 it
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 in
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
Im
ag
in
ar
y 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 c
om
bi
ne
d 
w
it
h 
ra
tio
na
l 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
ca
n 
en
ha
nc
e 
SP
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
. 
E
du
ca
tio
na
l 
re
se
ar
ch
  
20
09
 
M
ah
m
ud
, e
t a
l. 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t
al
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
 
[2
];
  
(5
-1
);
  
(5
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
ro
po
se
 a
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
d 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 
sc
en
ar
io
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t i
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
A
 p
ot
en
tia
l u
ni
fy
in
g 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
w
it
h 
im
pa
ct
 in
 
D
M
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
va
lid
at
io
n,
 v
er
is
im
ili
tu
de
, 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 c
le
ar
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
sh
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
. 
Sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ite
ra
tiv
e 
an
d 
dy
na
m
ic
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
19
88
 
M
an
ne
rm
aa
 
(1
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ne
w
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 th
at
 c
om
pl
ex
it
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 c
an
 b
ri
ng
 in
to
 "
fu
tu
re
s 
re
se
ar
ch
" 
Id
ea
s 
br
ou
gh
t f
ro
m
 c
om
pl
ex
it
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 o
ut
lin
e 
a 
ne
w
 c
on
ce
pt
 f
or
 "
fu
tu
re
s 
re
se
ar
ch
":
 m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
   
 
C
om
pl
ex
it
y 
th
eo
ry
  
20
05
 
M
ie
tz
ne
r 
an
d 
R
eg
er
  
[2
] 
L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
 
D
is
cu
ss
es
 d
if
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 
So
m
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 r
ev
is
ed
. S
tr
en
gt
hs
 
an
d 
w
ea
kn
es
se
s 
di
sc
us
se
d 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
03
 
M
ill
er
 a
nd
 
W
al
le
r 
 
(3
,4
);
 
(4
-5
);
 
(5
-4
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
re
se
nt
 a
n 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 u
si
ng
 S
P
 a
nd
 
re
al
 o
pt
io
ns
 
T
he
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
pp
ro
ac
h 
pr
om
ot
es
 c
oo
rd
in
at
ed
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 a
nd
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
he
dg
in
g 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
  
R
ea
l o
pt
io
ns
 
an
d 
R
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
19
89
 
M
ob
as
he
ri
, e
t 
al
. 
E
le
ct
ri
c 
ut
ili
ti
es
 
(3
-4
) 
C
as
e 
St
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 c
as
e 
st
ud
y 
of
 S
P 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
at
 S
ou
th
er
n 
C
al
if
or
ni
a 
E
di
so
n 
T
he
 S
P 
pr
oc
es
s 
en
ab
le
d 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f 
st
ra
te
gi
es
. S
ce
na
ri
o-
ba
se
d 
pl
an
ni
ng
 b
ec
am
e 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 w
ay
 o
f 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
ft
er
 b
ad
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 
w
it
h 
tr
ad
iti
on
al
 f
or
ec
as
ti
ng
 m
et
ho
ds
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
89
20
09
 
M
oa
ye
r 
an
d 
B
ah
ri
  
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
vi
rt
ua
l 
ca
se
 s
tu
dy
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
ne
w
 m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
ge
ne
ra
ti
ng
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 -
 h
yb
ri
d 
in
te
lli
ge
nt
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
ge
ne
ra
to
r 
Pr
op
os
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 f
or
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
cr
ea
tio
n 
al
lo
w
s 
co
ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 f
uz
zy
 r
ul
es
 a
nd
 a
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
al
go
ri
th
m
s 
to
 le
ar
n 
an
d 
co
rr
ec
t f
ro
m
 e
xp
er
ts
 
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e 
sy
st
em
s 
19
96
 
M
oy
er
 
B
ri
tis
h 
A
ir
w
ay
s 
[2
];
 
(2
-3
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 th
e 
SP
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
an
d 
le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
ne
d 
at
 B
ri
tis
h 
A
ir
w
ay
s 
 
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
ca
us
ed
 B
ri
tis
h 
A
ir
w
ay
s 
to
 b
ro
ad
en
 
th
ei
r 
vi
ew
s 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
12
 
M
us
ka
t, 
et
 a
l. 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
y 
 
[2
] 
R
ef
ur
bi
sh
ed
 
ca
se
 s
tu
dy
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
m
ix
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 w
ith
 a
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e-
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e-
qu
al
ita
ti
ve
 s
eq
ue
nc
e 
fo
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
U
sa
ge
 o
f 
a 
qu
an
ti
ta
ti
ve
 a
nd
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
re
du
ce
s 
bi
as
 a
nd
 g
en
er
at
e 
re
su
lt
s 
of
 
hi
gh
 f
re
qu
en
cy
 a
nd
 c
on
si
st
en
cy
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
10
 
O
'K
ee
fe
 a
nd
 
W
ri
gh
t  
M
an
uf
ac
tu
-
ri
ng
 
7-
(3
-4
);
 
(3
-8
-4
) 
C
as
e 
St
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 c
as
e 
st
ud
y 
fo
r 
an
 
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 S
P
 in
te
rv
en
ti
on
 in
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
In
er
tia
 in
 D
M
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
tr
em
e.
 E
ve
n 
if
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fo
r 
ch
an
ge
 is
 s
tr
on
g,
 th
is
 w
ill
 n
ot
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 a
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
if
 p
as
t d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
re
 a
t r
is
k 
of
 
be
in
g 
qu
es
tio
ne
d,
 th
us
 u
ns
et
tli
ng
 s
om
e 
po
w
er
fu
l 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
C
on
fl
ic
t 
th
eo
ry
 o
f 
D
M
 / 
St
ru
ct
ur
al
 
in
er
tia
 
20
10
 
Ö
zk
ay
na
k 
an
d 
R
od
rí
gu
ez
-
L
ab
aj
os
  
P
ro
je
ct
s 
in
 
T
ur
ke
y 
an
d 
Sp
ai
n 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
D
ev
el
op
 a
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 f
or
 lo
ca
l-
sc
al
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
P
ap
er
 c
la
ri
fi
es
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 u
nd
er
 w
hi
ch
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 f
or
 lo
ca
l 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
09
 
P
ag
an
i  
3G
 m
ob
ile
 
T
V
 in
 
E
ur
op
e 
[2
];
 
(3
-4
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
P
ro
vi
de
 a
 to
ol
 f
or
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
rp
or
at
e 
or
 b
us
in
es
s 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
C
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 w
it
h 
cr
os
s 
im
pa
ct
 
an
al
ys
is
 a
ll
ow
s 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
of
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
th
at
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
s 
a 
to
ol
 
fo
r 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
08
 
P
ag
an
o 
an
d 
P
au
ca
r-
C
ac
er
es
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
E
xa
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 a
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
sy
st
em
at
ic
 e
lic
ita
ti
on
 o
f 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
fr
om
 in
di
vi
du
al
 le
ve
l t
o 
fi
rm
 le
ve
l 
C
on
ne
ct
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
an
d 
ca
us
al
 m
ap
pi
ng
 a
s 
el
ic
ita
tio
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ta
l d
im
en
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
H
ol
m
ic
 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r 
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
al
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
O
L
 
20
10
 
Pa
ge
, e
t a
l. 
 
T
ou
ri
sm
, 
Sc
ot
la
nd
 
[2
];
 
(7
-2
) 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y.
  
U
se
 o
f 
SP
 a
s 
a 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 to
 h
el
p 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
 o
f 
to
ur
is
m
 
SP
, w
he
n 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
to
ol
s 
su
ch
 
as
 e
co
no
m
ic
 m
od
el
lin
g,
 h
as
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l t
o 
id
en
ti
fy
 a
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
is
su
es
 to
 a
id
 p
ol
ic
y 
m
ak
er
s 
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
01
 
P
he
lp
s,
 e
t a
l. 
[6
] 
2 
C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
 
E
xp
lo
re
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 S
P 
on
 f
ir
m
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
So
m
e 
te
nt
at
iv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
im
pr
ov
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 S
P 
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
10
 
P
iir
ai
ne
n 
an
d 
L
in
dq
vi
st
 
Pa
pe
r 
In
du
st
ry
 
[2
] 
L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
 a
nd
 
ca
se
 s
tu
dy
 
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 tw
o 
ne
w
 m
et
ho
ds
 to
 
cr
ea
te
 s
ce
na
ri
os
.  
B
ot
h 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
 p
ro
po
se
d 
re
du
ce
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 
in
 th
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
ph
as
e,
 b
ut
 r
ig
or
 is
 a
ls
o 
re
du
ce
d 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
90
20
07
 
P
in
a 
e 
C
un
ha
 
an
d 
C
hi
a 
7-
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
is
cu
ss
 r
ol
e 
of
 te
am
s 
in
 im
pr
ov
in
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n'
s 
pe
ri
ph
er
al
 v
is
io
n 
T
ea
m
s 
w
it
h 
ex
pl
or
at
or
y 
pu
rp
os
es
, s
pe
ci
al
ly
 o
f 
th
e 
m
in
im
al
ly
-s
tr
uc
tu
re
d 
an
d 
im
m
er
se
d 
ty
pe
 
m
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 e
xp
lo
ra
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
pe
ri
ph
er
y 
T
ea
m
s 
20
05
 
Po
st
m
a 
an
d 
L
ie
bl
 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
ev
is
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 to
 o
ve
rc
om
e 
dr
aw
ba
ck
s 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
 
C
au
sa
lit
y 
an
d 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
in
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
bu
ild
in
g,
 
co
ul
d 
le
ad
 to
 s
er
io
us
 d
ra
w
ba
ck
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 
of
 c
om
pl
ex
 a
nd
 p
ar
ad
ox
ic
al
 tr
en
ds
 n
ot
 th
ou
gh
t 
be
fo
re
ha
nd
. A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
SB
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 
pr
op
os
ed
 in
st
ea
d 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
  
20
11
 
R
am
, e
t a
l. 
Fo
od
 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 in
 
T
ri
ni
da
d 
an
d 
T
ob
ag
o 
[2
] 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
 
In
tr
od
uc
e 
re
gr
et
 a
s 
a 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
cr
ite
ri
a 
ac
ro
ss
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 o
pt
io
ns
; a
nd
 
pr
es
en
t a
 n
ew
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 f
or
 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
ng
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 f
as
te
r 
T
he
 p
ro
po
se
d 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
de
pl
oy
ed
 
qu
ic
kl
y,
 in
co
rp
or
at
es
 s
ub
je
ct
iv
e 
ju
dg
m
en
ts
 f
or
 
m
ul
tip
le
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
, a
nd
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
 e
va
lu
at
e 
op
tio
ns
 a
cr
os
s 
an
d 
w
it
hi
n 
sc
en
ar
io
s.
 S
ev
er
al
 
dr
aw
ba
ck
s 
ar
e 
no
te
d 
D
ec
is
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
 
20
06
 
R
ik
ko
ne
n,
 e
t 
al
. 
P
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l 
[2
];
  
(2
-3
) 
L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
  
P
re
se
nt
 u
se
 o
f 
ex
pe
rt
's 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 p
la
nn
in
g 
pr
oc
es
se
s.
  
D
el
ph
i s
tu
di
es
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 
to
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 th
in
ki
ng
 b
y 
br
oa
de
ni
ng
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ba
se
 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
00
 
R
ou
be
la
t 
(1
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
R
ev
ie
w
 S
P 
in
 li
gh
t o
f 
its
 c
ap
ac
it
y 
to
 
us
e 
an
d 
cr
ea
te
 n
et
w
or
ks
 
T
he
 c
on
te
xt
 o
f 
co
rp
or
at
e 
SP
 is
 a
lw
ay
s 
in
 
m
ot
io
n,
 s
hi
ft
in
g.
 T
hu
s 
a 
ne
ed
 f
or
 a
 n
et
w
or
k 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
– 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 s
in
gl
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 –
 in
 
cr
ea
tin
g 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
06
 
R
ou
be
la
t 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
te
 
de
 F
ra
nc
e.
 
7-
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
y 
P
re
se
nt
 a
 lo
ng
it
ud
in
al
 c
as
e 
to
 
ill
us
tr
at
e 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 tr
ap
s 
of
 th
e 
SP
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
  
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
ar
e 
ra
re
ly
 a
da
pt
ed
 to
 
qu
es
tio
n 
do
m
in
an
t p
ar
ad
ig
m
s 
he
nc
e 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 
ha
ve
 a
 S
P 
ne
tw
or
k 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
 to
 
ch
al
le
ng
e 
ol
d 
pa
ra
di
gm
s 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
11
 
Sa
rp
on
g 
(5
-1
);
 
(7
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
pa
pe
r 
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 th
in
ki
ng
 a
s 
an
 
ev
er
yd
ay
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
A
ca
de
m
ic
s 
lo
ok
in
g 
at
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
th
in
ki
ng
 n
ee
d 
to
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 d
ai
ly
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
t t
he
 f
ir
m
 a
nd
 h
ow
 
th
os
e 
ar
e 
en
ac
te
d 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
 
So
ci
al
 
T
he
or
y 
of
 
P
ra
ct
ic
e 
20
11
 
Sa
rp
on
g 
an
d 
M
ac
le
an
 
P
ro
du
ct
 
in
no
va
tio
n 
te
am
s.
 
So
ft
w
ar
e 
 
(2
-3
);
 
(5
-1
),
 
(5
-4
) 
T
he
or
et
ic
al
 
an
d 
ca
se
 
st
ud
ie
s 
(3
) 
In
cr
ea
se
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
ca
us
al
 
lin
k 
be
tw
ee
n 
sc
en
ar
io
 th
in
ki
ng
 a
nd
 
in
no
va
tio
n 
Sc
en
ar
io
 th
in
ki
ng
 d
oe
s 
no
t n
ec
es
sa
ri
ly
 le
ad
 to
 
in
no
va
tio
n.
 C
re
at
iv
e 
em
er
ge
nc
e 
an
d 
op
en
-
en
de
dn
es
s 
of
 th
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
as
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
po
te
nt
ia
ll
y 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 in
no
va
ti
on
 
So
ci
al
 
T
he
or
y 
of
 
P
ra
ct
ic
e 
20
09
 
Sa
un
de
rs
 
M
us
ic
 
In
du
st
ry
  
[2
] 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
Su
gg
es
t a
 v
is
ua
l t
ec
hn
iq
ue
 to
 
co
lle
ct
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
T
he
 c
ol
la
ge
 te
ch
ni
qu
e 
ca
n 
ov
er
co
m
e 
so
m
e 
of
 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
of
 v
er
ba
l c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
.  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
91
19
93
 
Sc
ho
em
ak
er
 
M
B
A
 
st
ud
en
ts
.  
(2
-3
) 
4 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
.  
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 w
hy
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
is
 g
ro
w
in
g 
an
d 
its
 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l e
ff
ec
ts
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
ex
pa
nd
s 
pe
op
le
's 
th
in
ki
ng
 b
y 
re
du
ci
ng
 
bi
as
es
 o
f 
th
e 
hu
m
an
 m
in
d 
su
ch
 a
s 
ov
er
co
nf
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 a
nc
ho
ri
ng
 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
 
19
95
 
Sc
ho
em
ak
er
 
[2
];
 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
2 
ca
se
 
st
ud
ie
s 
D
es
cr
ib
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
an
d 
ho
w
 to
 u
se
 th
e 
re
su
lti
ng
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
 
G
oo
d 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
ca
n 
ov
er
co
m
e 
co
gn
iti
ve
 b
ia
se
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
ov
er
co
nf
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 tu
nn
el
 v
is
io
n 
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
02
 
Se
do
r 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
se
ll 
si
de
 
an
al
ys
ts
  
(2
-3
) 
E
m
pi
ri
ca
l 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 a
na
ly
st
s 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
es
en
te
d 
w
it
hi
n 
a 
sc
en
ar
io
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
 
Sc
en
ar
io
-l
ik
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 tr
ig
ge
r 
m
or
e 
op
tim
is
tic
 f
or
ec
as
ts
 in
 a
na
ly
st
s 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
20
06
 
Se
lin
 
7-
2;
 
7-
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
is
cu
ss
 h
ow
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 c
om
pe
l 
pe
op
le
 to
 a
ct
io
n 
an
d 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 f
oc
us
 
of
 tr
us
t 
T
ru
st
w
or
th
in
es
s 
in
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
so
ur
ce
s,
 c
on
te
nt
, 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
, n
ar
ra
ti
ve
 a
nd
 d
is
se
m
in
at
io
n 
T
ru
st
 
20
05
 
S
m
it
h 
(1
-2
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
D
is
cu
ss
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f 
co
m
pl
ex
it
y 
th
eo
ry
 f
or
ec
as
ti
ng
 a
nd
 S
P 
 
It
 is
 p
re
m
at
ur
e 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
eo
ry
 s
ta
tu
s 
up
on
 
co
m
pl
ex
it
y 
as
 it
s 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 s
ys
te
m
s 
ar
e 
no
t f
ul
ly
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d.
 T
hu
s 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 in
 f
av
or
 o
f 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
re
ca
st
in
g 
or
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 
C
om
pl
ex
it
y 
th
eo
ry
  
20
11
 
So
de
rh
ol
m
, e
t 
al
. 
G
lo
ba
l. 
C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
[2
] 
L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
re
vi
ew
. 2
0 
st
ud
ie
s 
A
na
ly
ze
 th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 
pr
es
en
te
d,
 e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
nd
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l i
ss
ue
s 
B
ot
h 
qu
al
ita
ti
ve
 a
nd
 q
ua
nt
ita
ti
ve
 c
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
ha
ve
 s
er
io
us
 li
m
ita
ti
on
s.
  
SP
 L
ite
ra
tu
re
 
20
06
 
So
ng
, e
t a
l. 
B
ei
ji
ng
 
[2
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C
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y 
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P
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h 
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SP
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 c
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 d
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ra
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ua
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an
d 
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e 
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C
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A
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 s
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S
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 b
et
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SP
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nt
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ve
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n 
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 c
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e 
ex
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 d
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n 
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D
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, e
t a
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y 
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nt
 a
 c
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e 
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 c
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ra
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at
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nd
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si
ng
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at
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 r
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 L
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-
W
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ke
r 
an
d 
C
he
rm
ac
k 
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C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
re
se
nt
 p
ar
al
le
ls
 b
et
w
ee
n 
SP
 a
nd
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e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
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se
 o
f 
th
eo
ry
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 S
P 
m
et
ho
d 
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d 
an
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nd
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tio
ns
, p
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s 
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tin
g 
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po
th
es
is
. I
t l
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ev
al
ua
tio
n 
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a 
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St
ra
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s,
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t a
l. 
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nc
ia
l 
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itu
tio
n.
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ut
h 
A
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7-
(3
-4
) 
C
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ce
pt
ua
l 
an
d 
ca
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st
ud
y 
In
tr
od
uc
e 
a 
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ew
or
k 
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m
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ni
ng
 
st
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ha
st
ic
 m
od
el
li
ng
 a
nd
 s
ce
na
ri
os
 
to
 a
na
ly
ze
 r
is
k 
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
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m
ul
ta
ne
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sl
y 
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pl
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en
ta
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 th
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os
ed
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
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to
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ed
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si
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s 
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 L
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ra
tu
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T
ap
in
os
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(1
-2
);
 
(3
-4
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
pa
pe
r 
 
M
ak
e 
ex
pl
ic
it
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 a
nd
 s
ce
na
ri
o 
pl
an
ni
ng
 
P
ro
po
si
tio
ns
 a
re
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 li
nk
in
g 
sc
en
ar
io
 
pl
an
ni
ng
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 d
if
fe
re
nt
 le
ve
ls
 o
f 
en
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ro
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en
ta
l 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
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P 
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 b
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te
gi
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s 
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d 
E
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m
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-
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U
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er
ta
in
ty
 
20
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T
ev
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(1
-2
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[2
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C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
Q
ue
st
io
ns
 p
re
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m
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an
t s
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e 
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 S
P 
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ta
tio
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ro
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si
ng
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ea
d 
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ri
en
te
d 
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B
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in
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fr
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ep
t o
f 
en
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en
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5 
st
ep
 f
ra
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ew
or
k 
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 p
ro
po
se
d 
w
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m
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iz
es
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al
 o
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en
te
d 
SP
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cr
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te
 f
ut
ur
e 
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fi
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w
an
ts
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n 
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tiv
e 
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So
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y 
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T
öt
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r,
 e
t a
l. 
C
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C
as
e 
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ud
y 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
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 tr
an
s 
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ip
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ry
 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
ca
n 
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pp
or
t m
or
e 
st
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le
 
st
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ct
ur
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 r
eg
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s 
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sc
ip
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pr
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s 
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e 
an
ta
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re
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te
d 
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le
dg
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 m
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tiv
e 
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ar
ni
ng
 p
ro
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te
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T
ra
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ar
y 
20
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V
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nd
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L
ite
ra
tu
re
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ew
 
O
rg
an
iz
e 
th
e 
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 li
te
ra
tu
re
  
P
ub
lic
at
io
ns
 c
en
te
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et
ho
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lo
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tic
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P 
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w
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l 
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 p
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an
ce
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 L
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tu
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V
is
se
r 
an
d 
C
he
rm
ac
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rm
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ra
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te
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ie
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ve
st
ig
at
e 
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e 
re
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tio
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p 
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ee
n 
SP
 a
nd
 f
ir
m
 p
er
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rm
an
ce
  
N
o 
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e 
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e 
of
 S
P.
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ep
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n 
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 o
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e 
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an
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tiv
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 f
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m
 p
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ce
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m
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re
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m
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l 
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 L
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V
le
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et
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l. 
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r 
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N
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C
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T
es
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 o
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en
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 s
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d 
by
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w
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 s
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A
 f
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 m
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e 
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 d
if
fe
re
nt
 o
rd
er
in
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 d
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ra
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is
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m
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L
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at
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m
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 p
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g 
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en
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 p
la
nn
in
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 c
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 d
ec
is
io
n 
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 L
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C
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pt
ua
l 
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 p
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 f
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 c
an
 b
e 
cr
ea
te
d.
 N
o 
su
ch
 
th
eo
re
tic
al
 f
ou
nd
at
io
ns
 c
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at
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: D
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at
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C
ri
te
ri
a 
D
ec
is
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 o
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 b
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ra
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 b
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 L
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 o
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 b
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at
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 b
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 p
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 f
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at
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 p
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at
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l c
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 p
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 b
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t b
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 c
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at
eg
y 
Q
ua
lit
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t  
20
05
 
W
ri
gh
t 
(2
-3
) 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
P
ro
po
se
 s
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l c
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 p
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 d
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 d
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w
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ra
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 p
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 c
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 c
or
re
ct
 th
is
 a
re
 p
ro
po
se
d 
C
og
ni
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D
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C
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fu
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 r
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W
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m
e 
in
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t D
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m
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tu
at
e 
in
er
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-
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 d
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m
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l b
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C
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l  
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t r
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 S
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ti
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 b
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O
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 p
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 s
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 L
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R
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P
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P
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 a
nd
 p
os
t 
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te
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n 
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A
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s 
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at
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ra
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n 
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ge
 in
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M
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 f
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cr
ea
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 c
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ra
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 f
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h 
st
re
am
 
O
pp
or
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 f
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 f
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ar
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 b
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 s
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t m
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 c
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 c
og
ni
tio
n,
 e
m
ot
io
ns
 a
nd
 s
oc
ia
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at
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ABSTRACT 
Integrating insights from organizational learning and scenario planning literatures, this study 
explores the dynamics of organizational learning through an investigation of the scenario 
planning process used by a leading global biotechnology company. Our longitudinal case 
study illustrates how scenario planning activities may operate as a learning system 
influencing both lateral and hierarchical transmission of learning throughout the organization. 
Following the learning trajectory from individuals to the organizational level over time, we 
identify important cognitive and socio-psychological barriers that affect both learning at each 
level and the transmission of learning between levels. Our study augments extant theory by 
providing empirical evidence of the multi-level and dynamic nature of organizational 
learning. We extend theory by conceptualizing strategic scenario planning as a learning 
system and providing new insights into barriers to organizational learning.  
Keywords: Organizational learning; scenario planning; barriers to learning; 
exploration; exploitation 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scenario planning (SP) intends to help organizations identify how environmental 
contingencies may necessitate changes to organizational strategies by forcing managers to 
consider alternative scenarios of future conditions (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002). This 
enhances strategic decision making by helping decision makers identify uncertainties, expose 
‘blind spots’ in organizational thinking and direct attention to issues which might otherwise 
be overlooked (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001). Moreover, it creates learning and future 
memory about how to deal with changes when they eventuate (Schwartz, 1991). Thus, SP 
provides competitive advantage by enhancing organizational awareness and shortening 
change response times (Chermack et al., 2001).  
Scholars propose that SP can generate such benefits because it (1) facilitates both 
individual and organizational learning; (2) helps devise better strategic options and aids 
decision making; (3) anticipates uncertain futures; (4) enhances sense-making; and (5) 
challenges mental frames, assumptions, prevailing mind-sets, and counter psychological 
biases (Chermack, 2004; Schoemaker, 1993, 1995; Schwartz, 1991; van der Heijden, 2004, 
2005; van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2002; Wack, 1985; Wright, 2005). 
Scenario planning first originated in the 1960’s (Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & 
van der Heijden, 2005) and the field has grown primarily through the development of a large 
numbers of scenario building methodologies (Varum & Melo, 2010) and anecdotal and self-
reported accounts of practitioners’ SP interventions (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008). The 
practitioner-driven nature of this literature has been more preoccupied with legitimizing and 
justifying SP than understanding causal mechanisms or grounding SP methods on solid 
theoretical foundations or empirical evidence (Goodwin & Wright, 2001; Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2008). Consequently, theoretical development and empirical research is much needed 
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to enhance understanding of the ways in which SP approaches can affect organizational 
outcomes (Burt & Chermack, 2008; Chermack, 2005; Chermack et al., 2001; Harries, 2003). 
Given the learning benefits attributed to SP, organizational learning (OL) theory 
offers a particularly promising conceptual lens for theoretically grounding our knowledge of 
SP; yet few studies have empirically explored this possibility (Chermack, Lynham, & van der 
Merwe, 2006). Those that have typically investigate learning through changes to individuals’ 
cognition. These studies have produced inconclusive findings as to whether SP produces 
changes in individuals’ mental models (e.g. Glick, Chermack, Luckel, & Gauck, 2012; 
Schoemaker, 1993; Zegras & Rayle, 2012) or perceptions of organizational-level learning 
(Chermack et al.,  2006).  
By conceptualizing SP as system for generating organizational learning, this study 
addresses calls for more theoretically grounded and systematic empirical research into SP 
(Burt & Chermack, 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008). Specifically, our study is designed 
to empirically investigate the mechanisms that might enhance or restrict flows of learning 
(Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011). We do so by exploring the 
dynamics of organizational learning through an investigation of the SP process used by a 
leading global biotechnology company. Using a participant-observer research design we 
studied the SP processes used by the company over a three year period to understand how 
new information flows through the organization, both laterally and hierarchically.  
The paper is structured as follows: The conceptual framework for the research derived 
from the OL and SP literatures follows this introductory section. The next section presents 
the methodology and data used for the analysis, followed by a discussion of our findings. We 
close with general conclusions, implications and directions for further research. 
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SCENARIO PLANNING AS LEARNING SYSTEM 
The conceptual framework for this study is developed from two key premises; (a) scenario 
planning (SP) activities operate as a system using inputs, processes, outputs and feedback 
(Chermack et al., 2001) and (b) the overriding purpose and explicit focus of SP is to foster 
learning by enriching how managers think, learn and feel about strategic situations 
(Georgantzas & Acar, 1995). Thus, SP processes operate as a system for generating 
organizational learning (OL). OL refers to the processes of communication, knowledge 
sharing and integration of new knowledge into organizational practices (Graham & Nafukho, 
2007). Effective OL enables the sharing of information and knowledge among organizational 
members to obtain insights about the environment, react to it more effectively and facilitate 
reflection about actions and consequences. Organizations learn about the effectiveness of past 
actions and apply that knowledge to guide future activities by drawing inferences from past 
activities and encoding them into routines for future behavior (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & 
March, 1988; Lipshitz, Popper, & Friedman, 2002) thereby increasing the organization’s 
capacity to take effective action.  
Though conceptualized and modelled in a wide variety of ways, there is general 
consensus that OL results from the learning that individuals’ undertake as organizational 
agents (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Wang & Ahmed, 2003). Individuals construct cognitive 
maps of the concepts and relationships they use to understand organizational situations 
(Weick & Bougon, 1986) and translate them into decision rules and action routines which 
guide organizational behavior (Cyert & March, 1963). The core process of OL is the transfer 
of learning by individual organizational members into organizational knowledge stocks 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Flores, Zheng, Rau, & Thomas, 2012). Individual-level learning 
transmutes into OL when insights are communicated across the organization, consensual 
validity is achieved, and information is integrated into organizational structures and 
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procedures to guide the subsequent thinking and behavior of organizational members 
(Shrivastava, 1983).  
To understand how learning progresses from the individual to the organizational level, 
Crossan and colleagues (1999) developed the 4I framework of OL as a multi-level theoretical 
model. The 4I framework suggests that processes of intuiting, interpreting, integrating and 
institutionalizing embed learning at individual, group and organizational levels, respectively. 
Individuals intuit insights and possibilities from their personal experiences and, through 
interpretation, modify their understanding and actions by refining cognitive maps. As such, 
interpreting deals with the conscious efforts to make sense of the intuitions, either within the 
one-self, or by transmitting those intuitions to others. As learning moves from group to 
organizational level the focus shifts to the process of integrating in order to develop a shared 
organizational understanding or memory (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Finally, incorporating 
insights into strategies, systems, structures and procedures institutionalizes learning into 
organizational culture, processes and actions.  
These four processes enable both explorative and exploitative learning. Explorative 
learning is the assimilation of new learning into the organization and involves a feed-forward 
process of moving learning from the individual to the group level and then to the 
organizational level. Exploitation is the utilization of learning by organizational members and 
occurs when knowledge embedded at the organizational level (institutionalized) feeds back 
into cognitive and behavior changes by individuals or groups within the organization 
(Crossan et al., 1999). Research has demonstrated the utility of the 4I framework for 
understanding the dynamics of OL underlying strategic renewal and (un)successful 
organizational change (Berends & Lammers, 2010; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003) and how such 
processes may be influenced by factors such as strategic leadership (Vera & Crossan, 2004) 
or political dynamics (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005).  
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We adopted the 4I framework for this study because we observed a strong conceptual 
linkage between the theoretically rigorous 4I OL framework and the more normative SP 
perspective. Specifically, integrating the two perspectives provides a useful conceptual 
framework for understanding how SP processes might operate as a learning system. 
According to the 4I framework, OL begins when “new knowledge enters the organization and 
individuals use their intuition to make novel connections, perceive new and emergent 
relationships, and discern possibilities that have not been identified previously” (Crossan et 
al., 1999: 526). While the 4I framework remains silent on where the new information comes 
from, the SP literature offers useful insights into how this may occur.  
One of the first steps in SP is to define the scope of analysis and develop the 
scenarios, which involves determining the relevant issues, past sources of environmental 
volatility and uncertainty, trends likely to affect the organization in the future, and the 
stakeholders likely to affect or be affected by these issues and trends (Schoemaker, 1995). As 
this process combines knowledge of past tendencies and circumstances with research into 
emerging and future trends and conditions, it incorporates both exploratory and exploitative 
learning by scenario developers. This suggests that the process of constructing scenarios 
could facilitate feed-forward exploratory individual level learning because development of 
scenarios requires that individuals intuit insights about the organization’s potential futures, 
interpret environmental information to refine their mental models of the organization’s 
environment, and develop relevant and credible scenarios which integrate these individual 
insights into group level (SP team) scenarios to be shared with other organizational members. 
When the process of scenario development is done collaboratively, such as through scenario 
workshops (Chermack et al., 2001; Schoemaker, 1995), discussions of issues, trends and 
uncertainties can also facilitate wider group level learning as diverse group members within 
103
the organization share ideas, engage in collective sense-making, and develop a common 
understanding (and language) of the future states the scenarios describe.  
Additionally, the communication of scenarios to other organizational stakeholders, 
such as senior strategists and business’ line managers, transmits the learning embedded in the 
scenarios across other organizational groups and up the organizational hierarchy (Wack, 
1985). SP may also help institutionalize and embed learning at the organizational level 
(Wright, 2005) if the insights captured in - or generated by - the scenarios lead to adaptation 
of organizational strategies, goals and mindsets, thereby completing the feed-forward 
exploratory learning process. Finally, when organizational members adopt and enact the 
organization’s new goals, priorities and strategies to exploit what has been learned, SP has 
also facilitated exploitative feedback learning. Furthermore, given the uncertainty in long 
term scenarios, trends need to be tracked and updated to inform which potential scenarios are 
developing. This refines strategies and informs implementation, further facilitating 
exploitation. In summary, SP processes can be conceptualized as a learning system by virtue 
of:  
1) Introducing new knowledge into the organization;
2) Facilitating both explorative learning (developing new knowledge) and exploitative
learning (using existing knowledge in new ways);
3) Supporting learning at individual, group and organizational levels;
4) Enabling flow of learning up the organizational hierarchy from individuals at lower
levels via middle managers to corporate level decision makers.
5) Institutionalizing new learning into organizational strategies and plans which guide
subsequent actions of organizational members.
Conceptualizing SP as a learning system draws attention to the specific SP activities
that may facilitate exploratory and exploitative learning by enabling the transmission of 
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learning between individuals, groups and the organization at large. As a result, we conducted 
a case study to empirically examine the processes through which SP activities generate OL.   
METHODS 
Research design 
The research was conducted as an in-depth case study in order to leverage the acknowledged 
strengths of case studies for a) investigating how and why research questions in contexts that 
researchers can observe but not control (Yin, 2003: 9); b) understanding social behaviors 
(Dyer & Wilkins, 1991); and c) enabling meticulously detailed examinations of  relationships 
between events, entities, processes and outcomes (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2010). 
Since the research was conducted to apply, challenge and extend our theory that SP processes 
may operate as a learning system, the study utilized an extended case method (Burawoy, 
1998).  
Following the tenets of the extended case method, we first clarified the conceptual 
framework for the study; our 4I OL theory of scenario planning processes. Next, we selected 
a case likely to confirm and challenge the theory (Wadham & Warren, 2014), which in this 
context required a focal organization actively engaged in SP. We chose a Danish 
multinational enterprise, Novozymes (NZ), operating in the biotechnology industry as our 
focal case because the company (1) operates in a dynamic and competitive environment with 
a stated organizational strategy of constant innovation and exploratory learning, (2) has an 
established SP process which has been in use for some years, and (3) has an explicit learning 
intention to better understand and improve its SP processes, enabling both research access 
and organizational commitment. We conducted the case study using an embedded design 
which combines multiple data sources to capture the interplay of professional activities and 
logics in their organizational and institutional context (Stake, 1995). Next, we analyzed the 
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data to determine the extent to which NZ’s SP processes operate as a learning system. We 
then refined and extended our theory about SP as a learning system to accommodate the 
barriers we identified in the study (Wadham & Warren, 2014).  
Data collection 
The study collected data through participant observations, field interviews, and archival 
material, as detailed in Table 1. As the study was broadly framed around the levels and 
processes of learning derived from the 4I framework (Crossan et al., 1999), we followed 
(Wickham & Woods, 2005) and charted the research design to a) define the data needed to 
provide conceptually valid evidence; b) identify potential sources for the data; and c) ensure 
valid analysis and interpretation of the data by verifying that data was coded in ways 
consistent with the conceptual definitions derived from the literature.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Observation data was collected by the lead author to offer insights into "behavioral 
patterns, but also the subjective experiences of organizational reality and the ongoing 
negotiations between members and subgroups over the interpretations and understandings of 
this reality" (Zilber, 2002: 237). Data was collected between December 2011 and April 2014, 
during which the lead researcher was granted access to NZ as a participant-observer in the 
company’s SP processes. During this period, the lead author spent approximately 15 hours 
per week immersed in various meetings and activities related to SP (including various 
meetings with senior executives, and one annual SP final presentation to the entire executive 
management team including the CEO, CFO and various executive VP’s). This immersion 
facilitated understanding of the key premises for SP in the company, identification of key 
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personnel involved in the process, and evaluation of the organizational context in which it 
was performed. In some weeks, the demands of the SP process required full time 
participation of the researcher (40+ hours per week); in other weeks the demands of the SP 
process did not require the researcher to be physically present in the organization. During the 
entire project period, the lead author was formally embedded and officially identified within 
the company as a researcher exploring SP processes, ensuring that organizational members 
knew the researcher’s purpose and were engaging with him in a fieldwork relationship 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). This approach provided access to individuals and 
highly confidential and commercially sensitive documentation that would be otherwise 
restricted or unavailable to outsiders. Similarly, it allowed the lead author to develop and 
utilize knowledge of organizational structures, processes and terminology to participate in 
discussions, observe actions, and identify the people, processes and documentation that 
should be examined as part of the research (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007). The disclosed 
identity as a participant-researcher in the company’s SP processes also allowed the lead 
author to ask questions and observe activities which would otherwise have been inaccessible 
or ‘out of bounds’ (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Observations were augmented by semi-structured interviews conducted with 22 
individuals involved in various SP processes. Interviewees were purposively selected for their 
knowledge and ability to contribute insights to our theoretical understanding of SP and OL 
(Bell & Bryman, 2007). An initial sample of 12 informants was recruited for the study based 
on their involvement in the company’s SP processes. This sample was subsequently 
expanded through snowball sampling (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981) as interviewees identified 
additional people involved in the process. The final sample of interviewees included directors 
and members of the executive leadership team (n=7), managers (n=9) and analysts and 
support staff (n=6) working in the functional areas of marketing and business development 
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(n=10), R&D supply operations (n = 6) and business support and finance (n = 6). 
Interviewee’s involvement in SP activities ranged from less than one year to over seven years 
in total, which provided an additional longitudinal perspective into the evolution of SP 
processes. The broad pool of informants – functional, hierarchical and with different tenure – 
provided impressions of the SP processes from diverse perspectives, which reduces potential 
biases in the data collection (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Table 2 provides an overview of 
the 22 interviewees. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The interviews were conducted between November 2013 and February 2014 and 
typically lasted between sixty and ninety minutes, producing over 28 hours of interview data. 
The interviews were structured around five main topics: (1) the interviewee’s personal 
background and organizational role; (2) involvement in the SP process and knowledge of its 
operation; (3) outcomes of involvement in SP which indicated learning effects, such as 
changes in individual cognition or behavior, or strategic actions derived from the SP 
processes; (4) possible learning barriers or enablers within the SP context; and (5) potential 
barriers or enablers of learning in the broader organizational context. At the end of each 
interview, interviewees were invited to raise any additional issues of relevance to the topic 
that were not touched upon during the interview.  
The semi-structured interview design enabled comparisons of interviewee 
perspectives on the five main topics while simultaneously providing flexibility to probe 
participants’ perspectives and experiences (Bell & Bryman, 2007). All interviews were 
recorded with interviewee permission and notes were taken as the interview unfolded, and 
revised within 24 hours of the interview’s completion for consistency with the recorded data. 
In 19 cases we also recorded voice memos after the interview to record the main impressions 
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and reflections of the interview: in the remaining three instances the insights generated were 
not novel enough to warrant this extra step.  
Interview and observational data were complemented by archival material including 
proprietary and nonproprietary company documents (e.g., field notes, working documents, 
company presentations, websites, and analytical models) to validate impressions from 
observations and interviews. Publicly available data (e.g., analyst reports) and historical data 
about the company’s SP processes during the period 2009 through 2011 were also collected. 
In total, qualitative and quantitative data covered 5 years of the company’s SP processes. 
Data analysis using N-Vivo  
QSR International’s N-Vivo software program was used to facilitate data management and 
analysis. All data was first imported into N-Vivo to create a case study database (Mainela & 
Puhakka, 2011). This provided an accurate and easily-updatable database which enabled the 
integration and comparison of multiple types and sources of data, thereby facilitating a multi-
faceted understanding of SP processes and dynamics and reducing the potential biases of 
relying on any single data type. N-Vivo was then used to support the coding and 
interpretation of the data by developing hierarchical systems of data categories (nodes) 
reflecting the concepts to which the data related and coding the data into the relevant 
categories for subsequent review and interpretation. Since the project focus was theory 
building and extension, we iterated between existing theory (4I OL theory), data, literature, 
and emerging theory (Locke, 2001) by combining deductive and inductive coding. Deductive 
coding was undertaken by developing a codebook of rules derived from the relevant literature 
(see Table 3 for an illustrative example) to guide the coding process. To ensure the coding 
was conceptually valid and consistent with the coding rules, a second author independently 
coded a selection of the interview data and variations in coding between the two authors were 
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addressed by discussing ambiguous data, clarifying coding rules and modifying the coding 
scheme (c.f. Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Inductive coding was used to develop additional data categories and coding rules 
which reflected and represented emergent themes identified within the data. For example, 
analysis of interviewee attitudes towards the SP process indicated that attitudes differed 
depending on the informant’s position in the organizational hierarchy. To capture the 
granularity in the data, nodes were created to enable coding according to the hierarchical 
level of the informant so that the perspectives of informants from different levels could be 
examined, compared and contrasted. During data analysis, N-Vivo was also used to explore 
potential associations between participant attitudes and characteristics by recording the 
attributes of informants and then using coding matrices to retrieve and review data according 
to informant attribute. As the analysis progressed, comparing and contrasting different 
versions of the node system provided an ‘audit trail’ of the decisions made, the evolution of 
our understanding, and the evidence on which it was based (Kikooma, 2010). As 
interpretations were developed and refined the second and third authors adopted the role of 
‘critical outsiders’ to whom the lead author detailed his observations, insights and 
conclusions. This was done to counter the acknowledged risk that being an organizational 
insider can lead researchers to probe less, assume too much and thus fail to consider 
alternative framings of an explanation (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007)  
THE CASE STUDY 
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Novozymes (NZ) is a worldwide market leader in industrial enzymes, which are biological 
catalysts that increase the rate of chemical reactions. The company has over 6,000 employees 
globally working in research, production, sales and administration (NZ website accessed 
August 2014). Their products sell in over 130 countries; 37% sales in Europe, Middle East 
and Africa; 33% in North America; 19% in Asia Pacific; and 11% in Latin America 
(Novozymes A/S, 2013). NZ’s product portfolio spans a variety of industries, including food, 
detergents, brewing, bioethanol, biomass conversion, forestry and textiles, among others. NZ 
has an active learning culture and the company’s strategy is predicated on innovation through 
learning and strong partnering (Novozymes A/S, 2012).  NZ’s four core cultural values – dare 
to lead, unlock passion, trust and earn trust, and connect to create - intend to encourage a 
learning context with highly motivated individuals alert beyond their own tasks. Indeed, 
employees are specifically requested to “learn from the outside” because the “world is full of 
ideas” (internal company document). Consequently, NZ’s culture can be characterized as a 
strong learning culture.    
Scenario planning at Novozymes 
NZ conducts SP as a deliberate and explicit learning process designed to facilitate explorative 
and exploitative learning. NZs SP process is undertaken every year and takes approximately 
eight months in total. It is a bottom-up approach which involves several organizational 
hierarchical layers across different organizational functions culminating in the presentation of 
the scenario work to the executive management and Board of Directors. Scenarios are 
developed using information from a range of internal and external sources such as the input 
given from each business units, external public information, macro trends identified by the 
core scenario team, and input from executive management. 
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Stage 1: Information gathering and construction of base case scenario 
The first stage of the SP process, which begins in September each year, concludes with the 
development of the initial base case scenario. The process begins with regional marketing 
managers from each of NZ’s various industry-based business units developing a strategy and 
forecast of sales and growth potential for the next five years based on price, penetration, 
industry growth, market share and new products. The forecasts are consolidated by the global 
marketing manager in consultation with the marketing director. Each industry strategy has 
input from employees from legal, finance, production, patenting, and R&D with the intention 
to pressure-test the different strategies. Out of this process, a base scenario for sales growth is 
created. Scenarios are also informed by anchor budget projections regarding the forecast of 
costs expected to be disbursed in achieving the anticipated sales – e.g., projections for raw 
material costs or human capital spending. These processes produce the anchor budget and the 
medium term planning forecast.  
After sign off by executive management, this 5 year forecast becomes the raw data for 
developing the base case scenario and subsequent scenarios. At this point the process 
becomes more centralized and a core SP team takes over. The core SP team is formed by 
three individuals anchored in the three functional areas of finance, marketing and supply 
operations. The main task of this scenario team is to analyze the base case scenario (5-year 
forecast) and stress-test its impact on different key parameters for the company such as steel 
capacity, investments needs, or overall profit margins. The study found that the individual-
level learning that occurred through base-case scenario construction and its transmission to 
Stage 2 was influenced by two factors: (1) searching and scanning routines and (2) individual 
cognitive biases.  
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Searching and scanning routines. Interviewees explained that when conducting 
environmental scans for information used in creating the strategies and forecasts that form the 
base case scenario, the organization focused their attention on 1) tracking the actions of main 
competitor’s, largely through publicly available information; 2) gaining a granular 
understanding of the market share in the company’s core enzyme business; and 3) ad hoc 
market intelligence requests. For example, special attention was given to conference calls 
from competitors and reports of key takeaway from these calls were routinely generated by 
NZ analysts and subsequently distributed to senior managers and executives. However, the 
organization did not engage in similar behaviors when scanning for possible competitive 
actions outside the obvious players, or new technologies. As one NZ analyst explained, this 
constrained NZs ability to learn about market dynamics: 
“…to give an honest opinion, I don’t think the information flow and analysis is that good at 
NZ… to give an example, we do not have clarity on the market share and size in this new 
market… NZ is mostly focusing internally towards what we are developing. How can we 
reach the market and so on, but what are the competitors doing? What is the next competitor 
move? We are not sure…. 
In learning terms, NZ’s scanning activities determine what information is filtered into 
the SP process. This filtering process, in turn, shape the content of the SP learning system 
being fed up the organizational hierarchy. In this way, the searching and scanning routines 
provide the basis for the development of industry strategies and later scenarios, thus acting as 
a barrier to the feed-forward process of learning 
Individual cognitive biases. During the scanning and scenario construction 
processes, the individual bias of overconfidence influenced the learning that occurred through 
SP by affecting perceptions of the competitive environment and NZ’s ability to compete 
successfully in it. For instance, the following statement from a senior manager discussing the 
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competitive landscape illustrates an overconfident attitude of environmental stability: “…I 
see possibility for all competitors, but that will probably go hand in hand with a big 
expansion in the market..”. As another director acknowledged, over-confidence in an 
organization’s knowledge about its environment can undermine learning when it limits the 
acquisition of new insights: “… I am not sure if we know enough about competing 
technologies. We have great knowledge in our core business, but I am not sure if we know 
enough outside our core areas…”.  
Interviewees also felt that estimations of future conditions were often over-confident, 
citing examples such as overestimations of future market potential and underestimations of 
investment costs. Analysis of five years of NZ’s SP presentations and projections show that 
projections are commonly over-estimated and then adjusted in the following years’ scenarios. 
As one manager explained, the tendency to over-estimate can also be exacerbated when 
projections are made over longer time periods: 
“The first year budget is typically much more realistic….but as you get further out… what 
you put into the projection in 2018 or 2019, most likely you will be in another position 
[within the organization] and will likely be less accountable for those numbers. And there is 
a long way to 2019, so the further out you go, it is more about being ambitious and seeing all 
the opportunities…..there is tendency to err on the side of being too optimistic rather than 
being cautious and conservative” 
Hence, overreliance on a stable environment and overconfidence in the organization’s 
capabilities were reflected in the form of high growth estimates, which may act as a barrier to 
explorative learning by affecting (biasing) the information that is filtered into the SP system. 
Moreover, such perceptions may also reduce credibility of the learning outcomes from the 
scenario process. As one director recalled: 
“I remember looking at these projections [from the scenario work] and I see something that 
goes like shooting to the sky… and I just thought, this sounds ridiculous to even be discussing 
this… how much uncertainty is out there and when we are discussing such new markets with 
this long run projections, I think we are wasting our time a little bit…” 
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The findings illustrate how over-confident estimations of future conditions may 
hinder forward learning in the organization by generating inaccurate understandings of the 
business environment and fostering perceptions in some organizational members that the SP 
process is based on unrealistic premises and thus of limited value. 
Stage 2: Scenario selection and refinement 
High and low case scenarios are built around the base case. These scenarios factor in different 
growth factors, specific products, market penetration, impact from the new product pipeline, 
optimization efforts, macro trends, industry, and regional factors. Other scenarios are 
considered if recommended by the core SP team or members of the executive management 
team (typically the CEO or CFO).  
This second stage of the SP process takes place in January. The scenarios are 
developed by the SP team and draft versions are presented to senior decision makers, 
typically the CEO and CFO. The draft scenarios include quantification of its effects on 
production needs, investments, and profit and loss items. These senior executives review the 
scenarios and provide feedback to the SP team as to whether any existing scenarios need to 
be further elaborated and/or any additional scenarios should be developed. As scenarios are 
further refined they are reviewed again by the CEO and CFO who may also consult other 
stakeholders as required. For example, if a scenario on bio-energy was constructed then the 
vice president for the bio-energy division would be asked to review the scenario and provide 
input. Final draft versions of the SP findings are ready towards the end of January. At this 
point the SP team has quantified the likely effects of the selected scenarios on production 
needs, investments, and profit and loss items. Next, the CEO and CFO are presented once 
more with these draft versions to discuss and select which are finally to be presented to the 
executive management team to inform their strategic decision making.  
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Our study identified several factors may impede the learning process during this 
stage. Particularly salient are: 1) functional bias of scenarios and 2) power and politics  
Functional bias of scenarios. The study found that scenarios themselves acted as a 
learning barrier by affecting how and which environmental information was communicated 
through the SP process. As the information is analyzed, interpreted and integrated within the 
frame of an operationally heavy process, information that could not be driven to fit such 
frame was excluded. Several interviewees expressed concerns that the financial 
(mathematical) and operational nature of the SP process frustrated exploratory learning about 
new environmental developments because, as the director of the SP process acknowledged, 
scenarios were only included “if they could materialize in numbers”. This hinders 
consideration of new strategic opportunities when the future market size and potential 
outcomes of investment are difficult to quantify, thus preventing exploratory learning. 
Analysis of the final SP documentation and presentations given to strategic decision makers 
provided additional evidence of this learning barrier. Only 6 pages of the 50-page final 
presentation to Executive Management in 2012 contained scenarios and information about 
new environmental issues; three of those six pages were in the appendix. These findings 
indicate that the functional bias of scenarios acts as a learning barrier by filtering out 
information which cannot be quantified, thereby limiting the information which can be fed 
forward through the SP process.  
Power and politics. Our study showed political power as a potential barrier that 
prevented individual level insights from being transmitted to the group level and 
institutionalized throughout the organization. In the eyes of the informants, the SP process 
was limited by its inability to generate enough explorative learning and adequately challenge 
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assumptions and strategy. This dissatisfaction triggered several attempts for change, but the 
lack of bargaining power of these actors prevented the inclusion of new learning possibilities 
beyond the localized areas where these actors had influence. In some instances, efforts were 
blocked by powerful individuals by eliminating options and rivals, setting the agenda of the 
scenario process, or exerting influence over final presentations.  
For instance, many informants questioned the financial emphasis of scenarios but 
these actors lacked the bargaining power to change the SP process. Since the SP team leader 
was anchored in the production side of the organization, a focus towards production 
capabilities and risks was deemed natural and value adding. Similarly, transforming scenarios 
into impact over profit and losses was needed in order to increase confidence in the numbers 
and long term targets to be communicated externally, and thus deemed necessary from the 
CFO’s perspective.  
We found that individuals directly involved in the SP process had learned 
experientially that the process was operationally heavy and too granular. With the exception 
of one informant, the rest of the informants directly involved in the SP process described it as 
extremely operational and acknowledged they had concluded from their involvement with the 
process that scenario construction in particular could be made more efficient and less time 
consuming. For example, one director expressed the view that “the process does not have to 
be that huge”, while two other directors felt the process could be made more valuable for 
strategizing by challenging assumptions about organizational strategies and focusing more on 
strategic perspectives than production capacity. However, participants acknowledged that the 
SP process’ main focus and deliverables had remained essentially unchanged for years 
despite individuals attempting to adapt SP processes to make the process more exploratory 
and less detailed; for instance by developing an alternative model “with more high level 
estimates and much less detail to make the process more value driven” (Director).  
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Furthermore, the study found that power and political dynamics acted as learning 
barriers by preventing insights about ways to improve SP processes from transitioning from 
individual to group levels (interpreting) and from group to organizational levels (integrating). 
Interviewees explained that although several attempts had been made to change the SP 
process to generate more explorative learning and challenge assumptions and strategy, these 
attempts had been blocked by managers further up the organizational hierarchy. As one 
director explained when discussing the history of SP at NZ:  
“Historically, the ownership of the process…who is doing what... has been a result of old 
battles in the organization about having influence because you are sitting on very interesting 
information. It is also about being promoted; who is having the discussion with executive 
management; it is a question of influence …” 
Consequently, although learning was generated at the individual level, the lack of 
bargaining power of the lower and middle managers involved in the SP process prevented the 
learning from transitioning to the group level and up the organizational hierarchy. The 
learning was consequently biased in favor of a heavy production orientation of the SP 
process, which resulted in scenarios and discussions of them being focused on implications 
for production capacity rather than forward looking strategic considerations.  
Additionally, during Stage 2, the power of the CEO/CFO and some members of the 
executive management team to influence the selection and development of scenarios affect 
learning by filtering the content of the scenarios and determining which scenarios are 
transmitted up the organizational hierarchy to senior decision makers. As powerful 
individuals attach value to particular scenarios and sponsor the forward feeding process in the 
learning system, it affects the language and cognitive maps adopted by others in the 
organization (Daft & Weick, 1984). In this way, we find empirical evidence of organizational 
learning being hampered by power and politics (Lawrence et al., 2005). 
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Stage 3: Scenario presentation, decision-making and continuous learning 
Around mid-February, the final scenarios are presented to NZ’s executive management 
group. This is typically conducted as a one-hour presentation with some discussion of the 
implications that scenarios could have for production and capacity needs. The scenarios are 
then presented to the Board of Directors at the Board Meeting held in April or May, thus 
completing the SP process.  
Interviews with senior decision makers reveled that SP enabled them to learn about 
new environmental conditions, such as the development of new products by competitors, 
likely growth in particular markets, and political and regulatory influences such as renewable 
fuel standards. This knowledge is used more for refinement of strategy – e.g. exploitative 
learning – as it helps executives to determine how the company might need to adapt to future 
requirements. As one director succinctly explained:  
“[Executive-level discussions of scenarios] gave a lot of actions on how to broaden 
production, where to focus in production, how to, for example, convince customers to go to 
high activity products to save capacity and production capacity and things like that.” 
However, NZ’s SP process also facilitated exploratory learning by offering different 
perspectives of the business environment, and by stimulating discussions about the 
company’s capacity to handle them, as the following quote from a senior director illustrates: 
[SP has facilitated] fantastic discussions for example in [a specific product market]. That 
was really good discussions about how demanding it will be when it happens, and I still think 
it will happen, because it seems to be happening now….But if it really starts to shoot off this 
will be incredible demanding for NZ to follow the needs from the industry.     
Insights generated from exploratory and exploitative learning were then 
institutionalized into organizational-level learning through adaptations to capacity planning, 
investment plans, business strategies and competitive strategies. Yet, a number of factors 
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were identified at stage 3 which affected the learning outcomes as well as the company’s 
ability to institutionalize learning.  
Lack of formal and informal structures to institutionalize learning. The study found 
that NZ’s organizational structure and decision-making culture often acted as barriers to 
knowledge flows making it difficult to integrate learning into organizational responses. For 
instance, lack of forums to appropriately disseminate the learning from the SP process, or to 
absorb and act on new learning as it originated, prevented effective organizational learning. 
Specifically, the knowledge created from the SP process was rarely distributed to the 
organization at large beyond the people directly involved in the process. These people, in 
turn, would typically only utilize the knowledge within their specific functional areas - 
mainly capacity planning or investment planning. This lack of organized dissemination of the 
learning outcomes was pointed out by several informants as a major drawback in the process. 
It also affected morale as most individuals did not see any results or tangible actions from 
such widespread and demanding SP process, thus further questioning its value. Moreover, the 
time allocated for discussion of the main SP findings with executive management was 
criticized for being too short and lacking two-way dialogue to provide new insights. As noted 
by a director, final presentations of the SP findings to the executive management had the 
feeling of “being an information session rather than strategic discussion session”  
The effects of inadequate organizational structures and governance mechanisms are 
further illustrated by experiences reported by one director when discussing the link between 
insights and action:  
“I recall the case when our research team did an analysis on a competitor entering the 
market, and we saw [evidence] fairly soon as some of our guys were approached by head 
hunters about this company looking for talented employees on the production side…So we 
knew they were moving in..…Then we started thinking; how could they actually do this 
[entering the market]… and what ended up happening is that they did exactly as we expected 
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them to do…we should have taken action on the analysis we did. We could have slammed the 
door on their attempts to enter the market...” 
When questioned about the reasons behind the lack of action, the director replied:  
“The information was sent to people very high in the organization, but it was never 
discussed; there was never a request to take actions and investigate this further... If you are 
sitting further down the organization you need to have somebody to tell top management you 
need to look at this … you cannot sit very low in the organization and ask for a meeting with 
top management. That is not how it works. We actually know quite a lot about this market. 
We spend a lot of time in this market, so let’s be sure we have forums and governance for 
taking action. I would say we did not have the right forum to have that discussion…of course 
it is also a people issue. If we had had one VP in the organization say this is really 
interesting; I want to be sure I understand this, let me be sure I call a meeting with you guys 
and my boss [sitting in executive management] and then we discuss it, then maybe. Of course 
this is easy to do, but it never happened; the discussion was never there…” 
The organizational structure at NZ, at the time of this research, favored the 
independence of its many business units as reflected by their strategic processes generally 
being dislodged from other business units. This bottom up process to strategy converges into 
the executive management team, who have been traditionally expected to drive decision 
making. As noted by a director working during several years close to the executive 
management team: 
At times we felt people were expecting the executive team to make decisions for them… we 
rather wanted them to make the action plans and decisions - we pushed the decision making 
down in the organization.  
Consensus driven decision-making culture. Several interviewees noted that the 
company’s emphasis on consensus-driven decision processes created delays in taking actions 
and making important decisions. This, in turn, hindered NZ’s ability to apply and act on its 
learning. As one project manager noted: 
“From the time there is an idea until the time you can start manning that project, it takes 
about one year. Just because it needs [to go] through several rounds of approval and 
decisions, and by that time somebody else might already have executed on that idea… 
managers cannot make a decision; it needs to go through executives and board [Board of 
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Directors]. Sometimes even VP’s cannot make decisions…I think the way we are structured 
delays actions”. 
In a similar vein, a marketing director labelled decision making and actions as a 
collective effort: “maybe we are exaggerating discussion and analysis without somebody 
pulling the trigger, everybody needs to buy in”. Similar insights came from a manager located 
outside the headquarters:  
“My impression is that the decision making process [in NZ] is a bit slow because it is 
consensus driven. Even if you have a point of view or an insight, it probably needs to be 
bought in by multiple stakeholders. It probably needs a very strong champion to push 
forward that point of view. If you ask me, it is a slightly over-democratic process”.  
Another informant called this the “theatre of decision making” because people at NZ, 
including top management, are aware that making unilateral decisions is not well regarded in 
the organization. A senior manager with relatively short tenure further explained:  
“…from meetings around the strategy process, or alignment with finance, it is always 
brought up: who can make the decision on these issues? Who do we need to engage in order 
to get a decision? And the answer is always like: oh we need to look into it … my first 
impression is that people have a hard time in figuring out who has the power to make a 
decision…” 
Our evidence suggests that the consensus-driven culture at NZ affects the learning 
cycle as the information residing at the individual or group level cannot be easily or timely 
integrated into the organizational level. In addition, NZ successful past and dominant current 
market position created further learning barriers by fostering an unperturbed culture devoid of 
process monitoring and evaluation of performance measures. For instance, a director in 
finance noted: “… the money is there and there are no penalties for doing wrong, we are 
lacking follow up systems”. Two other interviewees (a director and a senior manager) 
identified “being content” as a learning barrier, explaining that NZ “does not have a culture 
of hard follow up”. Indeed, one senior manager suggested that “if you enforce mechanisms to 
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revise past decisions and enforce prior plans, then you have a different company”. Several 
directors and managers also noted independently that the lack of follow up mechanisms 
short-circuited the process of reflective learning from experience as insights from mistakes 
(or success) cannot be internalized.  
DISCUSSION 
This study traced the scenario planning (SP) processes at Novozymes (NZ) in order to 
develop a theory of scenario-based organizational learning (OL). Building on the widely used 
4I OL framework (Crossan et al., 1999), we conceptualized SP as a learning system and 
found that the SP process facilitated exploratory and exploitative learning about the 
company’s competitive environment through individual level learning, transmitted to the 
group level and up the organizational hierarchy to inform reviews of organizational 
strategies. We identified three distinct stages through which NZ went in the process of 
conducting SP; scenario construction, selection, and final presentation including subsequent 
links to organizational action. The transmission of learnings through each of these stages was 
influenced by a number of factors that acted as barriers to learning flows: individual cognitive 
biases, searching and scanning routines, the functional bias of scenarios, power and political 
dynamics, and the organization’s structure and culture of decision making processes. Figure 1 
presents a model of scenario planning as a learning system based on our empirical findings: 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Our findings that searching and scanning routines skewed information being brought 
into the learning system and the development of scenarios away from exploratory learning is 
consistent with prior research showing that scanning processes at all levels of the 
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organization are likely to be oriented towards known rather than unknown events (e.g., Beck 
& Plowman, 2009). Likewise, our finding that individual biases such as overconfidence 
affected the information fed into scenarios is consistent with some of the attributes of 
learning myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993). Overconfidence leads to reinterpretation of 
result to make them more favorable, which combined with successful individual’s 
underestimation of future risks may lead to biased overestimation of expected returns 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). 
Once the scenarios are constructed, the next stage involves selecting and refining the 
scenarios to be presented to the executive management team. We found that the functional 
bias of scenarios affected which information was attended to, and how individuals interpreted 
new information about the environment and integrated their insights into scenarios to be 
communicated to other organizational members. This is consistent with extant research 
demonstrating the problems that biases and heuristics cause on individual judgments (e.g. 
Bardolet, Fox, & Lovallo, 2011; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Durand, 2003; Hodgkinson, 
Brown, Maule, Glaister, & Pearman, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the context of 
SP, individual biases appear to constitute important barriers to feed forward learning 
processes; particularly in the process of moving learning from individuals via intuiting and 
interpreting to group and organizational levels. Although theoretically SP should help 
overcome individual biases by challenging existing frames of mind (Schoemaker, 1995; van 
der Heijden, 2005) and shifting focus to long run performance, our study suggests that SP 
may in fact exacerbate biases by perpetuating specific views of the environment.  
The evidence points to difficulties in bringing new information into the learning 
system. This complements the 4I learning framework (Crossan et al., 1999), which remains 
relatively silent on how new knowledge and insights enter the learning system as well as how 
individuals learn through cognitive processes. Moreover, it suggests the need for further 
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research focusing on how to improve or promote individual intuiting of truly new patters into 
the context of organizational learning.  
Scenario selection and retention is the responsibility of higher level managers, who 
exercise their power to determine what specific information and knowledge is transmitted up 
the organizational hierarchy. During this stage, power and political dynamics, in particular, 
affect the integration of insights into organizational learning and may prevent new insights 
from being institutionalized into revised organizational strategies. Our finding that power and 
political dynamics critically influenced how learning insights were transmitted up the 
organizational hierarchy and institutionalized into decision making processes is consistent 
with the notion of organizational learning as a political process (e.g. Blackler & McDonald, 
2000; Fox, 2000). 
These findings provide some empirical support for Lawrence et al.’s, (2005) 
proposition that the transition of feeding forward learning between groups and the 
organizational level may be challenged by administrative political processes. Powerful 
individuals may legitimize specific ideas and transform them into organizational 
interpretations through their ability to influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of those 
around them (Lawrence et al., 2005), which can result in decision making processes 
becoming focused on justifying past actions or the current position, even if change is justified 
(Das & Teng, 1999). Furthermore, our study shifts the focus from political power to lack of 
bargaining power by illustrating that political influence and power imbalances influence the 
transmission of learning upwards in the organizational hierarchy. Without the appropriate 
bargaining power to question assumptions and the status quo at the higher tiers of the 
organization, new learning becomes difficult to institutionalize. Thus, we extend knowledge 
about the barriers to learning flows (e.g. Schilling & Kluge, 2009) by providing empirical 
support for the proposed effects of power on learning processes, and by demonstrating that 
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they influence more learning processes than has previously been theorized (Lawrence et al., 
2005). 
The final stage in the scenario planning process involves presentation of finalized 
scenarios to executive management which forms the basis for institutionalized learning in the 
form of strategy development and subsequent links to action. Top executives are taxed with 
the task of making long-term strategic decisions based on the information that is retained in 
the final scenarios presented to them in often very short meetings. Our evidence shows that 
without the adequate corporate level formal and informal structures, absorption of new 
insights and transformation of learning into institutionalized organizational responses cannot 
occur. Given human cognitive limitations, the lack of such organizational structures may 
overload senior management and thus crippling its ability to attend to important 
environmental queues. Hence, even if these external queues are initially interpreted and 
integrated at group level, they may never become organizationally embedded through 
institutionalization.  
Paradoxically, the culture at NZ also was identified as a barrier to organizational 
learning. Even though the organization has a strong culture focused on learning and 
innovation, it was observed that the preference for democratic, consensual decision making 
combined with lack of effective monitoring and follow-up systems blocked the ability to 
effectively learn from prior mistakes. A ‘culture of content’ resulted in an insufficient 
impetus to translate cognitive action into process changes, thus preventing the 
institutionalization of process improvements (Berends & Lammers, 2010; Schilling & Kluge, 
2009). 
Finally, the organizational structures and decision-making culture at stage three were 
found to affect the extent to which learning moved up the organizational hierarchy. 
Specifically, organizational learning flows appear to be influenced by the power and 
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hierarchical positions of individuals within NZ; from analysts of front liners representing the 
“individual” level via project managers or directors representing “the group level” to VP’s or 
executives representing the “organizational level”.  
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our findings advance knowledge about organizational learning (OL) and scenario planning 
(SP) in a number of important ways. First, by conceptualizing SP as an organizational 
learning system we contribute to the theoretically grounding of knowledge about scenario 
planning. Despite a rich normative literature on the virtues and processes associated with SP 
(Burt & Chermack, 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008), our study demonstrates the utility of 
the 4I OL framework (Crossan et al., 1999) as theoretical lens for understanding how SP may 
operate as a learning system.  
Moreover, we extend theory by identifying specific factors that influence the feed-
forward transmission of learning up the organizational hierarchy through the SP processes. 
Specifically, we illustrate how SP process design may condition how new information enters 
the learning system and the role of various cognitive and structural biases in filtering 
information as it moves not only forward but also upward in the organization. Whereas the 4I 
framework focuses on the mechanisms that enable learning to move forward from individuals 
to teams and become organizationally embedded, our study highlights the importance of 
identifying cognitive and socio-psychological barriers to learning that influence both lateral 
and hierarchical transmission of learning throughout the organization. Taken together, these 
findings are relevant for practitioners given the widely spread use of SP processes in 
organizations. Our findings show that the intended learning outcomes of SP activities may 
never materialize as various barriers might block or bias any potential learning benefits. 
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The single case nature of our study has the acknowledged limitation that our 
interpretations and findings might be idiosyncratic to the studied organization (Eisenhardt, 
1989). For instance, NZ emphasizes learning and innovation as important parts of its strategy 
and invests in resources to promote learning, which may have influenced the resources, 
structures and processes of the SP learning system. Similarly, the company operates in the 
highly dynamic biotechnology industry, which may have created industry-specific external 
pressure to keep up with fast-moving environmental conditions that then influenced the 
organization’s engagement in SP and OL. Further research should extend this study by 
examining firms operating in different industries and with different learning orientations so as 
to determine whether and how these contextual factors might influence the SP and OL 
processes our study has described. Such studies could also pave the way for much–needed 
future studies critically evaluating and comparing SP approaches (Chermack et al., 2001).  
Similarly, organizational types or societal variables such as education inclination or 
labor market structures could also influence learning within an organization (Lam, 2000). 
Consequently, we encourage future empirical studies to apply the 4I OL model of the SP 
learning system to a wider range of cases and contexts in order to clarify the boundaries of 
our theory and identify where and how it can be further refined and extended. Future research 
could also extend this line of inquiry to include other barriers to learning, such as emotions 
(Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Schilling & Kluge, 2009; Sun & Scott, 2005), and examine 
how they may also influence learning in SP processes.  
Our case study included participant observation which provided the lead author 
unique access to valuable and detailed company information. Although this approach may 
raise concerns about ethnographer bias (Dewalt, Dewalt, & Wayland, 1998), this was 
minimized by charting the research design to identify theoretically relevant data and by 
collecting different types of data from multiple sources. Integrating data via the N Vivo case 
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study database for analysis ensured that interpretations could be verified through data 
triangulation, while coding checks and the second and third authors’ role as ‘critical 
outsiders’ verified interpretations and conclusions. Notwithstanding, we recommend future 
ethnographic studies of SP be conducted by embedding multiple researchers or research 
teams within organizations so as to further minimize the potential for ethnographer bias.   
Our study also provide additional support for calls to increase multilevel research on 
organizational learning to better understand the flow of learning across different 
organizational levels (Crossan et al., 2011). We specifically advocate further research 
examining individual-level differences in learning, especially in light of our findings that the 
power held by people at different levels of the organizational hierarchy may influence the 
transmission of learning from one level to another. Related, our findings about the influence 
of hierarchical level on learning through SP motivate us to suggest that future research further 
clarify learning flows in specific learning processes. Organizational learning theory 
conceptualizes learning as disseminating from the individual to the group and on to the 
broader organization (e.g., Crossan et al., 1999). Our study demonstrates that in the context of 
SP, insights were fed up the organizational hierarchy rather than diffused across the broader 
organizational system. Research into top management teams has established that individuals 
in upper echelon positions think and act differently to people at other (lower) levels of the 
organizational hierarchy (Doh, 2003). Hence, examining how individual-level characteristics 
differ across hierarchical levels may advance understanding of factors that influence learning 
at the individual level and the transition of learning between levels.  
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EPILOGUE 
A recent change in the company CEO followed by an internal reorganization seems to be 
addressing some of the identified barriers pertaining to organizational learning. First, formal 
teams have been put in place to better manage and follow up on the performance of the new 
product pipelines. Moreover, new personnel have been hired to create a “performance 
management” initiative which is endorsed by top management and has the necessary 
resources and empowerment to monitor performance and change reward systems 
accordingly. These measures aim at changing the “culture of content” at NZ and promote 
performance focus and revision of past actions. Further, a new corporate strategy center has 
been created. Among other tasks, this unit is responsible for the construction of scenarios 
aimed at challenging corporate strategy. This new unit will also be responsible of ensuring 
top-down integration of knowledge and learning throughout the organization and, as such, act 
as a feedback mechanism in the learning system by creating faster reaction time between 
learning and action. The success of these changes however is not certain; for instance, there 
are “many battles and strong resistance” to implement the desired performance changes and 
most of the people driving this project have already left the organization. 
130
REFERENCES 
Anand, B. N., & Khanna, T. 2000. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 295–315. 
Argote, L. 1999. Organizational learning: Creating, retraining and transferring 
knowledge. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic. 
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. 1978. Organizational learning: A theory of action approach. 
Reading, MA: Addision Wesley. 
Bardolet, D., Fox, C. R., & Lovallo, D. 2011. Corporate capital allocation: a behavioral 
perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 32(13): 1465–1483. 
Beck, T. E., & Plowman, D. A. 2009. Experiencing Rare and Unusual Events Richly: The 
Role of Middle Managers in Animating and Guiding Organizational Interpretation. 
Organization Science, 20(5): 909–924. 
Bell, E., & Bryman, A. 2007. The Ethics of Management Research: An Exploratory Content 
Analysis. British Journal of Management, 18(1): 63–77. 
Berends, H., & Lammers, I. 2010. Explaining discontinuity in organizational learning: A 
process analysis. Organization Studies, 31(8): 1045–1068. 
Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. 1981. Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain 
Referral Sampling. Sociological Methods & Research, 10(2): 141–163. 
Bingham, C. B., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2011. Rational heuristics: the “simple rules” that 
strategists learn from process experience. Strategic Management Journal, 32(13): 
1437–1464. 
Blackler, F., & McDonald, S. 2000. Power, mastery and organizational learning. Journal of 
Management Studies, 37(6): 833–852. 
131
Bradfield, R., Wright, G., Burt, G., Cairns, G., & van der Heijden, K. 2005. The origins and 
evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning. Futures, 37(8): 
795–812. 
Brannick, T., & Coghlan, D. 2007. In Defense of Being “Native”: The Case for Insider 
Academic Research. Organizational Research Methods, 10(1): 59–74. 
Burawoy, M. 1998. The Extended Case Method. Sociological Theory, 16(1): 4–33. 
Burt, G., & Chermack, T. 2008. Learning With Scenarios: Summary and Critical Issues. 
Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10(2): 285–295. 
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. 1999. Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental 
approach. The American Economic Review, 89(1): 306–318. 
Chermack, T. 2004. A Theoretical Model of Scenario Planning. Human Resource 
Development Review, 3(4): 301–325. 
Chermack, T. 2005. Studying scenario planning: Theory, research suggestions, and 
hypotheses. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 72(1): 59–73. 
Chermack, T., Lynham, S., & Ruona, W. 2001. A Review of Scenario Planning Literature. 
Futures Research Quarterly, (Quarterly Summer 2001): 7–31. 
Chermack, T., Lynham, S., & van der Merwe, L. 2006. Exploring the relationship between 
scenario planning and perceptions of learning organization characteristics. Futures, 
38(7): 767–777. 
Crossan, M. M., & Berdrow, I. 2003. Organizational learning and strategic renewal. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24(11): 1087–1105. 
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. 1999. An organizational learning framework: 
from intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 522–537. 
132
Crossan, M. M., Maurer, C. C., & White, R. E. 2011. Reflections on the 2009 AMR decade 
award: do we have a theory of organizational learning? Academy of Management 
Review, 36(3): 446–460. 
Cyert, R., & March, J. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Daft, R. L., & Weick, K. E. 1984. Toward a model of organizations as interpretation systems. 
Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 284–295. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 1999. Cognitive Biases and Strategic Decision Processes: An 
Integrative Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 36(6): 757–778. 
Dewalt, K. M., Dewalt, B. R., & Wayland, C. B. 1998. Participant Observation. In H. R. 
Bernard (Ed.), Handbook of methods in cultural anthropology: 259–300. Walnut 
Creek, CA: Altamira Press. 
Doh, J. P. 2003. Can leadership be taught? Perspectives from management educators. 
Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2(1): 54–67. 
Durand, R. 2003. Predicting a firm’s forecasting ability: the roles of organizational illusion of 
control and organizational attention. Strategic Management Journal, 24(9): 821–838. 
Dyer, W. G., & Wilkins, A. L. 1991. Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better 
theory: A rejoinder to Eisenhardt. Academy of Management Review, 16(3): 613–619. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 532–550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. The Academy of Management Journal Archive, 50(1): 25–32. 
Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. 1985. Organizational learning. Academy of Management 
Review, 10(4): 803–813. 
133
Flores, L. G., Zheng, W., Rau, D., & Thomas, C. H. 2012. Organizational Learning: 
Subprocess Identification, Construct Validation, and an Empirical Test of Cultural 
Antecedents. Journal of Management, 38(2): 640–667. 
Fox, S. 2000. Communities of Practice, Foucault and Actor-Network Theory. Journal of 
Management Studies, 37(6): 853–868. 
Georgantzas, N. C., & Acar, W. 1995. Scenario-driven planning: learning to manage 
strategic uncertainty. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. 
Glick, M. B., Chermack, T. J., Luckel, H., & Gauck, B. Q. 2012. Effects of scenario planning 
on participant mental models. European Journal of Training and Development, 
36(5): 488–507. 
Goodwin, P., & Wright, G. 2001. Enhancing strategy evaluation in scenario planning: a role 
for decision analysis. Journal of Management Studies, 38(1): 1–16. 
Graham, C. M., & Nafukho, F. M. 2007. Culture, organizational learning and selected 
employee background variables in small-size business enterprises. Journal of 
European Industrial Training, 31(2): 127–144. 
Harries, C. 2003. Correspondence to what? Coherence to what? What is good scenario-based 
decision making? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 70(8): 797–817. 
Hodgkinson, G., Brown, N., Maule, J., Glaister, K., & Pearman, A. 1999. Breaking the 
frame: An analysis of strategic cognition and decision making under uncertainty. 
Strategic Management Journal, 20: 977–985. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., & Healey, M. P. 2008. Toward a (Pragmatic) Science of Strategic 
Intervention: Design Propositions for Scenario Planning. Organization Studies, 
29(3): 435–457. 
134
Hodgkinson, G. P., & Healey, M. P. 2011. Psychological foundations of dynamic 
capabilities: reflexion and reflection in strategic management. Strategic Management 
Journal, 32(13): 1500–1516. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., & Wright, G. 2002. Confronting strategic inertia in a top management 
team: Learning from failure. Organization Studies, 23(6): 949–977. 
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. 1993. Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive 
perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39(1): 17–31. 
Kikooma, J. F. 2010. Using Qualitative Data Analysis Software in a Social Constructionist 
Study of Entrepreneurship. Qualitative Research Journal, 10(1): 40–51. 
Lam, A. 2000. Tacit Knowledge, Organizational Learning and Societal Institutions: An 
Integrated Framework. Organization Studies, 21(3): 487–513. 
Lawrence, T. B., Mauws, M. K., Dyck, B., & Kleysen, R. F. 2005. The politics of 
organizational learning: integrating power into the 4I framework. Academy of 
Management Review, 30(1): 180–191. 
Levinthal, D., & March, J. 1993. The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management Journal, 
14: 95–112. 
Levitt, B., & March, J. 1988. Organizational Learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14: 
319–340. 
Lipshitz, R., Popper, M., & Friedman, V. J. 2002. A multifacet model of organizational 
learning. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 38(1): 78–98. 
Locke, K. 2001. Grounded Theory in Management Research. London: Sage Publications 
Ltd. 
Lovallo, D., & Kahneman, D. 2003. Delusions of Success. How optimism undermines 
executives’ decisions. Harvard Business Review. 
135
Mainela, T., & Puhakka, V. 2011. Role of Netoworks in Emergence of International New 
Ventures. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing, 3(1): 5–25. 
Nag, R., Corley, K. G., & Gioia, D. A. 2007. The intersection of organizational identity, 
knowledge, and practice: Attempting strategic change via knowledge grafting. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(4): 821–847. 
Novozymes A/S. 2012. The Novozymes Report 2012 - Long-term targets and strategy. 
http://report2012.novozymes.com/menu/the-novozymes-report-2012/outlook/long-
term-targets-and-strategy. 
Novozymes A/S. 2013. The Novozymes Report 2013. 
http://www.novozymes.com/en/investor/financial-reports/Documents/The-
Novozymes-Report-2013.pdf. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. 2009. Research Methods for Business Students. 
London, UK: Prentice Hall. 
Schilling, J., & Kluge, A. 2009. Barriers to organizational learning: An integration of theory 
and research. International Journal of Management Reviews, 11(3): 337–360. 
Schoemaker, P. 1993. Multiple scenario development: Its conceptual and behavioral 
foundation. Strategic Management Journal, 14(3): 193–213. 
Schoemaker, P. 1995. Scenario Planning: A tool for Strategic Thinking. Sloan Management 
Review, Winter(36, 2). 
Schwartz, P. 1991. The Art of the Long View. New York: Doubleday. 
Shrivastava, P. 1983. A Typology of Organizational Learning Systems. Journal of 
Management Studies, 20(1): 7–28. 
Stake, R. E. 1995. The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage. 
Sun, P. Y. T., & Scott, J. L. 2005. An investigation of barriers to knowledge transfer. Journal 
of Knowledge Management, 9(2): 75–90. 
136
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185: 1124–1131. 
Van der Heijden, K. 2004. Can internally generated futures accelerate organizational 
learning? Futures, 36(2): 145–159. 
Van der Heijden, K. 2005. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (Second). John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Van der Heijden, K., Bradfield, R., Burt, G., Cairns, G., & Wright, G. 2002. The Sixth 
Sense: Accelerating Organizational Learning with Scenarios. Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley. 
Varum, C. A., & Melo, C. 2010. Directions in scenario planning literature-A review of the 
past decades. Futures, 42(4): 355–369. 
Vera, D., & Crossan, M. 2004. Strategic leadership and organizational learning. Academy of 
Management Review, 29(2): 222–240. 
Wack, P. 1985. Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, September - 
October: 73–89. 
Wadham, H., & Warren, R. C. 2014. Telling Organizational Tales: The Extended Case 
Method in Practice. Organizational Research Methods, 17(1): 5–22. 
Wang, C. L., & Ahmed, P. K. 2003. Organisational learning: a critical review. The Learning 
Organization, 10(1): 8–17. 
Weick, K. E., & Bougon, M. G. 1986. Organizations as cognitive maps: Charting ways to 
success and failure. The thinking organization: 102–135. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. 1993. Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful 
Interrelating on Flight Decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3): 357. 
137
Wickham, M., & Woods, M. 2005. Reflecting on the strategic use of CAQDAS to manage 
and report on the qualitative research process. The Qualitative Report, 10(4): 687–
702. 
Wright, A. 2005. The role of scenarios as prospective sensemaking devices. Management 
Decision, 43(1): 86–101. 
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Third Edition). Thousand 
Oaks: CA: Sage Publications. 
Zegras, C., & Rayle, L. 2012. Testing the rhetoric: An approach to assess scenario planning’s 
role as a catalyst for urban policy integration. Futures, 44(4): 303–318. 
Zikmund, W. G., Babin, B. J., Carr, J. C., & Griffin, M. 2010. Business research methods. 
Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning. 
Zilber, T. B. 2002. Institutionalization as an Interplay betwwen Actions, Meanings, and 
Actors: The Case of a Rape Crisis Center in Israel. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1): 234–254. 
138
Table 1  
Data description and quantification 
Qualitative data collected for the study   Quantification   
Interviews with 22 organizational members 
involved  
More than 28 hours of 
interviews  
Interview’s notes recorded while / or immediately 
after each interview with the aim at highlighting 
potential new insights and researcher reflections 
resulting from the interviews     
More than 70 pages 
19 voice memos were recorder with the 
researcher’s reflections about the interviews 
conducted. Memos were recorded within 48 hours 
of the interview.  
More than 80 minutes of 
reflections 
Observations taken while actively participating in 
SP 
Direct involvement in 2 SP 
processes   
Casual conversations in the organization about SP 
processes and the organizational context in general 
More than 2 ½ years of 
observations. 
Final documents with the SP findings presented to 
the Executive Management Team  
More than 500 pages 
Drafts / working documents previous to final SP 
findings 
More than 1500 pages 
Copies of strategy documents detailing industry 
and market strategies along with diverse scenarios  
More than 2000 pages 
Emails between members of the core SP team, and 
between team members and other stakeholders 
within the organization 
More than 100 emails 
Models of projected production capacity and 
projected financial models.   
Various proprietary models for 
capacity, optimization and 
financial quantification 
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firm 
Jose D. Balarezo  
Copenhagen Business School 
143
ABSTRACT 
Organizational ambidexterity – the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation – has 
emerged as a powerful concept in explaining long-term organizational success and survival. 
Despite a rich literature linking ambidexterity to various performance outcomes, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the specific managerial actions that facilitate the 
implementation and operation of an ambidextrous strategy. This study explores how a market 
leading biotechnology firm resolves challenges associated with the simultaneous pursuit of 
operational efficiency and innovation. Findings provide new insights into the multifaceted 
aspects of organizational ambidexterity and illustrate how companies dynamically manage the 
contradictory demands of exploration and exploitation at different organizational levels, and 
the different actors and decisions that enable organizational ambidexterity.  
Key words: Ambidexterity; exploration and exploitation; middle management; scenario 
planning  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most difficult tasks in strategic management is how to balance efficiency and 
innovation. Managers must choose between designing organizational structures and processes 
suited for operational routines and standardization, and those facilitating new ideas and 
innovativeness. This gives rise to the often-cited tension between exploration and 
exploitation, where organizations must effectively exploit its current capabilities; while at the 
same time engage in enough exploration of new knowledge and competences to ensure future 
viability (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). While exploration and exploitation may 
seem as potentially incompatible goals with contradictory demands, increasingly businesses 
find it imperative to balance these demands in the pursuit of superior performance. 
Exploitation is important for short-term survival yet exploration provides the basis upon 
which firms develop competitive advantages in the long run. Moreover, exploration has been 
linked to radical innovations while exploitation is associated with incremental innovation 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004); both prerequisites for improving performance.  
The key challenge with regards to organizational ambidexterity is that organizational 
structures and processes designed to promote exploration are distinct from – and often in 
conflict with – those that promote exploitation. Research has shown that centralization and 
standardization generally promotes exploitation whereas exploration typically is associated 
with decentralization and entrepreneurial processes (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). This gives 
rise to a crowding out effect where more focus on exploration detracts from the effectiveness 
of exploitation, or vice versa (Boumgarden, Nickerson, and Zenger, 2012). The result is often 
suboptimal outcomes when managers try to organize for both exploration and exploitation 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004, 2008). This puts a premium on 
finding ways in which to resolve this tension in order to pursue an effective ambidextrous 
strategy. 
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Research on ambidexterity shows several potential alternatives for how to balance 
the exploration/exploitation trade-off such as structural separation (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996), contextual ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004), or temporal separation (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 
2003). Empirical results provide evidence of the nature and role of the various types of 
ambidexterity in balancing exploration and exploitation as well as its positive effect on firm 
performance (He and Wong, 2004; Junni, Sarala, Taras, and Tarba, 2013; Kauppila, 2010; 
Khanagha, Volberda, Sidhu, and Oshri, 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Raisch, 2008).  
Despite general agreement among scholars and practitioners that organizational 
ambidexterity is necessary for business success and firm performance, relatively little is 
known about the specific managerial actions required to balance exploration and exploitation 
(Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). For instance, while the 
literature points to the important role of leadership in balancing exploration and exploitation 
(e.g., Benner and Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) the actual mechanisms 
through which management engages with and manages the interface between exploration and 
exploitation, originating both internally and externally, are largely left unexplored 
(Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). In particular, the different types 
of ambidexterity imply multilevel coordination processes in order to integrate exploration and 
exploitation taking part in separate (structurally, functionally and hierarchically) parts of the 
organization. Specifically, it appears that effective management of ambidexterity requires a 
distinct capability that may be facilitated by managerial interventions, actions, and/or 
processes. There is a need for fine grained accounts that delve into the role of managerial 
capabilities and how decisions are made, who is involved in making them, and how these 
decisions are implemented (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013).  
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This study investigates the managerial actions and decisions used at a market leading 
biotech firm in simultaneous pursuit of short-term exploitative efficiency and long-term 
exploratory innovation while facing market and technological uncertainties. Specifically, this 
study is designed to address the following questions: (1) How do large firms operating in 
dynamic and complex environments balance exploration and exploitation organizationally?; 
(2) what kinds of managerial decisions are involved in managing ambidexterity?; and (3) who 
makes ambidexterity work in large organizations? The empirical setting is Novozymes (NZ), 
a market-leading multinational biotechnology firm which is chosen due to its exceptional 
ability to continuously innovate (both incrementally and radically) while increasing its 
dominant position in the global enzyme market.  
The paper is structured as follows: First the theoretical stage is set by reviewing the 
ambidexterity literature with particular focus on its grounding in organizational learning 
theory. An overview of the methodology and data used for the analysis is provided in the next 
section. The following sections outline the main findings of the study and provide supporting 
evidence from the in-depth analysis of the managerial actions at NZ to become ambidextrous 
in the pursuit of innovation and commercial success. The study closes with a discussion of the 
specific processes and challenges underlying NZ’s attempt to balance exploration and 
exploitation and provides implications for theory and directions for further research.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The organizational learning literature provides a useful distinction between exploration and 
exploitation and highlights the tensions and incompatibilities between explorative and 
exploitative learning. According to March (1999), both exploration and exploitation compete 
for scarce resources, and firms are forced to make tradeoff decisions between them. 
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Exploration increases variance and fosters adaptation and long term survival; but it 
increases costs in the short run, has uncertain payoffs, longer term horizons, and lacks 
feedback loops for assessing adequacy of exploratory efforts. Exploitation, on the other hand, 
increases firm efficiency and is more tangible but reduces variance thus potentially trapping 
the company in the long run if its offerings lag market changes. These uneven tradeoffs are 
usually resolved by leaning towards the faster certainty and payoffs of exploitation, 
potentially self-destructing the company in the long run (March, 1991).  
While several models for organizational learning have been proposed (see Flores, 
Zheng, Rau, and Thomas, 2012 for a synthesis of the different models and sub processes), the 
4I learning framework presented by Crossan, Lane and White, (1999) best represents the 
tensions between institutionalized learning needed for exploitation and new learning 
necessary for exploration. The 4I model explicitly considers how information flows as a 
process from individuals via groups to the organizational level. It also provides insights into 
the specific processes linking these levels. Moreover, the framework is dynamic by explicitly 
discussing the interaction between the feed-forward process of moving information from the 
individual to the group level, and the feed-backward process of institutionalized learning 
impacting individual and group learning. These feedback processes specifically describe the 
tension between assimilating new learning (exploration) and using what is already known 
(exploitation). Crossan and colleagues’ (1999) model for organizational learning is heavily 
influenced by March’s (1991; 1999) discussion of the tensions and tradeoffs between 
exploration and exploitation, which has also fueled the theoretical interest in organizational 
ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013).  
Organizational ambidexterity is an organization’s ability to pursue explorative and 
exploitative innovation simultaneously (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). This balance is 
necessary for the long term survival of the organization. While adaptation, innovation and 
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proactivity are important characteristics of ambidextrous organizations, tight execution for 
exploiting current assets and generating short term value is also necessary (Birkinshaw and 
Gibson, 2004). 
Ambidexterity research proposes several alternatives to achieving organizational 
ambidexterity. Structural separation refers to the creation of dual, independent structures, 
each one dedicated exclusively to either exploration or exploitation (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996). Each subunit has its own structure, people, processes, incentives, and cultures. Behind 
the concept of structural separation is the notion that tradeoffs between future exploration and 
current execution cannot be reconciled under the same unit (Gilbert, 2003; Porter, 1996). In 
contrast, contextual ambidexterity suggests the organizational context as facilitator for the 
individual social behaviors necessary for balancing exploration and exploitation (Birkinshaw 
and Gibson, 2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Under contextual ambidexterity, the role of 
top management is to create the context necessary for the individuals to behave in 
ambidextrous ways. Thus, decisions related to exploration and exploitation are made by all 
the individuals that form the organization as opposed to the top management team alone. 
While the focus of contextual and structural ambidexterity is on managing the tensions 
between current execution and future adaptation, temporal separation proposes a sequential 
approach dependent on the current development stage of the firm. For example, Puranam and 
colleagues (2006) found that organizations in early stages of development, which are typically 
more exploratory intensive, are negatively affected by the loss of autonomy caused by being 
integrated with another organization. Consequently, during exploration intensive stages, 
autonomy tends to outperform coordination. Lastly, research has pointed to role of networks, 
both internally and externally, as potential mechanisms for organizational ambidexterity 
(Kauppila, 2010; Tiwana, 2008; Turner, Swart, and Maylor, 2013).  
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The different types of ambidexterity should be considered as complements rather 
than alternatives as firms are likely to use more than one form of ambidexterity (Birkinshaw 
and Gibson, 2004). To this end, while a select few studies have provided evidence of the 
possible combination of some of these ambidextrous designs (Kauppila, 2010; Raisch, 2008; 
Taylor and Helfat, 2009), most research has focused on only one of these designs 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Cao, Gedajlovic, and Zhang, 2009; Jansen, Tempelaar, van 
den Bosch, and Volberda, 2009; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009). Moreover, the majority of 
these studies build on large empirical surveys, archival data, or comparative case studies 
focusing more on organizational level constructs thus offering limited insights into the 
managerial decisions and behaviors underlying ambidextrous organizations (Eisenhardt, Furr, 
and Bingham, 2010; Rogan and Mors, 2014). Achieving ambidexterity is extremely difficult 
and the quality of management is paramount in achieving it (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013). 
Consequently, there is need for better understanding of the individual actions that underpin 
organizational ambidexterity.  
In sum, the literatures on organizational learning and ambidexterity offer important 
insights into the sources of tension between exploration and exploitation. The organizational 
learning literature provides the theoretical foundation for understanding the conflict between 
exploration and exploitation. While the ambidexterity literature provides clues as to the 
possible solutions to this tension, it has focused mainly on organizational level constructs 
leaving the behaviors and decisions of the individuals managing organizational ambidexterity 
largely unexplored (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2013; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, and Tushman, 2009; Rogan and Mors, 2014). In 
contrast, this study investigates the organizational actors and their decisions that enable 
ambidexterity. Importantly, because research of individual level actions requires an 
understanding of the organizational context where these decision occur (Barney and Felin, 
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2013), this study also investigates the organizational context at NZ – e.g. its ambidextrous 
design. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research design 
This research was conducted as an in-depth single case study. The single case study approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) is appropriate for answering how and why research questions; particularly 
related to social behaviors, contextual details, and investigation of multiple levels of analysis 
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). To assure NZ is a suitable 
organization for research on ambidexterity, prior academic work outlining the characteristics 
of ambidextrous organizations was revised and contrasted with the ones present at NZ. 
Because of the research intends to explore the actors and decisions in managing 
ambidexterity, the research follows participant-observer (Yin, 2003) observation mode. A key 
strength of participant-observer is the access to groups, meetings and presentations that might 
be highly confidential and commercially sensitive thus otherwise restricted or unavailable to 
outsiders (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007; Yin, 2003). Participant observation also allows the 
researcher to develop and utilize his or her knowledge of organizational structures, processes 
and terminology to participate in discussions, observe actions, and identify the people, 
processes and documentation that might be fruitful for the study (Brannick and Coghlan, 
2007). Consequently, participant-observer was the selected observation mode as it was 
expected to leverage best the unrestricted access to the organization and likely allow the 
author to identify and interact with the actors managing ambidexterity at NZ.  
Industry and company selection 
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Ambidexterity research suggests that the effects of ambidexterity on firm performance are 
industry specific and likely more prominent in dynamic environments (Simsek, Heavey, 
Veiga, and Souder, 2009). Recent meta-analysis research validates this assumption and 
demonstrates the moderating role of industry on the organizational ambidexterity-
performance relationship (Junni et al., 2013). Furthermore, organizational ambidexterity also 
presents a strong link to performance in firms operating in multiple industries (Junni et al., 
2013). The focal company of this study is embedded within the highly dynamic biotechnology 
industry and their product offerings reach several diverse industries, including food, 
detergents, brewing, bioethanol and biomass conversion, forestry and textiles, among others. 
Consequently, based on Junni and colleagues’ work, it is expected that ambidexterity is not 
only present, but necessary in a company like NZ. Further analysis grounded on the work of 
Sarkees and Hulland (2009) corroborates this expectation.  
According to Sarkees and Hulland (2009), ambidextrous organizations show positive 
effects on 4 different dimensions of performance: revenue, profits, product innovation and 
customer satisfaction. This is important as an organization that excels in one or two metrics 
might do so by trading off other performance areas. NZs’ market share in the enzyme 
business is 48% globally (Novozymes A/S, 2013a). Long term organic sales growth and 
earnings growth are approximately 7% and 13%, respectively. Product innovation ranges 
from continuous marginal adjustments to radical innovations. The company has introduced 
more than 75 new products/concepts over the last 10 years and it strives to introduce 6 to 8 
new products each year (Novozymes A/S, 2014a). In 2012 and 2013 Procter and Gamble 
named NZ as one of its 15 top performing partners out of more than 82,000 suppliers and 
agencies (P&G corporate press, 2013). NZ has received this award on 6 other occasions 
demonstrating strong customer satisfaction. Furthermore, in August 2014, NZ was named 
outstanding global corporate innovator winner (along with an American company - 
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Starbucks) by the product development and management association (PDMA, 2014). 
Undoubtedly, NZ shows positive results in the 4 different dimensions as proposed by Sarkees 
and Hulland (2009).    
Furthermore, by its own admission, NZ simultaneously pursues exploration and 
exploitation as catalyst for long term performance: “NZ drives innovation, expands 
opportunities and improves productivity to achieve sustainable long-term earnings growth” 
(Novozymes A/S, 2013a). Accordingly, NZ can be classified as an ambidextrous organization 
and the selection of the organization meets the criteria for revelatory single case study design 
(Yin, 2003: 42). 
Data collection 
A variety of qualitative and quantitative data was collected between December 2011 and 
February 2015. During this period, the researcher was actively involved and had 
responsibilities and deliveries in various processes carried out in the global headquarters of 
NZ. Hence, the mode of observation can be described as participant-observer (Yin, 2003). 
Data collected included observations, field notes, working documents, presentations, 
analytical models, internal memos, annual reports, public available information and various 
interviews with NZ employees.  
As the study was broadly framed around exploration and exploitation, it followed 
Woods (2005) and charted the research design to a) define the data needed to provide 
conceptually valid evidence; b) identify potential sources for the data; and c) enhance validity 
of data analysis and interpretation by ensuring that data was coded in ways consistent with the 
conceptual definitions derived from the literature. 
Data was mainly collected in relation to the researcher’s participation in two scenario 
planning processes at the organization. At NZ, scenario planning is a bottom up approach 
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which runs for about 8 months a year, every year. It is integrated into the corporate strategy in 
the sense that it builds from the diverse industry strategies set out for a 5-year horizon. The 
process starts at the regional levels and gradually becomes more centralized with the 
executive management team and Board of Directors as main stakeholders. It touches 
employees from several functional areas such as sales, marketing, supply chain operations, 
production and finance. Analysts, managers, directors, VPs and executives participate directly 
or indirectly in the process. Being actively involved in a process that touches upon many 
different hierarchical levels and functional areas offers a unique possibility to better 
understand the managerial decisions and actions for achieving ambidexterity at NZ.  
In addition to the scenario processes, the researcher actively participated in a 3 
month project designed to develop market positioning and penetration strategies in a 
developing country. This allowed for a closer view and understanding of the processes and 
strategies used by the company to penetrate markets and exploit its capabilities. To 
complement the active involvement in these processes and projects, the researcher also 
participated in various other corporate activities, such as team meetings, conferences, 
knowledge sharing sessions, social events, etc. In all, these numerous interactions facilitated a 
deeper understanding of the organizational context and underlying strategic processes at NZ.   
Interviews 
25 people throughout the organization were interviewed. Most of these informants were 
directly involved in the scenario planning process. In the initial interview list, 12 informants 
were identified as key contributors due to their strategic involvement and responsibilities in 
current or prior scenario processes. However, as the interviews unfolded, new leads were 
suggested by the informants as potential sources of information – leading to chain referral or 
snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). These new leads were contacted and 
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subsequently added to the interview pool. In total, 17 individuals were directly or indirectly 
involved in the corporate scenario process at NZ. The other 8 informants were a mix of 
scientists, innovation focused employees, or personnel involved with the R&D side of the 
organization. These individuals were contacted with the expectation to get further insights 
into their exploratory behaviors and the processes through which they contributed to 
ambidexterity at NZ.  
The final pool of informants included several functional areas. Some were 
competitor intelligence analysts located outside the headquarters. Others were managers with 
a scientific background anchored in the R&D functional area. Marketing, finance and supply 
operations were also represented. The broad pool of informants – functionally, hierarchically 
and geographically – allowed the researcher to gather impressions of the phenomenon of 
interest from diverse perspectives, which reduces potential biases in the data collection 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Importantly for the specific purpose of this study, the broad 
sample of informants allows for better understanding of the general context of NZ, for 
instance, in relation to structures to support ambidexterity, and behaviors and social 
interaction of the individuals making ambidexterity work.  
The final sample of interviewees included directors, VPs, and members of the 
executive leadership team (n=7), managers (n=11) and analysts and support staff (n=7). The 
informants belong to the functional areas of marketing and business development (n=10), 
R&D and supply operations (n = 8) and business support and finance (n = 7). Table 1 presents 
a list of the 25 informants, their seniority level, functional area and tenure. In an effort to 
extend the confidentiality offered to the participants, these three categories were intentionally 
made broad. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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The interviews were conducted between November 2013 and June 2014. These were 
open ended but based on a common set of questions and typically lasted 60-90 minutes. All 
interviews were recorded with the permission of the informants. This produced more than 30 
hours of interview data. At the end of the interviews, all informants were given the 
opportunity to add any impressions that they deemed important but were not touched upon 
during the interview. Notes were taken as each interview unfolded and these notes were 
revised within 24 hours for consistency with the recorded data. The interview protocol moved 
from general questions into more specific ones. Questions were as general as asking the 
informants to give their impressions of what it is like to be working for the company or to 
name the main competitors and customers. These general questions looked for information on 
the contextual and social environment of the organization. Other questions were more 
specific, such as asking informants to describe their daily routines. For instance, the people 
involved in the corporate scenario process were asked to describe their roles in the process, 
the conversations during the process, who made the decisions, and so on.  
Data analysis  
One of the potential limitations of the participant observation method is the large amount of 
data at the researcher’s disposal and the subsequent need to select, prioritize and analyze such 
a large dataset. Given the amount and diversity of data gathered, it was managed and analyzed 
using QSR International’s N-Vivo software program for analyzing qualitative data. N-Vivo 
was used to develop nodes (hierarchical systems of data categories) reflecting the concepts to 
which the data related and subsequently coded into. These data categories supported 
subsequent review, analysis and interpretation of the data.  
Since the researcher was aware of the main theoretical concepts in the ambidexterity 
literature, the analysis iterated between existing theory, data, and emerging theory (Locke, 
2001). Consequently, the coding was deductive when evidence supported for instance 
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exploratory and exploitative concepts. However, inductive coding was also used as theory 
emerged from the data, for example in relation to particular managerial actions for balancing 
exploration and exploitation.  
To assure the quality of the research and findings, particular attention was given to 
coding reliability. Specifically, checks for coding stability were performed. To ensure the data 
was coded in ways which were conceptually valid and consistent with the coding rules, two 
independent researchers undertook the coding and analysis. Specifically, one researcher coded 
a random selection of the interview data. Variations in coding between the two coders were 
addressed through discussion of ambiguous data or coding rules and modification of the 
coding scheme (c.f. Nag, Corley, and Gioia, 2007). A second independent researcher took the 
role of ‘critical outsider’ to whom the author detailed observations, insights, main conclusions 
in the study, and the evidence on which they were based. This was done in order to counter 
acknowledged risk with participant observation such as failing to consider alternative 
framings of an explanation (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007) and assuming advocacy roles or 
becoming supporter of the organization or group under study (Yin, 2003). The findings are 
presented in the next section. 
FINDINGS 
Simultaneous exploration and exploitation at Novozymes 
NZ has been in business for more than 90 years - initially as part of the Novo Group, and 
subsequently as a stand-alone company since 2000. The company is today a worldwide 
market leader in industrial enzymes – biological catalysts that increase the rate of chemical 
reactions creating diverse efficiencies. Much of its strategy has innovation at its core: 
“NZ is an innovation-driven company. More than 20% of our global workforce works in 
R&D, and annually we spend around 14% of revenue on R&D. The focus is to ensure 
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continuous development of our existing product portfolio while expanding the use of our 
technology by developing new concepts for new applications. Furthermore, we devote a 
significant part of our resources to long-term radical innovation in order to ensure our long-
term growth” (Novozymes A/S, 2014a)  
However, tight execution and productivity improvements are also very much part of 
the company’s core strategy:  
“…the R&D and Supply Operations departments continuously strive to find ways to improve 
production strains, increase product efficacy and optimize production processes. These 
improvements allow NZ to deliver better and more sustainable innovation to customers faster. 
At the same time, the company is cost-conscious, enhancing its ability to deliver earnings 
growth” (Novozymes A/S, 2013a) 
Evidently, NZ’s strategy is focused on attending simultaneously to the needs for 
exploration and exploitation in pursuit of long term success. The recent opening of two new 
platforms looking into future growth opportunities are further evidence of the innovative 
efforts at NZ. The first technology platform, BioAg, intends to supply biological solutions for 
farmers worldwide. It is a different technology to enzymatic solutions as it is based on 
“microbials, plant extracts and beneficial insects that allow farmers to improve crop health 
and productivity, and complement or replace traditional fertilizers and chemicals” 
(Novozymes A/S, 2014b). The second platform, Biomass conversion, is based on the 
company’s core enzymatic technology and “turns plant and animal materials into high-
quality fuels, electricity or renewable chemicals” (Novozymes A/S, 2014b).  
These two platforms complement the large pipeline of current products at NZ and 
provide further growth platforms for the short and long term. As noted by their Board of 
Directors (BoD), these two growth platforms “could transform Novozymes’ future business” 
(Novozymes A/S, 2013a). These two new platforms are pushing boundaries in different ways. 
Although BioAg leverages existing R&D and technology capabilities, it is a different 
biological business to their core enzyme capabilities and thus could be labeled as fully 
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explorative efforts. Biomass conversion, on the other hand, is about production scalability and 
cost efficiencies of core enzymatic technology within the biomass industry. The company has 
been trying for the last few years to reach commercial profitability through constant 
improvement of its technology applied to this industry. Therefore, it is closer in nature to 
incremental innovation – e.g. exploitation of current capabilities. As stated by the company’s 
CEO in its 2013 annual report: 
“Both BioAg and biomass conversion have the potential to become big. Those are big bets for 
NZ. They are very different in nature, for Biomass conversion we would say the technologies 
are roughly ready to be deployed. Now it is a question of deployment and getting the 
financing for the plants that are going to produce second generation bioethanol and 
cellulosic ethanol.. BioAg is a different history. It is about understanding the science. The 
companies who first understand the science of it, of how these products work, they will earn 
the licenses to develop the next generation, the next wave of products. So, biomass conversion 
is about deployment [exploitation] where BioAg is about investing on the science part of it 
[exploration]…” 
As the above examples illustrate, NZ excels at simultaneously exploring new 
possibilities and exploiting current capabilities. To NZ, these are not conflictive but rather 
complementary and necessary goals for long term success. To better understand the dynamics 
and mechanisms that make these potentially contradictory objectives coexist, I next examine 
the organizational processes, structures and actors that make NZ ambidextrous. 
Ambidextrous design at NZ 
Various ambidextrous designs were simultaneously observed. These designs, routines and 
processes were built to support the contradictory demands of exploration and exploitation 
needed for long term success. Importantly, the designs changed over time in consideration of 
external or internal forces. The dynamic design continuously supports concurrent explorative 
or exploitative needs.    
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Contextual ambidexterity. According to contextual ambidexterity, the organizational 
context acts as facilitator for the individual sociological behaviors necessary for balancing 
exploration and exploitation. As noted by Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004: 49) “in a business 
unit that is ambidextrous, the systems and structures are more flexible, allowing employees to 
use their own judgment as to how they divide their time between adaptation (exploration) and 
alignment (exploitation) oriented activities”.  
At NZ, leadership, cooperation, personal connections and alertness are greatly 
encouraged throughout the organization. For example, NZ’s culture is sustained by four core 
values (Novozymes A/S, 2014c): (1) Dare to lead (internally and externally; take initiatives; 
never settle); (2) Unlock passion (inspire others; focus on opportunities; do not fear mistakes; 
learn from them); (3) Develop a circle of trust (empower others; take care of others); and (4) 
Connect to create (learn from the outside; challenge conventions). These core values are given 
to employees when they join the company and yearly performance reviews include an 
assessment of the extent to which individuals ”live” these core values in their daily life at NZ. 
The impression is that employees at NZ are cooperative, alert, willing to learn, and highly 
motivated. These impressions were largely confirmed during the interviews as the majority of 
the informants revealed high motivation, stimulating tasks and continuous learning as some of 
the main behavioral traits of the daily life within the organization.  
Hence, NZ has managed to create a culture and context that stimulates continuous 
individual learning and attention. Additionally, the interviews revealed that individual’s 
motivations and interests are generally aligned with the corporate vision and ambitions. 
Research on identification and identity has shown the positive effects of individual 
identification in terms of increased effort, participation, beneficial decision making and 
intrinsic motivation (Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley, 2008). Consequently, NZ’s core values 
and motivational alignment enables highly motivated individuals and a learning culture. The 
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context and individual behaviors at NZ hold many similarities with the contextual attributes 
observed by (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) in ambidextrous organizations. 
Structural ambidexterity refers to the exclusive dedication of a sub-unit to either 
exploration or exploitation, which is supported by its physical (separated) location, people, 
culture, incentives or processes. Yet, there must be enough connectivity to create synergies 
and cost control among the different units. At NZ, innovation is mainly driven by the R&D 
side of the organization which receives a steady stream of funding for experimentation. 
According to official documents, 14% of revenues are allocated to explorative activities 
(Novozymes A/S, 2014a). About 2/3 of it goes to new exploration, and 1/3 is used to improve 
or optimize current products or technologies (Finance Manager). NZ’s R&D unit has more 
than 1000 employees located at eight global sites on 4 continents, each site representing a 
certain set of skills and competencies. One of these sites in located in the central complex that 
forms the headquarters of the organization. In this complex, the R&D unit is located in a 
different building than for example human resources, accounting, corporate finance or 
executive management, who are all centralized in the same building and viewed as a support 
and coordination unit. Production is housed elsewhere in separate locations.  
While the design and separation of functional units is evident, the internal 
connectivity is tangible. In accordance with prior research (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), the 
connectivity at NZ between R&D and the rest of the organization becomes stronger at the 
higher levels of the organization. For instance, business units’ strategies have R&D 
representation in addition to marketing, sales and finance. The R&D unit is fully integrated at 
the executive level, which assures the creation of synergies. However, evidence of 
connectivity is also observed along the life of the exploratory projects for new products or 
technologies and horizontally at the individual level in general. 
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Internal exploration of new products follows a three step process: new lead, 
discovery and development. As the exploration efforts move forward, the connection with 
other parts of the organization increases, for example with sales and marketing for estimating 
potential market sizes and defining product development at the later stages. New lead and 
discovery is typically about the technology and is mainly driven by R&D scientists. 
Similarly, more casual connectivity among individuals in different sub-units, though 
not very common, is possible and to a certain extent encouraged. For instance, in 2012 the 
finance team, which is an exploitative unit focused on control and support, had a global 
meeting and convened in Chicago for a week. One of the reasons for the chosen location was 
to learn the basics of a new technology and interact for a day with one of the subsidiaries for 
the BioAg platform which is located at driving distance from Chicago. Such initiatives are 
aimed at creating awareness and a loose structure of internal networks.  
Another example of connectivity among different units is the access that employees 
have to internal training courses with the intention to increase awareness and understanding of 
the different technologies, applications and platforms across NZ. These training sessions need 
to be approved by the immediate manager, typically take from one to three days and are 
driven by senior scientists or marketing directors. In the sessions, participants are presented 
with a basic understanding of the operations, opportunities and challenges of business units 
that otherwise would be difficult to obtain during the course of daily operations. 
Consequently, the link between the R&D, other business platforms, and the rest of the 
organization exists, and it goes beyond synergies at top management level, albeit somewhat 
loosely particularly at lower organizational levels.  
The structural ambidexterity is supported by markedly different cultures, behaviors 
and incentives as highlighted by some informants. For instance, a manager shared the large 
variation in the “type of people” that forms the R&D organization:  
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“…they [R&D employees] are hard core specialists, different between each other but very 
open minded, with the ability to think outside of the box. Contrarily, in finance for instance, 
everybody is aligned; they all look and act the same”.  
Furthermore, individual creativity is highly encouraged on the R&D side of the 
organization as NZ in general allows certain levels of autonomy in the individual pursuit of 
exploration. 
“…all scientists to have 10% of their work time allocated to pursue personal ideas (science 
managers 30% and science directors 50%). NZ’s organizational structure and working 
methods have been designed to create the optimal environment for innovation” (Novozymes 
A/S, 2014a)   
The evidence points to structural separation (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) also 
being an integral part of NZ’s strategy to achieve ambidexterity. Different subunits attend 
almost exclusively to exploitative or explorative needs. However, the reach of the 
interconnections and synergies extends beyond the higher tiers into almost all levels of the 
organization, albeit often in a relatively loose and unstructured fashion. These weak 
connections are more the decision of group leaders and the interaction with their subordinates. 
Thus, middle managers actively engage in promoting and reinforcing ambidextrous behaviors 
within dedicated units. This highlights the critical role of middle managers in the pursuit of 
ambidexterity. 
Managing organizational ambidexterity  
The case evidence points to several actions for managing organizational ambidexterity. The 
dynamic nature of ambidexterity is evident by the company’s constant pursuit of strategic 
refinement to better manage its explorative and exploitative efforts. For instance, while 
discussing recent competitive moves that directly affected NZ’s ability to exploit its 
knowledge base and technologic offerings, a VP shared:   
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“…we realized that the main driver for the deal between these companies [a long-tenured 
customer and a competitor] was the need to finance the cost of the plant… we discussed 
[internally, among the executive team] whether we should change our strategy or not. At first 
we decided to not change the strategy... But [subsequently] we modified that slightly [the 
strategy]… but yes, events like that certainly lead us to rethink the strategy and the strategy 
was modified somewhat last year… ” 
Thus continuous refinement to its ambidexterity design (reach of collaborative 
contracts in this case) is a vital managerial action to achieve continuous ambidexterity. 
However, variations on strategies and designs not only respond to competitive actions but also 
to market conditions. The changes in strategy support the maturity cycle of the particular 
industry. For instance, in the 2013 letter from the BoD (Novozymes A/S, 2013a) changes in 
go-to-market strategies are discussed as follows:  
“Depending on the industry in which the enzymes or microorganisms are used, different go-
to-market strategies are used. In some industries and regions, bio-solutions arriving on the 
market are so new, and at times revolutionary, that they require operational changes and 
investment for some customers. Therefore, the go-to-market strategies focus more on 
education, technology de-risking and adoption. In other industries, such as Household Care, 
customers are well established and looking for new ways to expand the market and make their 
value chain and products more sustainable. Here, biotechnology has already been adopted, 
and NZ’ go-to-market strategy is focused on increasing penetration and showing customers 
how they may benefit from using more biotechnology” 
The life cycle of the organization also affects how ambidexterity is managed. During 
the interviews, many informants referred to the “Steen culture” in clear reference to the 
leadership style of Steen Risgaard, the former company CEO who was highly innovative and 
transformational. Undoubtedly, this highly explorative style shaped NZ’s first years after the 
demerger in 2000. However, some informants described past exploration efforts as fantastic 
ideas that many times did not materialize commercially. Other mentioned that the company 
tends to stay too long in projects outside the core enzyme business that are not profitable and 
therefore should be exited faster. Therefore, a perceived weakness in past exploratory efforts 
relates to disconnection from market realities and needs. Yet, this is the essence of 
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exploratory efforts: the increase in variance and seeding of new possibilities. As noted by a 
VP, the company’s strategy rests as much in executing as it is in seeding for the future: “you 
need to continue investing for the future, some money you waste, but in some instances you 
succeed”  
Nevertheless, in 2013 the company changed CEO and underwent a complete 
reorganization aimed at better supporting its long term ambitions. Among the changes, the 
introduction of a project that prioritizes the new products’ pipeline in 2013 signals a direct 
effort to create a more efficient R&D process in order to increase the speed to market as well 
as to generate more significant innovation. Additionally, attention is given to prioritization on 
the pipeline and resources to determine faster when projects should be moved forward or 
terminated. Similarly, a new unit (performance management team) has been created with the 
intention to establish the mechanisms and processes necessary to introduce and support a 
“performance culture”. The strategy formation has also changed from being driven mainly 
independently by each business unit to becoming centralized at the organizational level. A 
new corporate strategy unit has been created to support these efforts. Consequently, as the life 
cycle of the company changes, the management and focus of their explorative and 
exploitative efforts changes as well. The evidence points to a company evolving from a 
largely explorative entity to one that although still explorative, is increasingly preoccupied 
with achieving various long term targets – including financial. The following paragraph taken 
from the “Letter from the BoD” in the company’s 2013 financial report (Novozymes A/S, 
2013a) highlights this change: 
“[At the beginning of 2013] The organization adopted a new structure to sharpen focus on 
the customers. Internal processes and procedures were reviewed and new R&D application 
units and novel growth platforms were created, all to help achieve NZ’ long-term targets” 
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The evidence adds another layer to the complexity of managing ambidexterity. 
Continuous support to simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitations necessitates 
constant nurturing and revisions of the process, strategies, structures and networks built to 
support the ambidextrous organization.  
Integrating mechanism. It appears that a mechanism to efficiently integrate the 
exploratory and exploitative learning residing at different sub-units and levels within the 
organization, and transform these into subsequent action is needed in order to manage the 
complex organizational structures at an operational level. Ambidextrous designs include 
distributive and integrative aspects (Smith and Tushman, 2005). At NZ, an integrative 
managerial process that touches many different organizational units (sales, marketing, R&D, 
finance, production), geographical regions and seniority levels (from analysts to executive 
management and the BoD) is scenario planning. The connectivity created by the scenario 
planning process is noteworthy. This is how the project manager of the scenario process for 
the enzyme business division (roughly 90% of total NZ’s sales) describes the process:  
 “… it [the scenario process] started in the autumn when the IS [Industry Strategies – 
business unit strategy] were made. At the same time, optimization efforts [production] were 
planned for the next 2 or 3 years, so we had some knowledge about new strains and stuff like 
that. These were completely separated processes timed up with the fixation of the AB 
[Anchored Budget]. So the ISs were done before the AB. Raw material development was also 
done before the AB. The AB and the MTP [Medium Term Planning] was the starting point of 
the scenario work. Out of the IS’s there came the MTP. Further, the complete R&D portfolio 
was also timed up against the AB process. All R&D bodies were reviewed and the NPV (net 
present values) values were updated against the AB process because the R&D NPV’s and 
portfolio NPV’s needed to be aligned to the AB.... So there were all these sort of different 
things being aligned to be the AB and MTP movement. The MTP came out of the ISs and 
there was this decision process with upper management around the MTPs… there were 
actually all the production recipes also done up against the AB. So in the AB all production 
recipes were calculated down and you had a pretty good base line of how the production 
economy was. So there was also a production economy alignment. So you kind of had all the 
major processes at NZ being aligned up against the AB. Of course all the cap cost budgets 
and things like that were also aligned against that. So you have all these major processes 
being aligned up against the AB [starting point of scenario work] at the calibration point…” 
166
The broad reach of the scenario planning process at NZ allowed integration of 
exploratory and exploitative learning residing throughout the organization. For instance, the 
exploration residing at the structurally separated R&D unit was captured through R&D 
participation in the different business unit’s strategies and via the product pipeline feeding 
into the scenario work. Knowledge from different networks within an industry was also 
represented and captured at the business unit level. Incremental, exploitative efforts using 
prior knowledge comes from production and supply chain operations in the form of more 
efficient product receipts, optimization from older strains, or introduction of better strains and 
formulation in the production and cost mix. On the Bio business division (the remaining 10% 
of the business), albeit some differences in regards to smaller scale and larger time frame (up 
to 15 years), the scenario process also acts as a coordinating and prioritization mechanism. As 
shared by a manger:  
“… the scenario work will consolidate different projects which will be discussed by the 
portfolio board. They will prioritize projects, where to focus the resource that we have 
available. After that portfolio discussion they will approve or reject new projects and allocate 
people [scientist] available according to their decisions…”  
Throughout the interviews, informants pointed to constant innovation, optimization 
of fermentation capacity and production scalability as some of the competitive strengths of 
NZ. Constant and radical innovation is mainly about future growth opportunities. 
Optimizations of fermentation capacity and production scalability are current competitive 
advantages that allow NZ to exploit their past explorative efforts. Having a clear picture of 
potential bottlenecks to their core production competence and clear decision points on where 
and when to invest are valuable insights for execution and production. As shared by a 
director, in the past, NZ has been caught off guard in responding to unforeseen market 
developments. This historical background has increased the organizational attentiveness 
toward current and future market dynamics affecting production in order to exploit efficiently. 
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Hence, in addition to coordinating and integrating knowledge around the organization, the 
scenario process serves as a mechanism to create awareness and highlight the main topics in 
need of discussion at the executive level, analyze it, and transform this knowledge into fine-
tuned action points around the core exploitative capabilities: 
“You started the scenario work simply by breaking down all production numbers, so you had 
the cost structure, the capacity structure of the production number using the knowledge about 
the optimization portfolio to say ok how will production cost evolve during the coming years?, 
how the production capacity will evolve for the different products during the years.. so we 
transferred coming products into capacity and profitability expectations based on the goals of 
the project and knowledge, based on how we have done this in the past and stuff. That was all 
consolidated in our scenario model… anyhow, that was done, and out of that you got capacity 
[utilization], investment [needs], capacity cost, forecasts, but of course it was done on 
fermentation forecast, then you had to do separate exercises on some of the other items. And 
all these gave a good basis for discussion, and I think this base case scenario [there were 
many other scenarios] is which gave the most value…” (Senior Director) 
In sum, the scenario process at NZ mainly acted as a mechanism for coordinating, 
integrating, and discussing exploratory and exploitative learning as well as turning it into 
actions for exploitation and optimal leverage of its competitive advantages. These are rather 
counterintuitive findings as the scenario process was expected to have mainly an explorative 
function. Figure 1 illustrates the matrix results from the data coding in relation to the leaning 
generated from the scenario planning process. As shown, across the different functional areas 
the general impression is that the scenario process is inadequate in generating exploratory 
leaning while more adept in generating exploitative learning.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Interestingly, following a recent reorganization, this scenario process has also 
changed. As noted by a senior manager, “the new scenario process is less about production 
and more about allocation of resources”. Furthermore, this new process is executed in close 
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collaboration with the newly developed corporate strategy team. This adds further evidence to 
the dynamism at NZ in their processes for managing ambidexterity. 
Actions of senior management (executives) in supporting ambidexterity. One of the 
most important traits observed in senior managers at NZ was the creation of contradictions – 
e.g. contradictory goals. For instance, for senior managers the goals of the organization were 
not exclusively focused on market share gains or increased profits (exploitation) or on radical 
change or innovations alone (exploration). Through various mechanisms, for instance external 
market guidance, senior managers were preoccupied with promoting simultaneous attention to 
both ends of the ambidexterity spectrum in support of very aggressive long term targets in 
various areas. For instance, they have recently guided the market with 5 year sales growth of 
8-10% organic, above their current 7% historical growth (Novozymes A/S, 2015). 
Additionally, the company plans to deliver 10 transformative innovations and save 100 
million ton CO2 by 2020 among other targets. As noted by the company’s CEO, “Over the 
next five years we aim to reach, educate, catalyze, deliver, save and enable to make a lasting 
difference” (Novozymes A/S, 2015). 
Internally, senior management aligns and reinforces behaviors through a variety of 
actions. For instance, employees are constantly reminded (e.g. through videos on the intranet) 
that long term objectives can only be achieved if NZ executes on all fronts, both in terms of 
performance and execution of current capabilities, and in exploring, finding and delivering the 
radical solutions and new growth platforms necessary to reach higher growth rates as 
compared to historical trends. To further align the interests of the individuals and the 
organizations, a recent profit sharing program has been implemented throughout the 
organization.  
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The creation of Blue Marble – an alternative scenario planning process [now 
discontinued] - is another example of senior management fostering and supporting 
contradictions. Blue Marble was an initiative driven by the sustainability department of the 
organization with heavy support of the R&D department and facilitated by external 
consultants. It had executive support and funding. The aim of the project was “to look for 
radical innovation that could change the revenue stream” (R&D Director). This scenario 
process contradicted in many ways the formal process - for instance, in relation to the purpose 
(find radical innovation), organizational anchors (sustainability and R&D) or integration (lack 
of) into the strategic cycle of the company. Consequently, it constitutes a good example of the 
constant inclination at the senior level to nurture paradoxical framing (Smith and Tushman, 
2005); thus recognizing and embracing contradictory demands for long term success.  
Another observation at senior level in managing ambidexterity is the use of the 
established scenario process as ambition setting mechanism (e.g. to push for further 
exploitation). Some informants felt the scenario planning exercise, in addition to inform on 
production capacity and investment needs, served as mechanism to push for higher sales 
growth. To confirm these impressions, analysis of documents and presentations from prior 
years’ scenario processes were compared against (1) realized figures and (2) the following 
years’ scenario presentation to assess any biases in the numbers. The findings confirm the 
impression of the informants and suggest an inclination to have too positive a forecast in the 
base case scenario. In many instances, informants revealed that it was not uncommon to have 
the sales figures that formed the base case scenario being revised several times [upwards] 
until management was satisfied with the figures in the forecast. At lower levels of the 
organizations, this top management behavior was understood as ambition setting.  
In addition to enabling and promoting an organizational mindset of contradictions, 
and challenging the organization, top management was tasked with creating the appropriate 
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learning context (e.g. through the 4 core pillars) and the allocation of resources (e.g. decision 
to fund individual projects or growth platforms).  
Actions of middle management in supporting ambidexterity. Managing 
ambidexterity goes beyond decisions at the higher levels of the organization. At NZ, middle 
management was also found to be actively engaged in activities that promote ambidexterity. 
For instance, a conference held in 2012 for the global business finance team – driven by two 
finance directors and supported by a finance VP - had sessions at an American university with 
key speakers that emphasized looking at the big picture, and thinking outside the box – 
exploring new possibilities. The intention was to promote exploratory behaviors in a 
functional area where routinized day to day tasks creates a clear exploitative and operational 
atmosphere. This encouragement of explorative possibilities creates behaviors where 
individuals explore routinely for novel, more efficient ways to carry out their tasks. As a 
finance director pointed out: “I recall the time when outside expertise was asked for to bring 
new insights into how to make this process [the scenario process] more geared towards 
challenging the internal assumptions that we work under, there was a need to explore more”. 
Analogous efforts to insert a more explorative focus to the scenario process were noted during 
the interviews with members involved in the scenario process. 
However, despite the organization’s predisposition to providing individual autonomy 
for exploratory efforts, and the department manager’s promotion of ambidextrous behaviors, 
active blocking of these individual exploratory behaviors was observed during the scenario 
planning process. In some instances, explorative attempts were blocked through persuasion as 
noted by a director:  
“…people are trying from time to time [to introduce changes to the scenario process] but we 
are persuaded to continue …it is requested, it is a deliverable we have, so we do it…”.  
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In other cases, the proposed changes intended to bring new exploratory learning were 
adapted to serve other exploitative purposes, as noted by another director: 
“…in one instance, building from my background, I built a different model to drive decision 
making, with more high level estimates, much less detail, to make the process more value 
driven…but the main process did not change, it was simply adopted into something else… ”.   
Analysis of draft documents of the scenario process against the final document 
presented to executive management revealed that some material containing explorative 
information were dismissed or relegated to the appendixes [by middle managers] in favor of 
information that supported execution (exploitation). Hence, evidence reveals the active role of 
middle managers in promoting ambidexterity and exploratory behaviors. However, selecting 
which of the ambidextrous proposals or behaviors are allowed to move upwards from the 
individual collaborator to the higher managerial decision level is also a key behavior of 
middle managers at NZ. 
Networks for exploration and exploitation. The network perspective to 
ambidexterity, especially at the individual level, is relatively new (Mom, van den Bosch, and 
Volberda, 2009; Rogan and Mors, 2014). A striking observation in this case study was the 
extensive use of networks in managing ambidexterity. These networks are internal and 
external and manifested at all levels, from the individual up to the organizational level. For 
instance, exploration of new ideas not only comes internally from the many scientists 
employed, but also from the outside through the extensive net of collaborative agreements 
that NZ has developed. A manager shared some of the external ties used for exploration:  
“To complement internal exploration, the company engages in different activities to 
explore externally. For instance, the company regularly applies for external EU funding and 
engages in research in areas of common interest. The company will also fund external 
exploration in capabilities or technologies too far away from its core expertise, for instance 
by cooperation with universities or funding of PhD research...”  
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In line with prior work highlighting the importance for R&D-intensive organizations 
in establishing close links with universities to open up the boundaries of exploration and 
technological transfer (e.g. Lam, 2003; Murray, 2002), the evidence points to NZ also using 
such external collaboration. However, the collaborative network for achieving ambidexterity 
at NZ is more complex. Some of these collaboration networks are internal. For example, the 
company’s Radical Innovation Catalysts (RIC): 
 “RIC is a cross-functional group collaboration for idea qualification involving 40 
people across functions over a period of one year. The focus is on ideas outside current 
strategic focus with radical innovation potential. The RIC team is responsible for getting 
business project ideas qualified before entering the front-end phase of the project 
management system” (Novozymes A/S, 2014a) 
Cross-functional interfacing and job rotations are additional internal mechanisms 
used to facilitate transfer of internal knowledge and in some instances to cross-fertilize 
(Taylor and Helfat, 2009) and create synergies between new and established units. For 
instance, it is typical that employees from established areas within the organization are sent to 
new businesses with the intention to share knowledge. 
At the individual level, an illustration of the predisposition of NZ’s employees to 
explore through networks is the time when the author was contacted by an NZ employee 
outside the organizational setting - through a university route – because this individual had 
“stumbled over” the research efforts in general terms and wanted to learn more about it. It was 
an explorative effort to learn from the outside, without realizing the anchoring of the author at 
the company. Both individuals were anchored at different organizational units and had not 
interacted before. After a few emails, a communication and collaborative channel was 
established. Following casual (e.g. lunch) conversations to learn about each other’s activities, 
the researcher was referred to additional people (in very different organizational areas) that 
might be of interest in common explorative efforts. This eventually resulted in a larger 
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network and options for collaboration and exploration of ideas. On another occasion, an 
informal chat with a manager resulted in this manager becoming interested and connected to 
part of the researcher’s external network with the intention to explore possibilities and share 
knowledge. These behaviors are rather common and encouraged among NZ employees, who 
can be considered expert networkers that create a broad, informal network base to explore 
ideas and share knowledge and experiences.  
At the organizational level, some networks are weak or bridging ties (Granovetter, 
1973) which increase the exploratory power of the organization through access to larger 
exploratory pools in areas of interest at the periphery of the company. For instance, 
crowdsourcing with partners and collaborative crowd foresight - to explore business 
implications of early stage technologies - are channels established to pursue possible 
exploratory venues. Moreover, the company is present and active in as many online forums as 
possible where it can share and gain first-hand access to potential ideas or disruptive 
technologies. In this way, NZ actively engages in open source collaboration. One such open 
collaboration is the so-called “hacker-spaces”, as explained by an innovation manager: 
“…there are plenty of ‘people out there’ who are bursting with good ideas on new 
technologies and applications. They want to develop and realize these ideas in collaborative, 
knowledge-sharing and open source ecosystems”  
The design of these weak ties has also changed over time, as explained by a senior 
science manager:  
“We have moved from financial sponsoring to active engagement. These are new and exciting 
times for us where we explore open source collaboration… For us it is a paradigm shift 
because we are not aiming at creating and securing IP (Intellectual Property) here – it is 
exactly the opposite” 
Evidence of strong external networks and collaborative agreements are also visible at 
NZ. Beyond exploring, these strong external ties intend to increase the adoption or success 
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rate of NZ exploration activities by aligning exploration with market needs. Since NZ’s 
innovations are at the forefront of technology, many of its partnerships intend to create a 
market as much as a product. As noted by March (1991), one of the potential limitations of 
exploration (innovation, experimentation or discovery) is the uncertainty of their returns. For 
NZ, having close relationships with their long term customers assures that exploration occurs 
in areas that might be of common interest.  
“We like to work with partnerships, so we align the pipeline to partners with compelling 
targets, where there is value for both NZ and the customer, and where there are technical 
possibilities and a chance to meet out common goals for the project within a reasonable 
timeframe” (executive VP for R&D, interview in Novozymes A/S, 2013b) 
This potentially increases the likelihood for creating a market and customer’s 
adoption (reduced uncertainty). At the same time, partners share the risks of exploration 
(financial costs, technological capabilities). The uncertainty of the potential winning 
technology also motivates changes in the structure of its partnership. NZ strategy is now one 
of impactful innovation through partnering along the entire value chain, which is markedly 
different to the previous strategy where “NZ wanted to be the independent enzyme developer 
and provider that will be willing to sell enzymes to everyone” (VP). The following statement 
from the CEO reflects on the new strategy at NZ: 
“It is not enough to develop better performing, lower cost enzymes; it is also about bringing 
our internal research to our partner collaborations in order to develop a process that 
performs. We recognize that it will take many different feedstock and production processes for 
cellulosic ethanol to reach its full potential. Therefore, we have developed a broad 
partnership strategy in order to enable as many technologies as possible. This has allowed us 
greater insight into the cellulosic conversion work currently underway across the globe…” 
(CEO on intranet video, accessed August 2014): 
In addition to partnerships with customers, joint ventures and investments in other 
companies (partial or complete takeovers) also form part of the exploratory activities used by 
the organization. Furthermore, the company actively tries to educate and influence public 
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opinion and government perception in areas in which it is exploring. By working with 
academia, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, the aim is to “encourage a balanced 
public debate and ensure that policy is scientifically based” (R&D VP). This strategy further 
increases the likelihood of potential markets and future exploitation of its explorative efforts. 
In their 2013 financial report, NZ explains the exploratory efforts in the last year 
aimed at expanding its portfolio of opportunities via joint ventures, partnerships and influence 
on governmental agendas:  
“ In 2013, NZ focused its efforts on finding new opportunities by seeking closer working 
relationships with customers and expanding its reach through new partnerships, such as The 
BioAg Alliance with Monsanto [partnership in BioAg], M&G Chemicals [partnership that 
looks at producing bioplastics – plastics derived from renewable biomass sources] and 
Raízen [production of cellulosic ethanol in Brazil]. NZ has also set a long-term target to 
champion the inclusion of biofuels as a High Impact Opportunity in the U.N.-led Sustainable 
Energy-for-All initiative. The aim is to identify needs and provide biosolutions in new 
industries and to nurture NZ’ four key growth platforms: Biomass Conversion, BioAg, Animal 
Health & Nutrition and Biopharma. The company consistently seeks to turn opportunities into 
significant business that can sustain growth and returns over time”.  
Hence, at the organizational level, we find evidence of a rich network of internal and 
external relationships and partnerships that underpins the basis for achieving organizational 
ambidexterity (Turner et al., 2013). Consistent with Tiwana (2008), the evidence points to a 
complex and dedicated network of weak ties that bridge areas of knowledge outside the core 
competences of the organization. Given the highly uncertain nature of its business due to 
many competing technologies, this greater capacity to generate ideas and variance is not only 
a casual outcome but very much a well-defined strategy. To complement this exploration, 
strong ties with long-term customers and other contractual agreements assure exploitation of 
past collaborative efforts, and potential markets (future exploitation, uncertainty reduction) 
for current exploration. At the individual level, the evidence builds on recent work pointing to 
the important relationship between an individual’s network and its composition (e.g. formal or 
informal) in promoting ambidextrous behaviors (Rogan and Mors, 2014).  
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DISCUSSION AND CONSLUSION 
This study has examined in detail how a large multinational firm operating in a complex and 
dynamic environment successfully balances exploration and exploitation. The findings 
indicate that NZ follows a complex yet deliberate strategy to achieve organizational 
ambidexterity. While prior work on ambidexterity has focused mainly on one type of design 
(e.g., contextual or structural), the study evidence supports the notion that many of these 
designs coexist at any given time. First, NZ continuously promotes an ambidextrous culture 
which is embraced on a daily basis by the individuals forming the organization. This approach 
is consistent with the contextual approach to ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) or human capital mechanism for achieving organizational 
ambidexterity (Turner et al., 2013). Second, a structural approach (Benner and Tushman, 
2003; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) is also evident as for instance the R&D unit is dislodged 
from most of the exploitative tasks which fall under the production, finance or marketing 
units. Despite this separation of tasks, there are enough loose connections to allow the 
benefits of synergies, which extend beyond the connections at the top management level. 
Third, the findings also point to the dynamism and constant refinement needed in managing 
ambidexterity. The different structures, culture, processes and networks that support 
ambidexterity at NZ oscillate to assure continuous support in the face of changes in the 
competitive landscape and market conditions. The refinement in the design also supports 
differences in the life cycles of the various business units of the organization, as much as the 
life cycle of the organization itself. Figure 2 illustrates the role of dynamic organizational 
design in managing ambidexterity at NZ. The figure shows some examples of how parts of 
the design have changed over time, and the intended objectives of the changes.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
177
Furthermore, the multilevel nature of organizational ambidexterity is evident from 
this case study. Consistent with organizational learning theory (Crossan et al., 1999), 
ambidexterity is rooted in individual behaviors and attention to specific tasks and information. 
As exploration and exploitation behaviors move horizontally (across functional areas) and 
vertically (up the organizational hierarchy), structures and processes must be put in place to 
ensure ambidextrous outcomes. Our study illustrates how scenario planning processes may act 
as a mechanism for the integration of exploration and exploitation behaviors across functional 
and hierarchical levels.  
Coordinating this dynamism and complexity in the ambidexterity design requires 
both adequate processes and active management. As pointed out by Birkinshaw and Gupta 
(2013), ambidexterity is achieved through good managerial capabilities, and this study 
uncovers  some of those managerial decisions. The evidence points to several players actively 
engaged in managing ambidexterity through a variety of mechanisms and actions. The senior 
management team (executives) creates and modifies the adequate organizational context. For 
instance, through the core NZ values which allow individual behaviors to become 
ambidextrous (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004), by managing organizational synergies 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) or by introducing a performance culture to sharpen exploration 
and exploitation efforts. Goal setting was also observed from the executive management, with 
emphasis on sales growth and execution.  
Most importantly, through ambitious external guidance on combined exploratory and 
exploitative organizational goals, senior management’s chief role in managing ambidexterity 
is one of creating and accepting contradictions as an organizational mental frame. Internally, 
these contradictions are constantly reinforced (e.g. via internal webcasts) and the work force 
is motivated and aligned towards achieving those contradictory goals (e.g. organizational 
wide profit sharing plans with exploratory and exploitative targets on it). Additional evidence 
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of senior manager’s inclination to contradictions is the temporary coexistence of two different 
scenario planning processes. Taken together, these findings support prior research theorizing 
on the role of contradictions in managing ambidexterity (Smith and Tushman, 2005) and 
provides insights into some of the mechanisms and actions used by senior managers in 
promoting these contradictions and ambidextrous mindsets. 
Though the organizational context heavily encourages ambidextrous behaviors, the 
findings also point towards the encouragement and subsequent management of these 
behaviors from individuals at key positions within middle management. For instance, many of 
the exploratory initiatives brought forward by employees actively involved at different times 
with the scenario process were blocked as it did not fit the exploitative inclination of the 
process at hand. Taylor and Helfat (2009) brought attention to the important role of middle 
managers in the context of ambidexterity and the replacement of a company’s core business 
with a new one. The evidence presented in this study extends these findings by pointing to the 
key role of middle managers in managing the dilemma of which ambidextrous behaviors are 
allowed to move up to the next level. Consequently, contrarily to arguments that place the 
decisions between alignment and adaptability on front liners (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004), 
we find it to be a continuous effort where ambidexterity is encouraged, but selectively 
nurtured, managed or blocked by middle managers. Hence, the evidence brings attention to 
the pivotal role of middle managers in actively promoting ambidexterity and exploratory 
behaviors, while at the same time selecting which proposals are allowed to move upwards in 
light of the needs of a specific unit, process or goal. Figure 3 shows the main actors that make 
ambidexterity happen along with their main responsibilities and decisions. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Raisch and colleagues (2009) identified the question of whether ambidexterity 
manifests at the individual or organizational level as one of the key areas in need of further 
research. In this case study, the findings indicate that ambidexterity is reflected at both the 
individual and organizational level because of the dynamism and flexibility in the structures 
to support continuously ambidexterity along with the managerial decision to shift, rearrange 
or control structures and behaviors.  
The organization and individuals at NZ are ambidextrous because the individual 
behaviors and organizational designs are constantly managed and nurtured. For instance, 
ambidextrous behaviors can be easily discouraged and frustrated by organizational routines as 
reflected by the impressions of the participants of the scenario process. Managerial actions 
(blocking exploratory behaviors) can accentuate the discomfort with the process, but other 
managerial actions, such as promotions and rotations, alleviate these negative attitudes. 
Importantly, in the process the individuals instill enough exploration of new ideas and 
variation so that eventually the process changes to continue supporting organizational 
ambidexterity in line with its contemporary needs. Redesign of contracts, partnerships, 
networks, and so on is what rejuvenates the ambidextrous design at NZ. Without the 
managerial actions, ambidextrous behaviors and design today might become a source of 
organizational inertia tomorrow. 
Together, these findings may explain the reported differences in the organizational 
ambidexterity-performance relationship found at different levels of analysis. Junni and 
colleagues (2013) found evidence that the relationship becomes stronger as the level of 
analysis increases from lower to more aggregate levels. Our case study highlights how NZ 
extracts organizational benefits from ambidexterity in terms of innovation and efficiency, 
which translates into strong corporate performance and innovation. However, at the 
individual/group level it may be harder to detect a direct relationship between ambidexterity 
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and performance. As noted, most individuals and groups reported frustration or even 
resentment in relation to balancing exploration and exploitation. Individuals (and groups) are 
typically assessed against objective, short-term measures of performance which tend to be 
based on efficiency (exploitation) rather than innovation (exploration). Moreover, as 
evidenced in the case, exploratory efforts are often blocked from reaching higher managerial 
levels. Together, these forces make the link between individual/group level of ambidexterity 
and (organizational) performance less clear. To what extent individual/group level 
ambidexterity is associated with individual/group level outcomes is research question ripe for 
future exploration. 
Another interesting finding pertains to the role of networks in achieving 
ambidexterity. At the organizational level, NZ deploys a complex network of internal and 
external ties for explorative and exploitative purposes. Some of these ties are strong and 
involve collaborative agreements, contracts and partnerships which intend to reduce market 
uncertainty, risk, and increase future exploitation of current explorative efforts. Other network 
relationships are of the weak type (Granovetter, 1973), and are in place to explore, increase 
the peripheral vision of the organization and create variance in the exposure to new ideas, 
potential applications or technologies. Partnering through the value chain is a deliberate 
strategy. The goal is to have enough weak ties for new technology or product exploration at 
the front end, while also having enough strong ties for market development and penetration to 
allow explorative efforts to become exploited.  
At the individual level, the evidence brings attention to the strong inclination of NZ’s 
employees in creating an internal and external network of informal ties as basis for potential 
future collaboration. These findings shed new light on the behaviors that support 
ambidexterity at the individual level and build on recent work looking at the relation between 
individual networks and ambidexterity (Mom et al., 2009; Rogan and Mors, 2014). For 
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instance, Rogan and Mors found that senior manager’s (partners in their context) informal ties 
within the internal organizational network have a positive relationship to ambidexterity. 
Interaction effects show this relationship becoming significantly associated with 
ambidexterity only in the presence of informal external ties. The behaviors of individuals at 
NZ are consistent with these findings. Importantly, the case evidence also extends Rogan and 
Mors’ work by showing how these behaviors are not only specific to senior managers 
(executives or partners) but rather exists across various hierarchical levels of the organization.  
 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The findings of this study have several implications for future research. First, it contributes to 
organizational ambidexterity literature in particular by looking at the actors and decisions 
involved in managing ambidexterity, within the context where these decisions occur. In 
regards to the design of ambidexterity at NZ, this research addresses one of the central 
tensions in ambidexterity research, namely, the static versus dynamic perspective on 
ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009). The case evidence indicates that ambidexterity is a highly 
dynamic phenomenon. Most of the configurations and mechanisms used for ambidexterity at 
NZ have changed during the last years, including the culture, networks, partnerships, 
strategies and reallocation of resources. Consequently, the research extend the simulations 
presented by Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) and the empirical work on differentiated units’ 
design by Westerman and associates (Westerman, McFarlan, and Iansiti, 2006) to suggest that 
continuous ambidexterity necessitates dynamic alignments and refinements given the needs of 
exploration and exploitation might be different over time. Further research may continue this 
line of inquiry and refine the findings by looking more closely at the different dynamics 
identified in this study, such as changes in the individual behaviors under contextual 
ambidexterity, or changes in the network structure needed to support ambidexterity. 
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 The ability of an organization to renew capabilities and reallocate assets to meet new 
market opportunities is one of the key features of organizational ambidexterity. This translates 
into management making difficult choices pertaining to the often conflicting demands of 
exploration and exploitation. Yet, these choices are embedded within existing organizational 
structures and processes that span multiple organizational levels and functions. While an 
ambidextrous strategy necessitates simultaneous attention to exploration and exploitation, 
such simultaneity may not be required throughout the entire organization as certain functional 
subparts may pursue exploration more effectively while others drive operational efficiency 
(e.g. structural ambidexterity). By the same token, the roles of top versus middle management 
and beyond may differ markedly in terms of exploration and exploitation; however, this 
crucial point is often left unexplored within the context of ambidexterity research. Hence, as 
shown from the case evidence, the individual behaviors involved in managing ambidexterity 
might differ across hierarchical and seniority levels. Further investigation into these 
individual differences is a fruitful area to increase our understanding of the individual 
behaviors (e.g. micro foundations) that support ambidextrous organizations.  
This study also contributes to the literature on scenario planning by providing a 
theoretical basis for understanding the strategic role of scenario planning. While the scenario 
planning literature has traditionally been mostly anecdotal and prescriptive (Burt and 
Chermack, 2008; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008), this study illustrates how scenario planning 
can be understood as a mechanism for balancing exploration and exploitation. Contrarily to 
the expectation that scenario planning aids mainly in the acquisition of explorative learning, 
the findings suggest it mainly plays a role in fine tuning exploitative efforts. In light of the 
novelty of these results, further empirical research is encouraged to follow the steps of this 
research to extend and clarify the conditions under which scenario planning processes may act 
as a facilitator or inhibitor of organizational ambidexterity.  
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Conducting the study as a single case study has the acknowledged limitation that the 
interpretations and findings might be idiosyncratic to the case company and thus cannot be 
generalized to other organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, NZ has enjoyed long 
periods of success and has at its disposal vast resources which might facilitate the deployment 
of different structures and strategies to explore and achieve ambidexterity. Similarly, NZ’s 
industry is highly dynamic and uncertain given the competing technologies; consequently, 
this might put extra pressure on achieving ambidexterity as compared to organizations 
embedded in different industries. Additionally, the observations were carried out while the 
author was mainly embedded within the headquarters of the focal organization. Although 
great effort was put into interviewing individuals located away from the headquarters, most of 
the time was spent at the headquarters. It is possible that the behaviors of the individuals 
working in central offices are not reflective of the rest of the organizational behaviors. Future 
research should strive to validate the findings in other organizational and industry contexts. 
Despite different measures taken to minimize limitations of the participant observation 
method used in this study, this method is susceptible to different biases (Dewalt, Dewalt, and 
Wayland, 1998; Yin, 2003). At the same time, given the nature and complexity of 
ambidexterity as it unfolds within an organization, further ethnographic research is highly 
encouraged. Future studies may seek to delve further into the intricacies of ambidexterity at 
individual and organizational levels by employing a mixed method design that combines the 
strengths of participant observations with large scale survey collecting information from 
employees across all levels of the organization. Additionally, comparison across multiple case 
studies over time may reveal interesting patterns of similarities and differences in terms of 
adoption and adaptation of ambidextrous strategies.
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ABSTRACT 
Integrating behavioral strategy into the 4I organizational learning framework, we develop a theoretical 
model for overcoming the key barriers to organizational learning. We identify five barriers that 
constrain the dynamic flow of learning and examine two mechanisms for dealing with these barriers. 
Specifically, we analyze how particular cognitive and social psychological barriers interfere with the 
feed-forward and feedback processes in the learning system and propose intervening and instigating as 
new mechanisms that help break mental frames and promote continuous learning and innovation. The 
resulting theoretical model extends the 4I organizational learning framework to account for behavioral 
mechanisms that restrict and enhance the stocks and flows of learning. Moreover, we advance learning 
theory and practice by providing insights into how organizations may manage the tension between 
continuity and change (exploitation and exploration).     
Keywords: Organizational learning; behavioral strategy; exploration and exploitation 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizational learning is critical for innovation and competitive advantage as it facilitates strategic 
adaption and renewal (Argote, 1999; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). The 
process of organizational learning is complex and involves dynamic processes through which the stock 
of learning flows between individuals, groups and the organizational at large. Our understanding of 
these learning processes has been greatly advanced by the seminal work by Crossan and colleagues 
(1999), which identified intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing as the (4I) processes 
that allow learning to move forward or backward between individual, group and organizational levels. 
The utility of this theory of organizational learning (OL) has resulted in a number of theoretical 
extensions and empirical studies (Berends & Lammers, 2010; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Holmqvist, 
2004; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005; Schilling & Kluge, 2009; Vera & Crossan, 2004).  
For instance, Crossan and Bedrow (2003) utilized the 4I framework to empirically investigate 
strategic renewal at Canada Post Corporation and highlighted the challenge of moving learning across 
the organization as well as managing the tension between exploration and exploitation. Vera and 
Crossan (2004) augmented the 4I framework by highlighting the critical role of leadership style and 
described how behaviors and practices of leaders may influence organizational learning. In a further 
extension of this framework, Lawrence et al. (2005) linked intuition to discipline, interpretation to 
influence, integration to force, and institutionalization to domination, and provided important insights 
into the role of power and politics in organizational learning. More recently, Berends and Lammers 
(2010) focused on discontinuities in organizational learning as a function of embeddedness in social 
and temporal structures. In their longitudinal case study of implementation of knowledge management 
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in an international bank, these discontinuities were found to disrupt and fragment learning flows as well 
as limit institutionalization of learning.  
Yet, although many of these studies highlight potential challenges to learning at various stages 
or places in the learning system, relatively little theory development systematically investigates the 
learning barriers and mechanisms for overcoming these. Building explicitly on the 4I framework, a 
recent review of the OL literature (Schilling & Kluge, 2009) provided a long list of barriers to learning 
but fell short of integrating these into OL theory (Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011). The effect of such 
barriers on the flows of learning forward and backward through the learning system, and in particular 
how to neutralize them, remains unexplored. Moreover, the often-cited tension between exploration 
and exploitation continues to haunt organizations and OL theory is largely silent on how to reconcile 
these seemingly opposing forces. As noted by Crossan and colleagues (1999: 535) and reiterated by 
Crossan and colleagues (2011), understanding the mechanisms that enhance or restrict the stocks and 
flows of learning and addressing how organizations deal with the tension between exploration and 
exploitation represent two areas in particular need of improvement in order to advance a theory of OL.    
This paper contributes to the further development toward a comprehensive theory of OL by 
integrating insights from behavioral strategy (Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011) pertaining to cognitive 
decision biases and socio-psychological organizational behavior into the 4I framework of OL. The 4I 
framework provides a cogent and dynamic way of analyzing the OL processes, which simultaneously 
pays attention to multiple levels of analysis and the flows of learning (feed-forward and feed-
backwards) between these levels. This framework points to four key processes of organizational 
learning; intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. The tension between new ideas and 
actions (exploration) and what has already been learned (exploitation) is captured by the feed-forward 
and feedback processes in the learning system. We identify five specific behavioral and social 
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processes that constrain the acquisition and transfer of learning and examine how they influence the 
forward and backward learning flows. We also propose two new mechanisms for dealing with these 
barriers in order to open up learning flows.  
First, drawing on cognitive and social psychology pertaining to the role of human biases, 
information processing limitations, and emotional responses (Bargh, 1989; Damasio, 1994; Dorner & 
Schaub, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Hogarth, 1987; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Taylor & 
Fiske, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) we introduce intervening as a mechanism for cognitive 
frame-breaking and reduction of ego defenses at the individual and group level. Prior research has 
discussed the role of interventions to facilitate change and routine braking. For instance, the need for 
conflict (Beech, MacIntosh, MacLean, Shepherd, & Stokes, 2002), changes in top executives (Crossan 
& Berdrow, 2003) and managerial interventions such as crisis creation (Kim, 1998) have been 
identified as potential routes to creating organizational learning. However, these interventions have not 
been systematically integrated into OL theory. We identify and discuss three processes underlying the 
intervening mechanism and their effects on reducing learning barriers; (1) forcing discrepancies; (2) 
challenging of expert knowledge capacity; and (3) promoting dialogue and critical self-reflexivity.  
Second, building on insights from the power and dependence perspective (Emerson, 1962), 
instigating represents the mechanism for ensuring learning is transmitted from individual to group and 
organizational levels. Consistent with Emerson’s (1962) original focus on power in social relations, we 
argue that instigating is the mechanism that alters the power dynamics within the social context of 
organizational learning by empowering organizational actors who hold key resources; i.e. new 
information or capabilities. By changing the power dynamics, a strong barrier (power and politics) at 
the group and organizational level is neutralized and new individual or group learning is allowed to 
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flow into the organization. In this way, instigating serves to shift power dynamics and alleviates 
barriers of power and politics thus facilitating dissemination of learning throughout the organization.  
While the 4I framework deals with organizational learning through the iterative processes of 
intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing, little attention is paid to how individuals 
access new (external) information in order to renew or invigorate the learning process. The theoretical 
model we advance allows for new information to enter the learning system at the individual level and 
subsequently move upwards to the organizational level. Furthermore, by identifying specific barriers to 
feed-forward and feedback learning processes – and designing mechanisms for overcoming these – we 
provide a more nuanced framework for understanding organizational learning as it unfolds over time 
across levels in practice. This helps advance OL theory by explicitly addressing the sources of tension 
between exploration and exploitation and how companies may deal with these (Crossan et al., 1999).  
We begin with a short review of the 4I OL framework (Crossan et al., 1999) upon which we 
build our theoretical model, and examine how information flows into the model. Next, we turn to 
identification of the barriers to learning flows. Finally, we explore two mechanisms designed to 
alleviate the obstructions to learning and discuss contributions to theory and practice.  
THE 4I ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK 
Pattern recognition: Bringing in new information  
Organizational learning is a multilevel, dynamic process that naturally begins with individuals. Crossan 
and colleagues (1999) placed the responsibility for recognizing differences and similarities of patterns 
at the subconscious level of two types of individuals: experts and entrepreneurs. Expert intuition entails 
the recognition of known patterns building from previous experiences. Building from countless similar 
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situations, the expert recognizes a pattern and acts immediately. Conversely, entrepreneurial intuition 
identifies potential novel connections within the patterns which were not previously identified. 
Consequently, entrepreneurial institution has a forward looking orientation (creativity, change, 
exploration) while expert intuition is backward looking (past knowledge, exploitation). Intuition is the 
beginning of learning and within the 4I framework this process is called intuiting (Crossan et al., 1999). 
An important aspect in relation to intuiting, largely left unexplained, is precisely how new 
information enters the OL system. According to Crossan et al. (1999: 526), “intuition is the beginning 
of new learning” and it is the responsibility of the ‘entrepreneurs’ within the organization and their 
entrepreneurial intuition to “make novel connections, perceive new and emergent relationships, and 
discern possibilities that have not been identified previously”. Yet, while some individuals may possess 
such entrepreneurial and creative characteristics, they are more likely the exception rather than the 
norm (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Moreover, intuition in most individuals is imperfect for two key 
reasons: the frequent use of easy to apply heuristics triggers biased judgments (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009; Simon, 1987), and limitations of individual information processing abilities leads to use of 
schematic, automatic information processing (Walsh, 1995; Louis & Sutton, 1991). Paradoxically, both 
heuristics and schematic information processing are not necessarily negative (e.g. can economize 
mental resources) but may lead to crippling errors when acquiring information and making judgments 
of it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Walsh, 1995). As noted by (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) when 
referring to intuition, “there is no subjective marker that distinguishes correct intuitions from intuitions 
that are produced by highly imperfect heuristics”.  
A theory of OL must be grounded in realistic assumptions about human cognition and 
acknowledge the difficulty in recognizing relevant new external stimuli and bringing it into the learning 
system. Cognitive filters leads to new information to the learning system being filtered out and/or 
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difficult to recognize and absorb. The human tendency to use heurists in their intuition and judgments 
biases the information in the learning system. We suggest that intuiting as the beginning of the learning 
system should be anchored in behavioral assumptions about human cognitive limitations and 
mechanisms for overcoming these limitations be developed in order to ensure continuous learning.  
Cognitive mapping: Moving learning from individual to social context 
For learning to move from the individual to the group level, ideas and knowledge must first be 
internalized and made explicit and transferable. This process of interpreting starts at the individual 
level as people try to make sense of and refine their ideas and embed them in the proper cognitive 
context before attempting to relay them to others at the group level. Whereas intuiting operates at the 
subconscious level, interpreting deals with the conscious efforts to make sense of the intuitions, either 
within the one-self, or by transmitting those intuitions into others. Crossan and colleagues (1999) 
stressed the importance of language for interpreting and transmitting ideas or insights to others (feed-
forward). Cognitive maps are used as interpretive mechanisms to help develop individual and group 
understanding of intuition in relation to specific knowledge domains (Huff, 1990). Yet, the feed-
forward process from intuiting to interpreting is fraud with challenges that may affect its effectiveness 
and these barriers are under-examined.  
As learning moves from one individual to groups of individuals, the same human limitation in 
terms of information processing filters and tendencies to use heuristics are likely to affect interpreting 
as well. Information that moves through the scanning filters needs to be interpreted and given meaning 
through the process of sense-making or encoding, and this is a critical point of entry for cognitive 
biases (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 1984). Moreover, emotions are likely to play an 
important role in individual interpretation of information as people actively attempt to shield 
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themselves from information that causes psychological discomfort (Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Seppi, 
2009). This is because new information that conflicts with prior assumptions or beliefs forces 
individuals into unease, anxiety and active rejection of the new painful information (Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2011). At the same time, power and politics arguably influence individual’s motivation and 
ability to process information and interpret and share intuitive insights (Lawrence et al., 2005). 
Consequently, as learning is moving from the individual into the social group context, prior 
experiences and cognitive filters of a larger number of actors come into play, in addition to emotions 
and individual interests in the form of power and politics. 
Shared understanding: Integrating learning organizationally 
As learning moves from group to organizational level the focus shifts to the process of integrating.  
The goal of integrating is to develop a shared organizational understanding or “collective mind” 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993) of a phenomenon or an idea. Crossan et al. (1999) point to language, dialogue 
and storytelling as pivotal processes through which cognitive maps can be translated into group-level 
and ultimately organizationally shared understanding. While individuals learn by interpreting 
information and stimuli via filters based on their individual cognitions, values and experiences 
(Hogarth, 1987; Hodgkinson, 2003; Walsh, 1995), groups learn through interaction and collaboration 
on problem-solving. Research suggests that the process of feeding forward learning between groups 
and beyond may be challenged by administrative and political processes (Lawrence et al., 2005) as well 
as emotions at both individual and group level (Huy, 2011; Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009). While the 4I 
framework acknowledges the difficulties in moving learning from the individual into the group, better 
theory development about the barriers in the process of creating a shared understanding and specially, 
the means to overcome these is needed. 
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Given the power and politics inherent in organizational life (Das & Teng, 1999; Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992), integration of learning via shared understanding may be seriously hampered by 
political agendas and power asymmetries among different groups (Miller, 1994; Lawrence et al., 2005). 
For instance, if the ideas of a group conflict with decisions made previously by others, this might be 
perceived as criticism (Weick, 1995). Moreover, different ‘thought worlds’ or ‘collectives’ who have a 
shared understanding in a domain may render integration difficult. For instance, different departments 
within an organization might find extreme difficulties in sharing ideas with other groups as the 
different sides may see other’s central issues as meaningless or incomprehensive (Dougherty, 1992).  
In addition, emotions may propel individuals to use specific language or metaphors in their 
dialogues and conversations which will unintentionally bias group interpretation and integration of 
knowledge (Barsade, 2002; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Group-focus emotions (e.g. in-group 
support and out-group confrontation) are felt privately by individuals and are linked to social identity 
(Smith et al., 2007). Social identities in groups are influenced by two underlying psychological 
processes: self-categorization and self-enhancement. Self-categorization minimizes in-group 
differences, and maximizes differences with other groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). Self-enhancement relates to the human need of maintaining a positive image of the self in 
relation to others, thus comparisons among group members are made in ways that favor the in-group 
(Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).  
Within a group learning context, this is relevant as individual views that might be perceived as 
violating group norms might be self-marginalized and concealed thus effectively becoming a learning 
barrier for the organization. Between group emotions might also be a learning barrier. For instance, 
groups might decide to not share learning experiences with other groups within the organization if this 
will put them at a disadvantageous position or get insufficient recognition for their insights (Sun & 
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Scott, 2005). Thus, integrating within the 4I framework must address the effects of dominant groups, 
power and emotional responses within and between groups; all of which might bias or block the 
learning process.   
Embedded learning: Institutionalizing into organizational routines 
The final process in the 4I framework as articulated by Crossan and her colleagues (1999: 525) is the 
institutionalizing or embedding of learning into organizational routines (or memory) reflected in 
strategy, structure, procedures, and systems. Institutionalizing is what differentiates individual or group 
learning from organizational learning. As such, group level understanding of business practices are 
rolled out organization-wide in an effort to capitalize or exploit current knowledge in the future. Firms 
seek to design systems that enable such institutionalization for instance by building knowledge 
management systems to formalize information storing and retrieval (Nielsen & Michailova, 2007). 
Similarly, explicit procedures to ensure embeddedness of organizational routines can be established, for 
example in formalized strategic planning process, or in the use of control systems for measuring and 
monitoring organizational functions (Simons, 1994). The feed-forward process of developing such 
routines and ensure their institutionalization may, however, be constrained by several factors such as 
time or resources (Beer & Eisenstat, 2000; Sun & Scott, 2005). Moreover, the process of feeding 
backward institutionalized learning into the intuiting, interpreting or integrating processes is relatively 
under-investigated as are the potential barriers that may obstruct this learning flow. It is unclear, for 
example, how learning that is institutionalized avoids leading to organizational inertia.  
An organizational cognitive structure is formed by three elements; identity, strategic frames and 
organizational routines (Narayanan, Zane & Kemmerer, 2010). Similar to the cognitive filters at the 
individual level, the organizational cognitive structure may hamper organizational learning. Once 
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shared strategic frames or dominant logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995) have been established, 
nonconforming points of views are likely to be discouraged or marginalized, which constraints 
organizational attention and capabilities (Janis & Mann, 1977). For instance, Miller (1994) reported 
how knowledge and suggestions residing within some groups at General Motors regarding small car 
manufacturing or pollution controls were rejected as this information went against entrenched beliefs 
within the dominant coalition of the company. Similarly, because organizational identity implies rules 
for exclusion, some practices, business initiatives or newly proposed avenues for improvement might 
not be allowed within the logic of the organizational identity (Narayanan et al., 2010).  
Additionally, an organization’s past success also reduces organizational attentiveness and 
incentives for looking for alternative ways of doing things (Levinthal & March, 1981). Research has 
shown how past success leads to institutional inertia, decline of information processing and scanning 
(Lant & Hewlin, 2002;  Miller, 1994). In this way, existing organizational cognitive structures and past 
performance are likely to influence learning flows. 
To summarize, the 4I framework is based on four main premises (Crossan et al., 2009); (1) 
organizational learning spans individual, group, and organization levels and is about moving stocks of 
learning forward or backward between these levels; (2) four broad categories of social and 
psychological processes – intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing (4Is) – provide the 
link between these levels; (3) organizational learning is associated with the tension between 
simultaneously exploring new knowledge and exploiting existing knowledge; and (4) cognition plays a 
pivotal role in the learning system as it affects actions and is affected by actions. - 
As the discussion above illustrates, the framework proposed by Crossan et al. (1999) provides 
a strong foundation for understanding the basic processes of OL. Yet, as individual learning feeds 
forward in the OL system, there are numerous barriers that may hinder this process. Similarly, 
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institutionalized learning might prevent an organization’s ability to renew itself by intuiting, 
interpreting and integrating new insights and thus the barriers in the feedback process must be 
identified and dealt with. In the following sections we examine the barriers to OL flows in more detail 
and propose two new enabling mechanisms – intervening and instigating designed specifically to 
overcome these. Figure 1 shows our conceptual model of adaptive organizational learning. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
BARRIERS TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Organizational learning is a dynamic process as evident by the continuous interplay between the feed-
forward process of acquiring new learning and the feedback process of exploiting institutionalized 
learning (Crossan et al., 1999). With an inherent positive focus on dynamic multilevel learning 
advancement, OL theory has neglected to pay adequate attention to potential barriers to learning at each 
level and process. To be sure, the challenges of learning and its movement forward or backward have 
been acknowledged in the literature and specific elements of these, such as power and politics, 
analyzed in more detail (e.g., Crossan et al., 1999; 2011; Lawrence et al., 2005). Yet, despite recent 
attempts (e.g., Schilling & Kluge, 2009), little effort has focused on examining the sources of these 
barriers and integrating them systematically into OL theory (Crossan et al., 2011). This is a critical 
omission in our understanding of the tenets of OL theory as these barriers may at any point in the 
process hinder learning from being acquired or advancing in the learning system.  
Our investigation of barriers to learning builds on behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011) to 
recognize that it is the psychological and social processes of individuals, embedded in groups and 
organizations that potentially obstruct learning flows. Specifically, “behavioral strategy merges 
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cognitive psychology with strategic management theory and practice” (Powell et al., 2011: 1371) and 
thus encompasses both individual level cognitive bases for human behavior as well as group and 
organizational level social processes. Building on these insights, we identify 5 behavioral factors which 
act as barriers to learning flows in organizations.  
Individual cognitive limitations and biases [B1] 
We begin at the individual level where information (new or experiential) is captured through intuiting. 
This intuiting process allows the individual to perceive certain patterns in diverse and disparate data, 
often in an unconscious way. Different people are likely to perceive such patterns differently. Intuition 
is shaped by individual personality as much as by an individual’s prior experiences (Behling & Eckel, 
1991). The view of intuition being determined by personality traits builds on the work of Carl Jung 
who classified human personalities in four dichotomies, sensing-intuition being one of them (Jung, 
1923). Jung defined ‘sensing’ individuals as having a preference for measurable facts while ‘intuitive’ 
individuals prefer hunches, inspiration and insights. Furthermore, research has provided support for 
two types of intuitive judgments; the analytical, and the intuitive or creative (Simon, 1987). As noted 
by Simon (1987: 58), “The primary evidence behind this dichotomy is that the two hemispheres [left 
and right in the human brain] exhibit a division of labor: in right handed people, the right hemisphere 
plays a special role in the recognition of visual patterns, and the left hemisphere in analytical processes 
and the use of language”. Intuitive judgments, however, are also grounded in knowledge and prior 
experiences. Bernard described intuitive judgment as having its source in “…psychological conditions 
or factors, or in the physical and social environment, mostly impressed upon us unconsciously or 
without conscious effort on our part. They also consist of the mass of facts, patterns, concepts, 
techniques, abstractions, and generally what we call formal knowledge or beliefs, which are impressed 
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upon our minds more or less by conscious efforts and study. This second source of non-logical 
[intuitive] mental processes greatly increases with directed experience, study and education…” 
(Bernard, 1938: 302, quoted in Simon, 1987: 58). Consequently, though intuition has a physiological 
dimension in the form of an inclination to intuitive thinking (e.g. experts and entrepreneurs as 
discussed in Crossan et al., 1999), much of this intuition is shaped by prior experiences, beliefs or 
contexts, all of which might be important sources of cognitive biases that may block new information 
from being acquired or from being moved forward in the learning system.  
Intuiting is shaped by prior experiences, beliefs, contexts and cognitive orientation. In 
combination, these  create a mental template or knowledge structure (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) which also 
affects interpreting. The concept of mental template lies at the center of theory driven information 
processing (Walsh, 1995). Information processing modes in individual cognition are seen as a 
continuum between controlled and automatic processes (Bargh, 1989). The controlled process is 
characterized by being effortful and active where information guides individual responses. Meanwhile, 
automatic processes are unintentional, autonomous and influenced by prior knowledge and perceptions 
(Bargh, 1989). The balance between these two processes varies depending on the task at hand 
(Hodgkinson, 2003). Given individual’s limited information processing capabilities and inclination to 
create economic tendencies (Hogarth, 1987), information processing in organizations is typically 
characterized by the dominance of automatic processing (Louis & Sutton, 1991). Importantly, while 
automatic information processing economizes mental resources and allows individuals to process a 
great deal of information, its overreliance can also limit the individual’s understanding of the 
environment by giving way to some problematic actions such as stereotype thinking, inaccurate filling 
of gaps, refusal to abandon cherished hypotheses, and inability to produce creative problem solving 
(Hodgkinson, 2003).  
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Interpretation processes are also subject to biases because individuals are selective rather than 
comprehensive in how they perceive information, and see what is expected to see and consistent with 
previous held beliefs or experiences (Hogarth, 1987). These simplified representations of reality 
(mental templates) become encoded within the mind of the individual, acting as filters through which 
information is processed (Hodgkinson, 2003). Knowledge structures, core beliefs, causal maps and 
schemas are some of the cognitive filters used by individuals (Walsh, 1995) which give meaning to 
environmental changes and in turn are linked to organizational action (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007). 
Therefore, the way individuals act is driven by how they interpret the world, which might be a biased 
or distorted interpretation.  
Extant research points to some of the cognitive biases and information processing limitations of 
individuals within organizational settings, such as categorization of environmental factors in automatic 
and stereotypical ways (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Porac & Thomas, 1990; 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), reliance on obsolete cognitive maps (Hodgkinson, 1997; Hodgkinson & 
Maule, 2002; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Schwenk, 1995), along with the problems that heuristics cause on 
managerial judgments (Bardolet, Fox, & Lovallo, 2011; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Durand, 2003; 
Hodgkinson, Brown, Maule, Glaister, & Pearman, 1999; Kahneman et al., 1982; March & Shapira, 
1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Consequently, interpreting is a critical process where cognitive 
biases may influence learning flows.   
Intuiting and interpreting are potentially hampered by these cognitive biases affecting 
individuals. To begin with, the cognitive filters (e.g. mental frames) used to acquire and interpret 
information might be dated in changing environments. Given the tendency towards automatic 
information processing, intuiting and interpreting are severely diminished, or at best biased towards 
known information. Although ‘entrepreneurs’ might have an inclination to see some of the novel pieces 
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of information and make some new connections, they are also inhibited by their own experiences and 
beliefs. However, even if new information is brought in by ‘entrepreneurial intuition’, this information 
still needs to be shared and interpreted by other individuals that do not necessarily show entrepreneurial 
inclinations. In fact, research has shown that ideas brought forward by innovators are usually resisted 
and their innovative initiatives blocked by other organizational members (Kirton, 1976, 1984).  
In sum, (1) individual mental models will determine which information will receive attention, 
and people are expected to focus their attention on cues that are recognized or offer support to current 
mental models while other important information pointing to changing environments might be ignored 
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982); (2) even if perceived by the process of intuiting, information will 
subsequently be interpreted under the lenses of the current mental models (Dutton & Jackson, 1987); 
and (3) dated mental model will hamper transfer of information and action as potential solutions will be 
analyzed and constrained to the ones that fit the current metal models (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; 
Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). Thus, we propose: 
P1:  Individual cognitive limitations and biases may obstruct the feed-forward learning 
processes of intuiting and interpreting. 
Emotions [B2] 
The strategic management literature has mostly ignored affective and emotional aspects of human 
beings, mainly portraying decision making as a series of sequential, analytical and dispassionate 
activities (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). However, individuals are not only exposed to biases and 
cognitive limitations; emotions also play an important role in individual-level thinking and behavior 
(e.g. Damasio, 1994). Research shows that people actively attempt to shield themselves from 
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information that causes psychological discomfort (Karlsson et al., 2009). In this way, new information 
that conflicts with current assumptions forces individuals into unease, anxiety and active rejection of 
the new painful information (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Further, reaching a decision in face of 
different perspectives and dilemmas is likely to create anxiety for the decision maker. Therefore, 
people tend to avoid active engagement through various responses (fast categorization, procrastination, 
excessive information seeking or hyper vigilance, and reaching a contrived solution) in order to 
eliminate the stress and discomfort of cognitive dissonance (Janis & Mann, 1977) created by the 
uncertainty (McKenzie, Woolf, Winkelen, & Morgan, 2009). Hence, emotions may act as a barrier to 
individual learning by actively blocking or ignoring cues where disconfirming information might 
reside. In this way, emotions affect individual ability to intuit novel patterns or rationalize away un-
corroborating information during the process of interpreting. 
While the influence of emotions on cognition and behavior is well established, the link between 
emotions and higher level outcomes, such as group and organizational learning and renewal, is less 
apparent. Emotions have been linked to organizational change (e.g. Huy, 1999, 2002), but the processes 
through which emotions impact the flow of learning from individuals to groups and beyond are poorly 
understood. As learning moves forward through interpreting, emotions may influence how information 
is being attended to. Learning can provoke emotional responses such as defensiveness, anxiety, fear or 
retrenchment as much as excitement or motivation towards new possibilities (Vince, 2001). However, 
as learning moves from the individual into group, the focus of these emotions is the social context and 
interaction of its members, much in line with the essence of behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011).  
As interpretation involves cognitive efforts to attach meaning to the patterns recognized in the 
earlier stage with the purpose of communicating this to others, collective emotions might surface 
during the interpreting stage. Evidence from social psychology shows that emotions spread among 
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individuals within a group, creating clusters of shared emotions (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Brief & 
Weiss, 2002). Collective emotions are important as these can precipitate either action or inaction (Huy, 
2002; Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005). Moreover, in an organizational context, emotions may run high in 
times of crises (e.g., downsizing) or radical change but the emotions are likely to differ among 
individuals (Barsade, 2002; Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009). As a result, the influence of such 
contextually bound emotions may lead to information being interpreted differently. To the extent that 
emotions are causing certain information to be perceived positively or negatively at the expense of 
other information, it biases the learning process, thus providing a potential barrier to forward learning 
flows.  
Extant research has provided powerful evidence of group-level (collective) emotions and its 
impact on collective behavior (e.g., Smith et al., 2007). Grounded in social identity theory (Turner & 
Oakes, 1986), affiliation and strong identification with a social group may elicit collective, group-focus 
emotions. Consistent with multilevel theory (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000), employees within a social 
group (e.g., team, department, or firm) likely experience emotions that are more similar to other 
individuals within that social group compared to individuals outside that group (e.g., members of 
another team, department, or firm). Organizational identity research points to the shared beliefs and 
culture of an organization that makes up its ‘character’ and often evoke collective emotional responses 
to situations when the organization faces events that may impact the welfare and identity of the 
organization. Such group-level social identities are shaped by self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987) 
as individuals think and act as embodiments of the relevant in-group; thus minimizing in-group 
differences while maximizing inter-group differences. Valuing social group identity can elicit positive 
emotions while devaluing it may arouse negative emotions (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). To this 
end, Huy (2011) showed how social identities among a group of middle managers facilitated aroused 
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emotions that led them to support or covertly dismiss a particular strategic initiative even when their 
immediate personal interests were not involved. Thus, collective emotions play an important role in 
group behavior towards other groups or the organization at large (Barsade, 2002; Mackie et al., 2000).  
The emergence and impact of group-emotions may play a critical role in how learning is 
translated and integrated into a shared understanding at the group and organizational level. For 
instance, Vince (2001) showed how organizations might exhibit severe disruptions to the learning 
process as emotional responses such as envy, mistrust, or personal dislike were tangible across different 
organizational groups. These group emotions blocked effective communication across units creating an 
inefficient learning context dominated by mistrust. Ultimately, communication was avoided and 
separateness was not only justified but also protected. Naturally, integrating learning in such contexts 
is all but impossible. Hence, emotions, either individual or collective, may act as powerful barriers to 
organizational learning, especially in the intuiting, interpreting and integrating learning processes: 
P2: Individual and/or collective emotions may obstruct the feed-forward learning processes of 
intuiting, interpreting and integrating. 
Power and politics [B3] 
The important role that power and politics play in organizations has long been recognized. For 
instance, Pfeffer (1981) provided an overview of the different forms of power in organizations and 
asserted that a critical source of power is the access to and control of critical resources. Organizations 
are political systems (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992) where individuals have an inclination to self-
preservation and consensus building, and where the most powerful group usually determines the final 
decisions (Das & Teng, 1999). In the OL literature, Lawrence and colleagues (2005) referred to power 
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and politics as the ‘social energy’ necessary for promoting learning processes. Recognizing the 
complex role of power and politics, Lawrence et al. (2005:188) stated that “…power and politics are 
not a dysfunctional aspect that needs to be remedied but, rather, are an intrinsic part of the process that 
should be appreciated and understood...” We argue that power and politics may impede learning as 
powerful individuals will tend to allow learning to move upwards in the feed-forward process of 
learning only if it is beneficial to their political agendas and careers. As a result, new learning that goes 
against their interests will be blocked and the learning process will be biased.  
Extant research recognizes the importance of power and politics for organizational learning  
(Blackler & McDonald, 2000; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Fox, 2000; Lawrence et al., 2005). For 
instance, Lawrence and colleagues (2005) explicitly built on the 4I framework and argued for specific 
types of power being more salient during the different processes of OL. Specifically, intuiting is linked 
with discipline, interpreting with influence, integrating with force, and institutionalizing with 
domination. These different types of power will influence the learning flow of the organization by 
deciding which learning flows are restricted or allowed to move on, depending on the political interests 
of different organizational actors. Lawrence and colleagues differentiated between episodic and 
systematic forms of power. Episodic forms, such as influence and domination, are sufficient for 
moving or restricting learning during interpreting and integrating – e.g. by timing the opportune 
moments for exerting these forms of power. Conversely, systematic forms of power - for instance by 
laying out manufacturing plants or designing information systems - are necessary for continuously 
supporting patterns of practice that will affect the OL processes of institutionalizing and intuiting. 
Consequently, organizational learning is affected by different forms of power, some of which are timed 
and episodic, while others are built into systems and routines and thus exert their purposes without the 
constant vigilance of the interested actor(s).  
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Additionally, the influences of the upper echelons of the organization will interfere with 
organizational learning by directing which cues to attend to. Incomplete and inaccurate scanning can be 
the product of top management team (TMT) focus as their attention is with topics they deem most 
relevant while others get selectively ignored (Bogner & Barr, 2000; Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). In other words, TMT attention focus and causal logics act as organizational filters for 
noticing and responding to environmental changes (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). The power of TMT 
members combined with lack of influential skills of lower level employees might prevent the 
opportunity to make sense of a situation by other organizational groups (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). 
Consequently, interpreting will be biased towards the interests of these powerful individuals. 
Similarly, as shown by Siggelkow and Rivkin (2006) the OL process of integrating can be 
affected by political or personal interests. The authors investigated if decentralized exploration at lower 
levels combined with higher level coordination will foster organizational exploration (feed-forward 
learning). It was expected this combination would be fruitful to organizational exploration given the 
proximity of lower level managers to environmental realities and better positioning to see new 
alternatives as compared with the upper echelons. Instead, the authors found organizational exploration 
suffered as lower level manager followed their own interests and blocked exploration in areas that did 
not fit their own goals or interests (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). Proposals against their interests were 
screened out or concealed from senior management. Therefore, more exploration at lower levels can 
actually decrease firm level exploration, illustrating how politics and power may be harmful to the 
integrating process of feeding forward exploratory learning. Moreover, institutionalizing is also greatly 
affected by power and politics as the views of powerful individuals or coalitions will have great impact 
on which (and how) particular learning becomes organizational routines. Hence: 
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P3: Power and politics may obstruct the feed-forward learning processes of interpreting, 
integrating and institutionalizing.   
Organizational cognitive structure [B4] 
The previous three barriers block learning from feeding forward in the learning system. We now turn to 
two factors that may obstruct the feedback learning process after learning has been institutionalized. 
The first barrier is organizational cognitive structure which refers to relatively stable patterns and 
characteristics of organization behavior. Organizational identity, strategic frames and organizational 
routines are the elements that form the structure of strategic cognition in organizations (Narayanan et 
al., 2010). Crossan and colleagues (1999) identified the potential inhibiting effects of institutionalized 
learning on exploratory learning; “This [to allow intuitive insights and actions to surface and be 
pursued] is extremely difficult because the language and logic that form the collective mindset of the 
organization and the resulting investment in assets present a formidable fortress of physical and 
cognitive barriers to change”. However, they referred mainly to “systems, structures and routines” 
(Crossan et al., 1999: 530) as representations of institutionalized organizational learning. Building on 
organizational behavior and strategic cognition, we offer a more nuanced account of institutionalized 
learning and the potential constraining effects on new learning.  
Organizational identity is the organization member’s collective understanding of central and 
relative permanent features of the organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Since identity implies rules 
for exclusion, some practices, business initiatives or newly proposed avenues for improvement might 
not be allowed within the logic of the organizational identity (Narayanan et al., 2010). Consequently, a 
shared identity provides an anchor for organizational meaning construction (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 
2010) and strong organizational identities might result in cognitive inertia (Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger & 
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Palmer, 1996). As noted by Gagliardi (1986), learning is usually restricted by the organization’s efforts 
to preserve its identity. 
Similar to how individual mental frames affect individual learning, organizations also possess 
strategic mental frames which can constrain their ability to learn. Organizational level frames or 
dominant logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995) take time and energy to construct, but once consensus is 
achieved, there is substantial inertia in changing that frame. Dated strategic frames are usually reused 
automatically to interpret current issues or information cues, whether adequate or not (Corner, Kinicki, 
& Keats, 1994). Consequently, once a dominant logic or collective mental frame is established, it 
creates blind spots by providing a framework that dictates the organization’s orientation towards 
change and innovation. This, in turn, increases the chances for incorporating a related or similar 
strategy in the future (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006), while ignoring changes in the 
environmental conditions until those changes are so significant and far-reaching that the organizations’ 
adaptation is seriously undermined. In this way, when ‘groupthink’ (Janis & Mann, 1977) or consensus 
becomes institutionalized, non-conforming views are discouraged or marginalized thus hampering 
learning. 
Organizational routines are repeatable patterns of independent behavior often used to 
accomplish organizational tasks (Feldman, 2000). Routines involve information processing but 
economize on cognition as prevailing strategic frames dominate cognitive processes (Narayanan et al., 
2010). Because organizational routines favor standard operating procedures over systematical analysis 
of alternatives (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), such routines tend to have a constraining effect on 
individual thinking and learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Strategic 
planning is an example of institutionalized learning that often fails to generate new learning or actions 
(Mintzberg, 1978, 1994). Instead, it may lead to strategies that are resistant to change (Janis & Mann, 
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1977). Hence, using routinized processes to exploit prior learning may act as a barrier to explorative 
organizational learning. Consequently, an organization’s identity, its strategic mental frames and 
routines are important factors that might block organizational learning:    
P4: Organizational cognitive structure may obstruct the feedback learning processes of 
intuiting, interpreting, and integrating.   
Past performance [B5] 
Interpretation of an issue is path dependently influenced by prior experience with the issue at hand 
(Martins & Kambil, 1999). Past successful performance can be detrimental to organizational learning, 
because it creates ‘psychological slack’ in managers leading them to overestimate their capabilities and 
create overconfidence in the probability of future success (Milliken & Lant, 1991).  Therefore, firms 
with a history of success may lack the motivation to pursue different strategies. According to Miller 
(1993), firms that have experienced success in the past are more inclined to become one-dimensional 
by focusing for instance on a single goal, strategy or world view. Successful past strategies or actions 
can also create slack resources. This subsequently may hinder an organization’s ability to adapt to 
external environments because slack creates a buffer between the organization and environmental 
changes. Since environmental changes are often seen as temporarily or unimportant, the company does 
not react to them but rather prefers to wait them out (Meyer, 1982; Milliken & Lant, 1991). 
Consequently, past success reduces incentives to look for alternative ways of doing things, thus leading 
to status quo or organizational inertia (Levinthal & March, 1981). Information cues or signals that will 
suggest the need for change will be ignored, information gathering will suffer (Miller, 1994) and 
learning will be transformed into ‘superstitious learning’ where any future good performance will be 
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attributed to any factor management feels inclined to (Levitt & March, 1988). As a result, there is an 
inclination in successful organizations to not change what has worked in the past; to exploit rather than 
explore (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991).  
Hence, past organizational success may hinder intuiting for instance by ignoring potential 
sources of information to better understand the reasons behind environmental changes. Interpreting and 
integrating will also be affected by past performance as the new information, if acquired, will be 
interpreted under the current successful dominant logic. Thus, information that contradicts the current 
strategy will be rationalized as a temporarily fluke that can be waited out. In contrast, bad performance 
is generally supportive of organizational learning and strategic renewal as there is incentive to revise 
the reasons for the failing current strategy (Boeker, 1989; Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992). Thus: 
P5: Past (positive) performance may obstruct the feedback learning processes of intuiting, 
interpreting, and integrating.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 summarizes the barriers and their impact on learning flows across organizational levels. 
In developing these barriers to learning we recognize that organizational learning does not follow a 
natural, uninterrupted flow from the individual to the organization at large; there are many obstacles 
that learning flows might encounter as it moves forward and backward and the barriers we identify are 
not exhaustive (Berthoin-Antal, Lenhardt, & Rosenbrock, 2003; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). For 
instance, Lam (2007) highlights the importance of an individual’s (e.g. a scientist) career structure in 
understanding his or her motivation in firm level R&D collaborative projects with external partners. 
Lack of alignment might disturb the learning flow thus preventing the organization from fully 
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benefiting from the external collaboration. However, rather than presenting a long list of potential 
barriers we have focused on 5 socio-psychological barriers that in our opinion deserve particular 
academic attention. The 5 barriers have been placed along the learning process where we believe their 
effects are most predominant; however, given the complexity and dynamism of organizational learning 
along with the many feedback loops it entails (Crossan et al., 1999, 2011), these barriers may also 
affect other sub-processes of the OL system.  
The first three barriers leverage behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011) to recognize that 
organizational learning is mainly a social interaction process predicated on human behaviors in a social 
context. These three barriers (individual cognitive limitations and biases, emotions, and power and 
politics) affect primarily the feed-forward process of OL. Learning starts at the individual level, and 
our first two learning barriers [B1] and [B2] recognize the limitations of humans in recognizing – 
intuiting - new patters among the many information cues available, and correctly make sense - 
interpreting – of such information. Cognitive limitations and biases [B1] is rooted in past experiences 
and automatic information processing and is operating unconsciously. Emotions [B2], on the other 
hand, represent a conscious process of actively avoiding or hiding information, which also affects 
integrating of understanding throughout the organization. Power and politics [B3] is an important 
barrier that gets more tangible as learning moves from the individual into the group and the 
organization, and finally becomes organizationally embedded via institutionalizing. 
The last two barriers, organizational cognitive structure [B4] and past performance [B5] are 
present in the feedback process of OL. These two barriers represent the effects of institutionalized 
learning on new learning – the tension between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). In line 
with Crossan and colleagues (1999), routines and structures affect new learning; however, 
organizational cognitive structures [B4] are expanded to include identity and strategic frames as further 
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barriers to new learning. Past performance [B5] represents the path dependency of organizational 
success, which may act as deterrent to exploratory learning due to the slack resources it has created, 
and the lack of motivation to change individual and organizational habits and strategies that have 
worked well in the past.   
OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO LEARNING: INTERVENING AND INSTIGATING 
Identifying barriers to learning is important only to the extent that such barriers can be integrated 
meaningfully into a theory of OL and – perhaps more importantly – mechanisms be designed to 
overcome these barriers. As noted earlier, the extant literature has remained curiously silent on how 
specific barriers to learning flows may be surmounted. This section develops two specific processes 
through which firms may seek to avoid or lessen the potential negative effects of the behavioral and 
social barriers identified above.  
Intervening  
Enticing shift in information processing mode. Our starting point is the early stages of the 
learning system where individuals’ effort at recognizing patterns via intuiting and posterior interpreting 
is obstructed by cognitive limitations and biases [B1] as well as emotions [B2]. To reduce these 
barriers we introduce the process of intervening. According to information processing theory (Bargh, 
1989; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Taylor & Fiske, 1978), there are two main information processing modes 
in humans; one being automatic, effortless and influenced by prior knowledge – top down or theory 
driven; the other being controlled – bottom up or reflective. Most organizational tasks are performed 
under automatic processing (Louis & Sutton, 1991), which economizes mental resources but might 
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hinder learning. Intervening acts as mechanism for switching cognitive gears from automatic to 
conscious information-processing; top down shifting in information processing mode.  
By engaging in conscious information-processing, individuals are more likely to notice new 
patterns in the environment and interpret them away from engrained mental schemas and past 
experiences regularly used as interpretation filters. However, switching to a conscious mode implies 
the inclination or motivation to learn. Yet learning, especially if the new learning goes against 
preconceptions, might create anxiety and activate ego defense mechanisms (Brown & Starkey, 2000). 
By the same token, noticing a threat can block learning. If a threat is perceived, managers rely on fewer 
sources of information (Smart & Vertinsky, 1984) and emphasize cues consistent with current, known 
frames. Such behavior, in turn, will propel organizations to cling to known routines thereby causing 
rigidity in strategic responses (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Hence, even if individuals do notice 
discrepant information, they are likely to make sense of (interpreting) it by reverting back to automatic 
information processing when changing to a conscious process is necessary. As noted by Luis and 
Sutton (1991: 71); “cognitive errors occur and problems result not because people rely on cognitive 
structures and engage in automatic processing. Rather, errors occur because people fail to recognize the 
presence of conditions in which they should switch cognitive gears into active thinking”.  
Louis and Sutton (1991:60) identified three conditions under which individuals are likely to 
become consciously engaged. First, experiencing a novel or unusual situation – “something that stands 
out of the ordinary” – is likely to engage the individual into a conscious processing mode. Second, 
switching is provoked by discrepancy – “an unexpected failure, a troublesome situation, a significant 
difference between expectations and reality”. Third, a deliberate initiative is usually a response to an 
external or internal request – “trying something new”, or when people are “explicitly questioned”. 
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Intervening is the process of enticing individuals to actively shift cognitive gears from an 
automatic mode to a conscious mode by creating novel situations, forcing discrepancies, or provoking 
deliberate initiatives. In doing so, individuals are more likely to perceive discrepant information or 
novel information (intuiting) and process it (interpreting) free of filters characteristic of automatic 
information processing. 
Challenging expert knowledge adequacy. In addition to promoting cognitive gear shifting, 
intervening challenges expert knowledge adequacy. As argued earlier, expert intuiting is valid in stable 
environments with clear rules yet not adequate for changing business environments. As the 
organizational circumstances change, mental frames need to be updated accordingly. Recent research 
on schema emergence identified deconstruction of existing schemas as a key step in the formation of 
new schemas (Bingham & Kahl, 2013). By challenging potentially dated individual and organizational 
mental frames new configurations and relationships of the business environment emerge. New 
connections can be made and information cues might be interpreted differently. The overall effect of 
deconstruction is thus the broadening of relationships and categories (Bingham & Kahl, 2013). By 
challenging current frames or schemas, biases such as overconfidence or extreme commitment to 
current strategies might be reduced. Since individual mental frames affect intuiting and interpreting, 
challenging these frames enhances organizational learning.   
Promoting dialogue and critical self-reflexivity. Strategic adaptation requires the critical self-
assessment of an organization’s core premises, which is captured by its identity (Hurst, Rush, & White, 
1989). However, such self-assessment is stalled by inclinations to maintain individual and collective 
self-esteem by not questioning prevailing self-concepts. Ego defenses protect self-concepts and 
learning is not a motivation as it might entail anxiety provoking identity change. Information that 
224
threatens individual or collective identity is often marginalized, ignored or even concealed. Therefore, 
organizational learning must prepare individuals to challenge the group or organization’s identity. 
Thus, the understanding and mitigation of ego defenses through the promotion of dialogue and critical 
self-reflexivity enables organizational learning (Brown & Starkey, 2000). This can be facilitated in an 
organization with a culture of dialogue as this helps people share their anxieties in an environment 
where it is acceptable to express doubts. In this way, doubts become a catalyst for learning. In a culture 
that promotes dialogue, reflexivity and learning, questioning beliefs and updating mental frames is 
more likely; thus improving the learning processes of interpreting and integrating.  
In sum, the process of intervening mainly counters individual cognitive limitations and biases 
[B1] and emotions [B2] associated with the feed-forward learning processes of intuiting, interpreting 
and integrating. It does so by (1)  enticing cognitive gear shifting towards a controlled mode in relation 
to information processing, (2) challenging expert knowledge capacity, and (3) promoting dialogue and 
critical self-reflexivity:    
P6: Intervening helps alleviate the negative effects of [B1] individual cognitive limitations and 
biases and [B2] emotions on the feed-forward learning processes of intuiting, interpreting and 
integrating by (1) enticing shifting towards controlled information processing mode, (2) 
challenging expert knowledge adequacy, and (3) promoting dialogue and critical self-
reflexivity. 
Instigating  
Intervening has limited capacity to move learning forward to the organization level because power and 
politics [3B] act as a powerful barrier to learning. We agree with Lawrence and colleagues (2005) that 
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power and politics are “an intrinsic part of the [learning] process that should be appreciated and 
understood..”. To this notion, we add that it must also be managed in order to facilitate organizational 
learning. If power and politics are not addressed, powerful individuals may allow learning to move 
upwards only if beneficial to their careers or political interests. Ultimately, organizational learning 
becomes a truncated or biased exercise. Instigating addresses this learning barrier and thus allows 
learning to move from the individual level to the group and the organization at large. Consequently, 
instigating is directed mainly at the processes of integrating and institutionalizing within the 4I 
learning framework.     
 Theoretically, instigating builds on sociology. Specifically, we draw from Emerson’s (1962) 
seminal paper on power dependence relations. Emerson’s bargaining power and dependence 
perspective has been generalized to the organizational level (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and applied to 
inter-organization learning (Harrigan & Newman, 1990; Holmqvist, 2004). In line with the essence of 
bargaining power and dependence (Emerson, 1962), we apply power dependence relations to the social 
setting inside the organization. In bringing the level of analysis within the organization, we also remain 
true to our overall intention to insert human behavior and social dynamics (behavioral strategy) into a 
framework for organizational learning. 
 According to Emerson (1962: 32), power to control or influence the other resides in control 
over the things the other party value; that is: “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency”. By 
recognizing the reciprocity in social relations in general and specifically inside an organization, a 
power – dependence relationship among organizational actors hinges on the dependency of the actors 
over the resources possessed by other actors, and in the actors’ ability to shift those power relations 
through balancing operations. Emerson (1962:34) defined balancing operations as “structural changes 
in power-dependence relations which tend to reduce power advantage”. Emerson identified four types 
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of balancing operations which are dominant in social relations. Specifically, a power structure can be 
altered by 1) motivational withdrawal of the weak party, (2) extension of power network by cultivation 
of alternative social relations, (3) giving status to highly valued members, and (4) coalition or group 
formation. In the first balancing operation, weaker actors will move away from social relationships 
which are unbalanced to their disadvantage. In the second, the extension of a power network reduces 
the power of stronger actors. In the third balancing operation, giving status to highly valued members 
increases this member’s power to control formerly more powerful members. The last balancing 
operation increases the power of weak actors through collective actions. 
For the purposes of altering the power balance of parties that might block information within 
the context of organizational learning, we focus on the third balancing operation – giving status and 
formal authority to valued members. In our learning context, valued members are the ones with a 
powerful resource: new information, insights, or knowledge. Such new information or learning might 
upset powerful individuals which hold authority and power and, given the unbalanced power structure 
of organizational life, learning will be blocked from moving forward. Consistent with the first of 
Emerson’s (1962) balancing operation, the (less powerful) members with the valuable information will 
eventually withdraw their motivational investment from the group or organization; for instance by 
losing interest in pursuing further exploratory learning. Instead, these members might comply with the 
status quo or become frustrated and eventually leave the organization. Under these conditions of social 
interaction, exploration of new possibilities that go against the status quo or interest of powerful 
individuals is severely reduced, challenging the learning processes of integrating and institutionalizing.  
Instigating is a power balancing mechanism where formal authority is given to an individual or 
organizational group with the mandate to explore and challenge strategic frames and organizational 
identity – i.e. to instigate or activate exploration at the organizational level. An individual or group 
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alone cannot explore on behalf of an organization; however, this individual or group has the formal 
authority to serve as a central repository of new learning and initiatives; i.e. knowledge brokers 
(Hargadon, 2002). This formal authority (e.g. by the board of directors creating a team dedicated to 
exploration) or status (e.g. making the leader of such team a VP) is consistent with balancing operation 
three in Emerson’s (1962) framework.  Furthermore, this individual or group has the mandate to put 
forward initiatives, connect with the necessary parties wherever they may reside within or outside the 
organization, and follow up on initiatives while challenging current strategy or identity. Consequently, 
an organizational actor with a valuable resource – exploratory learning – is given the formal authority 
and power to counterbalance powerful individuals who might oppose new initiatives. Importantly, this 
actor (or group of actors) does not belong or report to a specific part of the organization but is acting 
independently as instigator of initiatives:  
P7: Instigating helps alleviate the negative effects of [B3] power and politics mainly on the 
feed-forward learning processes of integrating and institutionalizing by balancing power by 
giving status and formal authority to valued knowledge brokers. 
Intervening and instigating are in line with the spirit of continuous change as opposed to 
episodic change (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Both intervening and instigating are institutionalized 
processes for exploration and attention to the future. Episodic interventions, such as changes in top 
executives, contain most of the mechanisms argued for, such as switching to conscious information 
processing, change in mental frames, and power to execute. Consequently, these interventions might 
create organizational learning (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). However, in the absence of a continuous 
process, a new equilibrium will be reached and inertia will set forth once again (Weick & Quinn, 
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1999). Consequently, an episodic intervention is not the type of intervention that will institutionalize 
exploratory learning. By acting in a continuous fashion, intervening and instigating in time reduce the 
potentially constraining effects on the feedback process of OL. For instance, despite ongoing success 
and good performance, inattention to the external environment does not become common practice. 
Similarly, strategic frames and organizational identity can be challenged at any time in order to support 
constant learning. Thus, with time, we expect intervening and instigating to overcome [B4] and [B5] 
learning barriers in the feedback process of learning as well: 
P8: Over time, intervening and instigating will combine to alleviate the negative effects of [B4] 
organizational cognitive structures and [B5] past performance on the feedback learning 
processes. 
Table 2 presents the main mechanisms and effects of intervening and instigating. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have integrated behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011) into the 4I organizational 
learning (OL) framework (Crossan et al., 1999) in order to investigate how individual cognitive 
decision biases and socio-psychological organizational processes may influence the flow of learning 
within organizations. We began with the premise that organizational learning starts at the individual 
level – and thus is hampered by individual limitations such as human biases, information processing 
limitations, and emotional responses. Next, we emphasized that learning is mainly a social interaction 
process, and as such potentially hindered by various socio-psychological obstacles. Taking this view 
allowed us to incorporate assumptions about human limitations and social behaviors that might present 
229
powerful barriers to learning flows as learning moves from the individual to the groups and beyond. As 
such, this study presents the first attempt to systematically integrate behavioral barriers into the 4I 
learning framework (Crossan et al., 2009).  
The first three barriers affect the feed-forward process of OL. Our study investigates how 
individual cognitive limitations and biases, as well as emotions, affect primarily the sub processes of 
intuiting and interpreting. Specifically, information entering the learning system is severely influenced 
by individual heuristics, schematic and automatic information processing. Automated and schematic 
information processing acts as a filter to allow only certain types of environmental cues to be attended 
to and thus brought into the learning system and moved forward to the group level. For instance, 
scanning, one of the first steps in organizational learning (Daft & Weick, 1984; Flores, Zheng, Rau, & 
Thomas, 2012; Walsh & Ungson, 1991) can be detrimental for changing perceptions because of 
individual information processing limitations and biases. As noted by Dorner and Schaub (1994), most 
information collection mistakes are due to preformed images of reality as people are not prepared to 
look at the whole range of information but only at what is considered important from the point of view 
of their preconceived image of reality. For instance, dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) stresses the 
individual preference for confirming rather than dissonant information to previous decisions, 
experiences or beliefs. Therefore, individuals are selective (biased) rather than comprehensive in how 
they perceive information (Hogarth, 1987).  
By the same token, emotional responses play a crucial role in making sense of environmental 
information and sharing it with others within the organization. For instance, as people actively attempt 
to shield themselves from information that causes psychological discomfort (Karlsson et al., 2009), 
individuals might actively block or ignore cues where important, yet disconfirming information might 
reside. By shrinking the “pool” of information, intuiting is affected. Similarly, individuals might 
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rationalize away un-corroborating information, if, for example new information contradicts the 
rationale for prior decisions made. Under such a scenario, personal feelings towards “pet projects” may 
affect the process of interpreting. Moreover, emotional responses are also present at group level 
(Barsade, 2002; Mackie et al., 2000). Emotional responses in groups may lead a group to support or 
covertly dismiss a particular strategic initiative even when personal interests are not involved (Huy, 
2011). Consequently, emotions also affect the process of integrating.  
Power and politics affect interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. In line with Lawrence 
and colleagues (2005) we acknowledge the pivotal role of power and politics in organizational 
learning. However, our view towards this potential barrier is more negative as learning flows are likely 
to be allowed forward in the organization only if it is beneficial to the political interests (e.g. 
promotions, removing rivals) of powerful individuals or groups along the learning system. This may 
bias or block organizational learning. Our study also highlighted potential leaning barriers on the 
feedback process of OL, for instance in relation to organizational identity, and inattention to learning 
due to successful past performance and build-up of slack resources. Hence, by integrating an important 
leaning model (4I) with realistic assumptions of human and social interaction, we present a more 
complete and realistic account of the difficult journey of organizational learning. In absence of these 
assumptions, learning models are interesting theoretical desk exercises, but difficult to integrate with 
real life to guide management practitioners.  
Yet, integrating learning theory with behavioral assumptions is important only to the extend 
mechanisms to correct these limitations are investigated. Consequently, we have proposed two new 
processes – intervening and instigating - for dealing with the five barriers to organizational learning. 
Drawing on insights from information processing and social psychology, we introduced three main 
mechanisms through which intervening enables learning at the individual level to enter the learning 
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system; (1) enticing shifting towards controlled information processing mode; (2) challenging of expert 
knowledge capacity; and (3) promoting dialogue and critical self-reflexivity. Through these 
mechanisms, intervening helps advance organizational learning by overcoming the barriers of 
individual cognitive limitations and biases, as well as emotions.  
Instigating is designed to address the learning barrier of power and politics in particular. 
Drawing on Emerson’s (1967) concept of power dependence relations in social contexts, instigating is 
a process that alters the balance of power within the organization by giving formal authority to 
individuals or groups with a valuable resource – new information or capabilities. This shifting of power 
neutralizes powerful individuals or coalitions who might be inclined to block new learning and 
possibilities due to their preference for status quo and exploitation of learning. In this way, instigating 
reduces the potential feed forward barrier of power and politics associated mainly with integrating and 
institutionalizing.  
In combination, intervening and instigating allow new learning to enter the organization at the 
individual level, and subsequently flow forward to groups and the organization at large. By extending 
the original 4I framework to encompass these two new processes, we address the challenges that 
individual limitations and social interaction exert over organizational learning. The resulting theoretical 
model advances learning theory and practice by providing insights into how organizations may manage 
the tension between exploitation of learning and exploration of new possibilities. According to March 
(1991) both exploration and exploitation compete for scarce resources, and firms are forced to make 
tradeoffs decisions between them. The differences in payoffs, time horizons and uncertainties are 
usually resolved by leaning towards the payoff certainty and faster feedback of exploitation, thus 
driving out exploration. While the literature on ambidexterity emphasizes the critical role of strategy, 
structure and leadership in balancing exploration and exploitation (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
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O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004), the underlying behavioral mechanisms driving the choice between 
exploration and exploitation are largely ignored (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2013). By integrating behavioral strategy into the 4I OL framework and identifying five learning 
barriers rooted in individual cognitive limitations and social behaviors, we have given a behavioral 
account of why exploration might be driven out in many organizations. In addition, we have suggested 
two new processes which may help balance the interface between exploration and exploitation. As 
such, our explicit focus on barriers and enablers to learning flows contribute to OL theory by exposing 
the critical role of individual cognition and behavior in social settings that drive organizational 
learning.  
IMPLICATION FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
The utility of OL theory rests on its ability to provide management with practical guidelines for 
enhancing learning flows and managing the tension between exploitation and exploration. Our theory 
extension raises a key question concerning the implementation of the two enabling processes of 
intervening and instigating. To this end, we suggest scenario planning (SP) activities may act as 
catalyst for increasing individual and organizational awareness of barriers to learning flows and ways 
to overcome these. 
SP  is a highly participative approach that uses multiple plausible futures (scenarios) to 
challenge individual and organizational mental frames (Schoemaker, 1993; van der Heijden, 2005; 
Wack, 1985). In doing so, SP activities compel organizational actors to engage in conscious 
information processing in order to relax their conventional frames of reference. Specifically, scenarios 
achieve mental changes by reducing biases such as overconfidence, anchoring or availability through 
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exploiting the conjunction fallacy bias, or inclination to believe that a combination of events is more 
likely than a single one. In this way, scenarios exploit biases in human cognition as mechanisms to help 
individuals learn through a deeper appreciation of the factors that could shape the future (Schoemaker, 
1995). Essentially, SP works under the assumption that the future will not be constant or similar to the 
current business environment; therefore scenarios are designed to question the deepest assumptions 
about an organization’s strategy and identity. Hence, SP can be an organizational aid for both drawing 
attention to behavioral barriers to learning flows and intervening to overcome these. 
Although potentially effective, SP is not without its limitations. For instance, its effects in 
disabling emotional barriers to learning are not clear. Building scenarios can be viewed as playing 
experimental yet sophisticated games; and playing games may create ‘transitional objects’ that serve to 
diminish and control anxiety (Winnicott, 1974). For instance, Wack’s (1985) detailed account of an SP 
intervention showed how fear created by the scenarios served as a powerful device for learning. On the 
other hand Hodgkinson & Wright (2002) presented a scenario intervention where the stress and anxiety 
generated by the different scenarios interrupted the learning process. Consequently, given the limited 
and mixed empirical evidence, the role of SP activities in organizational learning is poorly understood 
and in need of further research.   
We have also brought attention to the role of instigating as a key process to allow exploratory 
learning to move to the group and organizational level. We argued that instigating generates the 
necessary shifts in power to counterbalance the learning barrier of power and politics created by 
powerful individuals blocking feed forward learning. Within the SP context, intervening will challenge 
long held assumptions and strategies which might bruise some egos along the way. This puts a 
premium on the composition, design and reporting structure of the SP team in order to ensure its 
effectiveness. The literature traditionally argues that the scenario team should be anchored at the 
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executive level (Goodwin & Wright, 2001; van der Heijden, 2005). Yet, if some of the learning from 
the scenario team challenges the views of powerful individuals at the top, this learning may be blocked 
or its importance relegated. This suggests that a direct reporting line to the board of directors might be 
a better way to generate the necessary balance in power. Given the potential importance of the 
scenarios for moving learning forward from individuals to the group and organization at large, the 
scenario team must have the necessary autonomy and power to challenge mind-sets and change 
cognitive frames. Future research should investigate how scenario team composition and power may 
influence learning flows (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008).
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CONCLUSION  
This research has addressed the need for more theoretically grounded and systematic 
empirical research into scenario planning (Burt and Chermack, 2008; Hodgkinson and 
Healey, 2008). More broadly, it has contributed to the organizational learning and 
ambidexterity literatures by empirically and theoretically investigating the mechanisms that 
might enhance or restrict flows of learning and by showing some of the individual actions and 
decision that balance exploration and exploitation. Figure 2 presents the main findings and 
contributions of this PhD project as whole, and the individual contributions of the four papers 
contained in this project.  
Figure 2 
PhD project. Main objectives and findings 
P1
• Integrative review, framework and debate 
areas (DA)
Paper Objectives Findings
• DA1: Prowess of scenarios as cognitive devices
• DA2: Embeddedness of SP and influences 
• DA3: SP team, composition, function and position
• DA4: SP transfer flows into the organization level
P2
DA2
DA4
• Theoretical grounding of SP 
• Investigate mechanisms that might 
enhance or restrict flow of learning
• SP acts as learning system
• Cognitive and socio-psychological barriers identified  along 
learning system
P3
DA2
• Investigate individual  actions and 
decision underpinning ambidexterity
• Investigate ambidextrous design at NZ
• SP integrating mechanism
• Ambidextrous design is dynamic
• Important role of middle managers
• Important role of internal and external networks
P4
DA 2
DA3
DA 4
• Integrate behavioral strategy with  4I 
organizational learning framework
• 5 behavioral and social barriers discussed and integrated into 
the 4I framework 
• 2 new mechanisms proposed to  open up learning flows
Thesis • Effects of SP on organizational learning
• SP is influenced by various behavioral and social influences
• Proposed 2 new mechanisms that might enhance effectiveness 
of SP and  organizational learning in general
• SP applications  different as proposed – integrating mechanism
• Theoretical and empirical work strengthening SP, organizational 
learning and ambidexterity literatures
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The main objective of this thesis was to investigate the effects of scenario planning 
on organizational learning. Taken together, the findings presented along this project show that 
the intended, utopian learning outcomes of scenario planning – e.g. exploration of new 
possibilities - may never materialize as various barriers might block or bias potential learning 
benefits. To be certain, scenario planning was found to generate exploratory learning in some 
isolated instances but broadly speaking, due to various behavioral and organizational 
influences, the process rarely translated into exploratory learning at the organizational level. 
Rather, scenario planning was found to serve as an integrating mechanism used for fine 
tuning exploitative efforts. 
By theorizing scenario planning as a learning system, this research provides a solid 
theoretical foundation to empirically explore the effects of scenario planning in organizations. 
By the same token, by showing different barriers that potentially constrain the learning 
generated by scenario planning, organizations should better prepared in designing processes 
that could sidestep or overcome these learning barriers. Importantly, by presenting two 
potential mechanisms that could alleviate these learning barriers, this project sets the stage for 
further research by academics and practitioners alike investigating – theoretically or 
empirically – or designing potential mechanisms and organizational processes better prepared 
at overcoming the various learning barriers. For instance, in the 4I framework (Crossan and 
colleagues, 1999) is not evident how new learning enters the learning system. The intervening 
mechanism presented in paper 4 contains three underlying processes that might shed some 
light and ideas about how to facilitate new learning into the system. Similarly, the scenario 
planning literature rarely addresses the ideas presented surrounding the instigating 
mechanism. In the absence of appropriate actions for shifting power dynamics, scenario 
planning in particular, and organizational learning processes in general are at great risk of 
becoming biased exercises.  
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This research also highlights the potential value of shifting the level of analysis in 
organizational processes from “organizational levels” – e.g. individual, group or organization 
- into “hierarchical levels” – e.g. analysis, managers, directors, executives and so on. The 
findings indicate that upward flow or learning is not so much about traversing individual or 
group levels, but rather about negotiating the hierarchies of the individuals interacting in the 
social context of the organizational. Hence, conceptualizing the flow of learning as a 
progression across hierarchies rather than broader organizational levels might provide 
interesting conceptual lenses. Similarly, it opens up interesting areas for further research. For 
instance, examining individual-level differences across hierarchical levels may advance our 
understanding of the various factors influencing learning flows.  
The main proposition of this project was presented in the earlier chapters of this 
dissertation, namely: “whether scenario planning in organizations might seek exploratory 
learning, a combination of poorly designed processes and a variety of learning barriers at 
various levels renders organizational outcomes that have little to do with exploration”. This 
main proposition was born from a combination of practical experiences and a dedicated 
literature review. For instance, while attending classes on the topic of scenario planning at a 
renowned international university, I could not get answers or a basic understanding of what 
mechanisms were underpinning the process. I got the commercial rhetoric, but I could not get 
under the hood. This was disappointing as I was in no position to design a process around 
scenario planning and bring it home to my own organization. I was confused. This experience 
was followed by many months of an extensive review of the scenario planning literature. As 
pointed in paper 1, the reader in this literature is likely to be either misguided, or frustrated by 
a similar review exercise. Under these conditions, I had many doubts that a manager at a 
given organization will have the necessary elements to guide her or him in the design of a 
scenario planning process. The second part of proposition – e.g. about learning barriers - 
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comes from my various years of experience working at organizations. The lack of factual 
evidence and simplicity of the histories described in the scenario planning literature where in 
direct conflict to what I had experienced for many working at four different organizations in 
three different continents – e.g. there are various individual and organizational barriers or 
realities that block learning and subsequent action.  
The various findings and discussions along the four papers provide support to the 
main proposition in this thesis. For instance, paper 3 reveals the coexistence of two scenario 
processes in the focal company. Similarly, the views of various participants in the scenario 
process presented in paper 2 are quite dark in regards to its purpose and outcomes. Both of 
these findings point out to confusion and doubts about the scenario planning process at this 
organization. Importantly, various individual and social barriers are identified, which 
generally nullified the exploratory learning of this process and subverted it into an 
exploitative outcome. This provides further support to the overarching proposition. 
These findings are indeed worrisome for managers and businesses. At Novozymes, 
transforming an exploratory process into exploitation works fine as the company has many 
other redundancies to explore and adapt. The company makes an exceptional effort in this 
regards, as discussed in Paper 3. But not all organizations are like Novozymes. Generalizing 
out of a single case study is difficult, but if the reader bears with me for a minute, I will argue 
that if an organization like this - so devoted to learning and exploring - can subvert an 
explorative process into exploitation, it is not a stretch to expect the same out of other 
organizations. In the event this proves to be the case, it can be argued that scenario planning 
has the potential to veer organizations towards exploitation, inadvertently reinforcing current 
strategies. On any event, this warrants further research. 
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